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Chapter One  
INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 1.1
In much of the Western world, the common image of Chinese television is often one of 
tradition, seriousness, and political control. That may have been the case before the turn 
of the century; however, with the diffusion of economic reforms into the media domain, 
Chinese television has been used to promote economic modernisation, and the state’s 
ideology has become ‘de-emphasized’ (Lee 1990). Since China entered into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, broadcasting in the nation has become relatively 
more liberalised—both in terms of organisation and of programming—introducing new 
TV channels with more Western-style entertainment including reality television shows.   
In 2008, the Shanghai Entertainment Channel started to air a new type of TV 
programme: a reality television mediation show called Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, 
hereafter XLNJ; literal meaning: New Elder Uncle
1
). The show quickly became very 
popular in Shanghai and its surrounding areas. According to the China Television Annual 
Book (Wang 2010,451), it was ranked 17 out of the Year 2009 Top 30 most popular 
programmes in Shanghai, achieving on average 8.2 percent audience ratings (about 1.81 
million people) and 27 percent market share2. At the time, it was unprecedented and 
innovative to show people’s mediation on TV, which made the show a unique television 
genre. On the show, people who have a dispute were invited to talk about their 
contentious issues, and these are then discussed live and ideally solved with the help of a 
mediator—usually a judge, a lawyer, or a People’s Mediator, who has good knowledge of 
                                                          
1 In the Chinese context, the term Niangjiu refers specifically to a maternal uncle. 
2 Audience rating indicates the percentage of the sample watching a particular programme or channel out of the 
total market population. In contrast, market share refers to the percentage of persons or households tuned to a 
channel or a programme at a given time period out of the total number of persons watching television at that 
time period. According to the official census, the permanent population of Shanghai in 2009 stood at 22.103 
million (see Shanghai Statistics Bureau 2014) 
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civil laws and/or relevant regulations and policies. The show soon established the 
reputation of helping ordinary citizens to solve their common issues.  
In the wake of the success of the XLNJ show, mediation shows have proliferated 
on other television stations, especially in 2010 when the China’s Supreme People’s Court 
officially promulgated the People's Mediation Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Tiaojie Fa), which provided legal backing to mediation 
and attempted to bring social organisations—such as mediation committees or 
neighbourhood committees—into play at an early stage to ease conflicts and tensions and 
prevent the deterioration of disputes. Similar popular types of programmes—sometimes 
also labelled as problem-solving or life-counselling programmes (bangmang lei jiemu)3—can 
be found in other cities and provinces; for instance, True Feelings Mediation (Zhenqing 
Tiaojie) in Qingdao, The Third Mediation Court (Di San Tiaojie Shi) in Beijing, Golden 
Medal Mediation (Jinpai Tiaojie) in Jiangxi, Qiantang Elder Uncle (Qiantang Lao Niang Jiu) 
in Zhejiang, and Help You Till the End (Yi Bang Daodi) in Shandong. By 2012, there were 
47 television mediation shows being broadcast daily or weekly by 40 local television 
stations and 7 provincial satellite networks (see Appendix 1 for a list of mediation shows 
in China up to 2012)
4
. These mediation shows have found a niche, not only by achieving 
high audience ratings, but also by responding to the then Hu-Wen government’s demands 
for establishing and maintaining a ‘harmonious society’.  
Being the first mediation show endorsed by the local justice bureau, Xin Lao 
NiangJiu is seen by the local government as an important tool for promoting people’s 
mediation and social harmony (Li 2010b). The propaganda department organised several 
seminars during which officials discussed the social influence of the show with television 
makers, sociology professors, and other scholars (see Chapter Five). It turned out that 
issues solved on TV mediation often involve disputes related to the distribution of real 
estate property, financial issues, and in-family relations (including parent-child, siblings, 
                                                          
3 In some audience rating reports, Chinese television practitioners categorise mediation shows and other shows 
providing solutions to citizens’ issues in life into a broad category called problem-solving or life-counselling 
programmes. In this dissertation, problem-solving programmes and life-counselling programmes are 
interchangeable.  
4 Based on the analysis report of Feng (2011), I update the total number by including 6 more programmes. 
These programmes are selected from two general categories: Specialised programmes (专题类节目) and Life 
service shows (生活服务类节目). All programmes that mediated/solved disputes are included.   
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and in-law relations). On the show, mediators often adopt a mixed approach of empathic 
listening, moral persuasions, and basic knowledge of regulations and policies. A specific 
example from Xin LaoNiangJiu can provide a better understanding of the show. 
 Example Case: A Battle of Conscience  1.2
Eighty-year-old Ms Zhang lives alone on her minimal pension in a one-bedroom flat in 
Shanghai
5
. Under the financial pressure of her increasing medical costs, Ms Zhang plans 
to sell her flat, but her step-granddaughter—who is officially registered as living in the 
same place but actually lives outside Shanghai in Jiaxing (in Zhejiang Province)—refuses 
to sign the transfer agreement. Ms Zhang therefore cannot sell the property, because 
Chinese law requires that cohabitants must consent to the selling of the flat. Out of 
helplessness, Ms Zhang turns to the mediation TV show XLNJ. The reputable mediator 
Bai Wanqing invites the mother of her step-granddaughter, Ms Yang, to come to 
Shanghai for a mediation on TV. 
On the show, Ms Zhang and Ms Yang sit on the couch in the studio facing each 
other. With the guidance of the show host, they recount their story, which is a 
complicated one: Ms Zhang was the first wife of her husband, Mr Yang, with whom she 
had no children. Mr Yang and his second wife had a daughter, who is Ms Yang. In the 
1950s, Mr Yang and his second wife moved from Shanghai and settled in Jiaxing, leaving 
their daughter to live with her stepmother, Ms Zhang, in Shanghai. In 1969, during the 
Cultural Revolution, Ms Yang moved to settle down in Jiaxing and married a local worker, 
with whom she had a daughter, who is the aforementioned step-granddaughter. In 1979, 
the Shanghai government launched a resettlement policy allowing the children of 
sent-down youths to return to Shanghai. Mr Yang then decided to settle his 
granddaughter’s hukou (residence registration)
6
 at Ms Zhang’s home. Therefore, it 
                                                          
5 This case was broadcast on December 5, 2009, titled ‘She is not my granddaughter’. The story was also 
narrated and published on Xinmin Evening News (新民晚报), October 19, 2010. The Chinese version can be 
accessed online via the link: http://www.news365.com.cn/wxpd/bhygb/ygb/201010/t20101020_2856418.htm 
[Accessed on January 28, 2015]. This case was one typical dispute that manifests the complex situation where 
interpersonal relations are intertwined with legal regulations (see Hawes and Kong, 2013 & 2014).  
6 Hukou is a record in China’s household registration system, and it is required by law in mainland China. Hukou 




became the current situation that Ms Zhang and her step-granddaughter are in theory 
cohabitants, while in fact Ms Yang lives somewhere else. 
Now, Ms Zhang claims that Ms Yang’s migration to Jiaxing was voluntary, to 
follow her birth parents, so that she should not be categorised as a sent-down youth, and 
therefore, the step-granddaughter should not have benefited from the resettlement policy.  
Ms Zhang says that her ex-husband, Mr Yang, moved the step-granddaughter’s hukou to 
Shanghai without informing her first, and she had been kept from the truth until Mr 
Yang’s death a couple of years before. Based on this argument, Ms Zhang claims that she 
should have the full ownership of the property because her step-granddaughter’s hukou is 
invalid. As a result, she should be able to sell the property without the 
step-granddaughter’s consent.    
After the story is made clear, the mediator, Bai Wanqing—known as Aunty Bai (Bai 
Ayi), a retired government official who is known for her sharp-tongued style—begins her 
mediation between the two parties. Firstly, she tells Ms Zhang that the legitimacy of her 
step-granddaughter’s residence status is beyond doubt. Bai points out that Ms Yang’s 
migration in 1969 should be considered as part of the sent-down educated youth 
movement, even if she moved from Shanghai voluntarily. She believes that the spirit of 
the Shanghai government’s resettlement policy was to allow all children of sent-down 
youth
7
 to return to their parents’ home city. The government would not have processed 
the step-granddaughter’s residence application at the time, if her mother had not been 
considered a sent-down youth. Besides, according to the regulation that was in force at 
the time, the step-granddaughter’s hukou can be registered in Shanghai as long as the 
homeowner—who was Mr Yang at that time—has given permission. Therefore, Mr Yang 
registering his granddaughter’s residence was a legally recognised act, satisfying the law. 
After hearing all of these facts, Ms Zhang admits that her step-granddaughter not only 
                                                          
spouse, and date of birth. Respondents were asked in which place their hukou is registered, and what type it is, i.e. 
rural or urban. 
7 Sent-down youth, also known as zhiqing (知青), were the young educated people who left urban cities to settle 
in rural areas against their will, living and working as local peasants. It was part of the ‘Up to the mountains and 
down to the countryside movement’ (上山下乡运动) during the period from the beginning of the 1960s to the 
end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. See a more detailed account in Chapter Two.    
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has a valid hukou but also the legal right to ultimately inherit the flat. Of course, she must 
get her step-granddaughter’s consent before selling the property. 
After Bai has clarified the issue of legal ownership to both disputing parties as well 
as the audience, she proceeds to deal with the distribution of the flat. This proves to be a 
difficult dilemma in terms of ‘conscience’. On the one hand, Ms Zhang is a poor elderly 
lady suffering from a severe disease. Her demand to sell the flat and split the proceeds is 
reasonable and understandable; she needs money to cover her living and medical costs. 
On the other hand, Ms Yang’s financial circumstances are not better, since both Ms Yang 
and her husband had been laid off in the 1990s. Therefore, it is not wrong for Ms Yang to 
insist on keeping the flat, because her daughter will inherit it after Ms Zhang passes away. 
Both parties can be considered to belong to the ‘socially disadvantaged groups’ (shehui 
ruoshi qunti).8 Taking either party’s side would certainly hurt the other.  
Being aware of the moral dilemma, Bai tells Ms Yang that she has legal rights to 
either sell the flat or keep it, but it would morally be more appreciated to agree to sell the 
property. Bai reminds Ms Yang that it was Ms Zhang who treats her as her own child and 
took care of her when she was left by her own parents in Shanghai. Bai tells Ms Yang that 
she will feel guilty if she and her daughter insist on keeping the flat, with Ms Zhang in 
great financial need. Under this moral persuasion, Ms Yang agrees not to insist on 
keeping the flat. Bai then proposes two solutions: one is to sell the property and split the 
money between Ms Zhang and Ms Yang, and the other is that Ms Yang buys out the part 
of the flat that belongs to Ms Zhang. Ms Yang decides to choose the latter. Then Bai 
persuades Ms Zhang to agree on a reasonable price because Ms Yang’s family cannot 
afford a high price. In the end, both parties reach a mutual agreement. 
This example demonstrates how a dispute is solved in a mediation show through a 
more morally appreciated approach—by reminding both parties about the positive 
aspects of their past relations, the mediator guides them to place themselves in each 
other’s shoes and make a compromise. To a large extent, the show manifests the spirit as 
called for by the authority at the time—establishing and maintaining a harmonious society. 
We can see how TV mediators, such as Bai Wanqing, combine moral persuasion, 
                                                          
8 Bai indicated in an interview I had with her that it is her wish to help the disadvantaged groups in society and 
protect their rights. These groups include previously sent-down youths and their children, laid-off workers, 
migrant workers, the poor, and the living-alone elderly.  
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government policy, and legal regulations9 to mediate between the disputant parties and 
help them to reach a compromise. In the show, we find that interpersonal relations and 
family bonding outweigh legal or individual rights when the mediator provides disputing 
parties with her suggestions. From issues in the show, we see that family disputes can be 
complex; one cannot simply judge who is right and who is wrong. In the majority of 
cases—be they family issues or more economic or political—disputing parties often have 
equally valid justifications for their arguments. Although in some cases the final solution 
seems to benefit one party, the ultimate resolution is more or less a compromise made by 
both parties.  
Moreover, this example indicates that many factors are involved in a seemingly 
simple family dispute over housing property. If we take a further look into the dispute, we 
can see how social and political changes also have a generational impact: Ms Yang was 
initially sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, and later lost her job due 
to economic reforms. People who are in similar situations as Ms Yang can be found in 
many other broadcast episodes, as well, encountering a declining financial situation when 
being laid-off, living in cramped conditions because of unaffordable increasing housing 
prices, etc. Apparently, the mediation show seems not only to have the function to help 
the ordinary citizens, but also to pacify their grievances.  
The seemingly apolitical family dispute involves a series of factors reflecting the 
impact of social, economic, and political changes. These changes in the Chinese context 
and their social effects have formed the basis for the rise of the mediation show, which 
will be discussed in the next paragraphs (Section 1.3). While the social and cultural 
context as well as the media reform to a certain extent sustain the popularity of the show, 
there are inevitable contentions brought by the show in terms of political, entertainment, 
and cultural aspects. I will further discuss this puzzle of my research question and aim of 
this study in Section 1.4. The last section will provide a layout of the dissertation 
structure.  
  
                                                          
9 Bai summarised these three principles in mediating family disputes on television.  
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 Context for the Emergence of the Mediation Show  1.3
 Social Issues and Impact of Political Change 1.3.1
As a part of the political movement during the 1960s and 70s, many others of Ms Yang’s 
generation left the cities and moved to the countryside (see Chapter Two). When the 
central government finally ended the rustication programme in 197810, a vast number of 
unmarried rusticated youth were allowed to return to Shanghai11. It was not until 1989 
when the Shanghai government enacted another policy that permits the educated youths’ 
children—one child per family—to return to Shanghai with a hukou, provided that they 
had extended family who were willing to accept them. In this case, according to the policy, 
Mr Zhang arranged to transfer his granddaughter’s hukou to Ms Zhang’s apartment, 
though she lived with her mother, Ms Yang, outside Shanghai in Jiaxing. In many other 
cases, the educated youth and/or their children returned to Shanghai and lived with their 
extended family members in cramped flats, which often triggered family conflicts.  
In the 1990s, the sent-down youth generation suffered again, being laid off (xia gang) 
as a consequence of structural reform of state-owned enterprises and large-scale 
privatisation—there was a 48 percent drop of state-owned enterprise in the early 2000s 
(Brandt, Rawski, and Sutton 2008)—which caused an enormous number of workers to be 
laid off. The retrenchment of millions of workers occurred and brought about labour 
unrest across the country. Laid-off workers like Ms Yang often appear on the XLNJ 
show, usually having faced similar difficulties: declining financial situation because of 
unemployment or low income, living in cramped conditions because unaffordable 
increasing housing prices, etc. 
                                                          
10 The Cultural Revolution ended in September 1976 with the death of Mao Zedong. But the subsequent 
government under Hua Guofeng continued the rustication programme until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping 
returned to power. Because of the obvious financial failure the programme incurred and the pressure from pleas 
of the educated youth who felt their lives were wasted in the rural area, the programme came to an end in 1978. 
For detailed accounts of the rustication program, see Yihong Pan, 2003, Tempered in the Revolutionary Furnace: 
China’s Youth in the Rustication Movement.  
11 The local government introduced a policy that unmarried youth could return to the city. Many who had 
married locals abandoned their spouses, and sometimes children, in order to get back to Shanghai. A 
well-known television drama Unpaid Debt (nie zhai) portrayed cultural and social conflicts when a group of 
abandoned children come to Shanghai to find their birth parents. More details are discussed in Chapter Two. 
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The household registration, hukou, plays a crucial part in many family issues that 
sent-down youth and their children, as well as non-local in-laws, often experience. This is 
because, as a holder of urban hukou, they will be entitled to a full spectrum of social rights 
and welfare benefits including compensation for demolition, better medical care, and 
rigorous education. The government enacted a new policy in 2009, announcing that all 
sent-down youth are entitled to Shanghai hukou when they reach retirement age (60 for 
men, 55 for women) provided that they can afford a house in Shanghai or have a child in 
the city who will house them. Therefore, Ms Yang’s daughter inheriting the apartment in 
the future means that she could transfer her hukou back to the city eventually. Perhaps, 
the policy change along with the increasing house prices adds to the reason why Ms Yang 
and her daughter insisted on not selling the apartment—they need this place for hukou 
registration, and they were not able to afford a home with their part of the proceeds.  
The past three decades have witnessed the rise of social issues and the impact of 
policy changes on Ms Yang’s generation. The rustication programme deprived them of 
opportunities for higher education and forced them to leave school at the age at which 
they should have been educated. During the large-scale layoffs caused by enterprise 
reforms since the mid-1990s12 (see Chapter Two), many of them were laid off after 
having served their respective factories for more than two decades, and then found 
themselves uncompetitive in the job market because of their lack of education and other 
skills. In addition to the economic insecurity, they also faced hukou and housing issues 
that put pressure on relative relations. The surging housing market and China’s 
long-standing hukou system prevented them from having access to more options to deal 
with their properties. In this case, the elderly lady Ms Zhang’s situation reflected another 
common social issue in an aging society where the vast majority of urban elderly lives 
alone on their pension while unpredictable high medical costs might await them in the 
future.  
 Mediation: Reinforced Promotion of Harmony 1.3.2
Economic reforms leave behind not only laid-off workers but also other disadvantaged 
groups such as migrant workers and urban elderly, who have fallen to the bottom level of 
                                                          
12 The wave of layoffs started in the mid-1990s when a large number of state-owned enterprises and public 
assets were sold or contracted out to private investors.  
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society in the ongoing process of social stratification (Hand 2011). In the face of 
unemployment, the lack of resources, and financial pressures brought by medical and 
social welfare reforms, these citizens took collective actions to resist the reforms including 
social protests, petitions, or even anti-social activities (Cai 2002, Peerenboom and He 
2009, Shi and Cai 2006) 
Such discontent led to increasing instability in society, which became a crucial 
concern facing the government. To pacify these ‘growing pains’ of economic reforms 
(Minzner 2011), in 2005, the then Hu-Wen government launched the ‘harmonious society’ 
campaign, making efforts to reduce conflicts and emphasising the need for ‘harmony’ in 
society. The official promulgation of the People's Mediation Law signifies the 
government’s determination to eliminate disharmony outside the court, as part of the 
overall goal of ‘building a socialist harmonious society’. Mediation today serves more 
functions than to mobilise the masses to support party policies during the Mao era, and 
People’s Mediators play a role of social control: resolving civil disputes by applying legal 
rules and policies, as well as preventing conflicts from becoming worse and eliminating 
the need for lawsuits and petitions (see Chapter Two for extended discussions on the 
development and changes of the mediation system). 
Mass mediation has been carried out widely by mediators at sub-district offices13 as 
a form of dispute resolution. It seems particularly useful for family disputes which often 
involve complex emotions, relationships, and/or reciprocal interests and thus are difficult 
to judge as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. As a Chinese saying goes, ‘even an impartial judge will find 
himself worthless in hearing a case of domestic dispute’ (qingguan nanduan jiawushi), 
implying the intricate relations underlying a dispute. For disputants like Ms Zhang and Ms 
Yang, a legal adjudication might well be an option, but it may inevitably jeopardise family 
relationships, and the time-consuming procedure and the legal costs could be beyond 
their affordability14. In this and many similar cases, mediation appears to be a useful 
solution that might help both parties to reach an agreement without harm to the 
                                                          
13  The sub-district office is the sub-district’s administrative agency. The sub-district is a form of township-level 
division, which is one of the smallest political divisions of the People's Republic of China. 




relationship, which manifests the ‘harmonious’ spirit called for by the government at the 
time.  
 Social Role of Commercialised Media 1.3.3
Speaking of the manifestation of ‘harmonious’ spirit, mass media are often seen as useful 
tools to achieve the government’s goal. Meanwhile, changes and developments in the 
television sector have urged the need for innovative programmes that are close to life, 
especially since the turn of the millennium when reality television became a worldwide 
phenomenon (Ouellette 2014). Chinese television practitioners also started making 
reality-based programmes to attract audiences. Since circa 2003, confessional talk shows 
(qingganlei jiemu)—usually revealing ordinary people’s conflicts and confusions in 
emotional life—have come to occupy a prominent position on Chinese television screens. 
Like that of commercialised media elsewhere, these profit-oriented programmes 
were keen to exploit viewers’ voyeuristic fascination for sensational stories, which 
were later criticised as vulgar. In December 2008, the State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film and Television of China (SARFT) issued an order to regulate 
domestic television programmes, especially those confessional talk shows focusing on 
people’s emotions (Zhang 2008). Chinese television makers are facing a dilemma: 
competing for viewers and generating revenues on the one hand, while meeting the 
censorship and propaganda demands of the government on the other (see Chapter Two 
for a more detailed discussion). In this context, XLNJ programme makers seemed to be 
cautious and ingenious enough when pursuing profit. Their strategy plays up to the 
authority by adopting a positive mediation approach, and at the same time still exploits 
personal issues to meet audiences’ voyeuristic demands. It exemplifies the hybrid 
‘infotainment’ approach that many other programmes in China also adopted (Hawes and 
Kong 2013) and thus finds itself a niche in the market.  
Being the first television show that collaborated with the Shanghai Justice Bureau 
(SJB), the show sophisticatedly used this endorsement from the SJB to distinguish itself 
from confessional talk shows and increase its credibility. The SJB was also happy about 
this cooperation, as it provides a platform to promote civil mediation as an alternative to 
solve disputes. Noticeably, the show focuses on interpersonal disputes only, deliberately 
excluding sensitive issues that involve the Party officials or state-owned entities (see 
Chapter Five). By providing mediation as a solution to family chaos, the show attends to 
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various requirements by the government: adopting a positive attitude when dealing with 
family disputes as indicated in the SARFT Order 2008 (Zhang 2008), establishing an 
‘ethics building’ model to fulfil media’s social responsibility as required by the SARFT 
Directive 2011 (SARFT 2011a), and guiding the public opinion efficiently in order to 
promote harmony in society (Committee 2011). It integrates political needs with market 
needs in the sense that it provides solutions to contemporary domestic issues partly 
associated with commercialisation and rapid economic growth, emphasising Confucian 
principles of moral and family relations, which simultaneously responds to the 
government’s overall goal.  
As indicated above, the seemingly apolitical reality mediation show as shaped by 
both market and state forces is a site integrating complex ideological legacies and 
value-laden politics. Cases on the show have exemplified how ‘the personal is often 
political’ (Hanisch 1970) and how the private became public. The experience of Ms 
Yang’s generation is not an individual’s story, but part of the consequence of policy 
changes that reflects the political status quo. By watching only one single episode of such 
a programme, one can already identify complex social and historical causes for disputes 
such as increasing unemployment brought by the transformation of state-owned 
enterprise (guoqi gaizhi) and the 2008 global economic crisis, as well as rising commodity 
prices that exceed most people’s finances.  
 Puzzles, Research Questions, and Aims 1.4
Mediation, a form of dispute solution that has been used by Chinese people for centuries 
(see Chapter Two), has now been successfully presented as a form of television 
entertainment. This combination of mediation and television gives rise to three latent 
tensions. Firstly, as a market-oriented programme, XLNJ tactically blurred the boundary 
between politics and entertainment. Being broadcast on the Entertainment Channel (xin 
yule pindao), the show is required by the higher hierarchical management level to 
incorporate entertainment elements with a supposedly serious mediation process. Making 
a serious and propagandistic mediation show with an entertaining purpose seems 
challenging enough for programme makers; as for the audience, how could watching 
arguments be entertaining? Secondly, it seems paradoxical to promote harmony by 
showing conflicts. On the one hand, the show proudly claims to have contributed to 
maintaining social stability; on the other hand, however, its very content exposes part of 
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the consequence of social and political changes resulting from economic reforms. And 
thirdly, in a nation deeply influenced by Confucianism, people would prefer mediation 
rather than going to court for the sake of saving their reputation, which is obviously 
contrary to the approach of publicised TV mediation. Exploiting people’s privacy for 
higher profit seems to fly in the face of the traditional saving-face culture, of which one 
important virtue is that ‘domestic shame should not be made public’ (jia chou bu ke wai 
yang). Traditionally, people have typically tried their best to solve the disagreement on the 
smallest possible scale rather than revealing it to non-family members. Logically speaking, 
the mediation show is not consistent with this traditional value that people were taught. 
These tensions arise from entertainisation, social and political, and cultural aspects, that 
form the puzzle of this study and raise the question: how do programme makers and the 
audience come to terms with these tensions? 
This study devotes attention to the nascent phenomenon of mediation reality 
shows during the beginning of this century, a topic that remains understudied to date. 
According to a search of the Chinese academic database, China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI.net), there are in total 55 articles including journal articles, doctoral 
or graduate theses, conference papers, and newspaper articles on this topic during the six 
years period 2009-201415. By and large, these published articles and unpublished theses 
mostly describe the general programme format and celebrate its popularity without 
substantive data from concrete empirical research. Among the limited existing Chinese 
literature sources, scholars have demonstrated obvious interests in mediation shows in 
terms of its effectiveness and legitimacy in resolving civil disputes (Li 2009, 2012a, Zhang 
2011); its public and private discourse; its representation of individuals; and its 
consumerism (Li 2010a, Wu 2013). In the Western (English) academia, communication 
scholar Shuyu Kong and legal scholar Colin Hawes (Hawes and Kong 2013, Kong and 
Hawes 2014) have written articles analysing Chinese mediation shows in terms of their 
legal and moral discourse and relations to the grand mediation scheme in China (see 
Chapter Three). To the author’s knowledge, no study has been conducted focusing on the 
programme makers nor the audience at the receiving end of the show. Hence, my 
                                                          
15 The search result was obtained using a combination of two key words: television (电视) and mediation (调
解). Then I checked the resulting list and only counted the number of relevant articles.  
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research aims to provide an insight not only into the context of the emergence and 
popularity of mediation shows but also the aim of such shows as seen by programme 
makers and mediators, and also to formulate a unique perspective to understand 
audiences’ usages and perception of such programmes.  
Many studies have been conducted on the transformation of Chinese media and 
the relationship between the state and China’s media, both by Chinese and foreign 
scholars (see Chapter Two). However, not much can be found on Chinese audiences’ 
perception of entertainment programmes, particularly the mediation TV show. This 
research aims to begin to remedy this limitation by carrying out a study on the audience 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods. My research focuses on the XLNJ, not 
only because it claimed to be the first mediation show, but also because it was the first 
television reality show that collaborated with the Justice Bureau. The mediation show 
provides the audience with a demonstration of the process of civil dispute mediation in a 
watchable and attractive format. Put differently, the mediation show brings together 
several elements from other television genres including talk shows (where a guest 
discusses issues with the host); reality shows (where a show presents actual and unscripted 
mediations of real events); and legal programmes (where a show tries to educate the 
public about legal solutions). The programme makers claim that their show pays 
considerable attention to the life of ordinary citizens sharing their concerns. They believe 
that the audience may be able to acquire a new way to resolve their disputes through the 
televising of the mediation process16. Furthermore, by collaborating with the SJB, XLNJ 
also institutionally mixed entertainment and the political, while at the same time it was 
seen by the authorities as a means to advance a harmonious society. Embracing various 
entertaining elements and multiple social and political functions in one programme, the 
show inevitably brings about contentions to both programme makers and the audience. 
Focusing on the production and the audience of the mediation TV show, my research 
probes into their perceptions of the intrinsic tensions of the show. In this sense, the 
general research question of my project is: 
                                                          
16 Interviewees #1, 3, and 6 
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How do programme makers and the audience come to terms with the potentially 
contradictory and conflicting entertaining, social and political, and cultural aspects of Xin 
Lao Niangjiu?  
This general research question will be answered by the following three 
sub-questions, focusing on the particular show XLNJ. In order to explore answers to the 
general research question, it is necessary to understand what is the aim and goal of the 
mediation show. That is, as a reality show broadcast on the entertainment channel and 
collaborating with the local governmental institution, does its aim appear to be 
profit-oriented, educational, or propagandistic? This question would be best investigated 
through in-depth interviews with two groups involved in the production of the show: 
programme makers and mediators. Therefore, my first sub-question is: (1) What do 
programme makers and official mediators see as the aim of Xin Lao Niangjiu? 
The aim of the show, be it political or commercial, may or may not be perceived by 
the audience. In other words, the audience at the receiving end of the programme may 
have a different understanding subject to their usage or perception of the show. 
Accordingly, this leads to my second sub-question: (2) Why do viewers watch XLNJ and what 
gratifications do they (not) get out of it? 
After obtaining insights into the viewer’s perception, I can then compare it with the 
goal established by the producer to check if the producer’s political and commercial 
mission is achieved. Through the comparison of the programme makers’ view and the 
audience’s perception, I will also explore their attitudes towards the three tensions 
mentioned above, which constitute my third sub-question: (3) What do local viewers get out of 
a mediation TV show that potentially conflicts with their cultural and political values? 
In order to answer these questions for my study, I have adopted a multiple method 
design taking advantage of the strengths of different research methods. The overall 
research was divided into two phases: one focusing on the programme production and 
one examining the audience. Figure 1.1 shows the relation of the two phases of this 
research (see also Chapter Four for research design and methodology).  
 Structure of This Dissertation   1.5
This dissertation consists of eight chapters in total. Chapter Two, the Background chapter, 
discusses a number of developments in China, to further contextualise the mediation 
show. In this chapter, I will firstly describe the structure and format of the mediation 
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show XLNJ and the major changes made to its content, in order to provide an idea of 
what the mediation show had been and what it is now. Secondly, I will discuss media 
transformation and commercialisation in China; in particular, the latent power of the 
entertainisation of the television industry. In this section, I explain the media environment 
in which the mediation show emerged and why it was innovative at the time. Thirdly, I 
will elaborate on the broader social and political context in China for the emergence of 
the mediation show, particularly social discontent following economic reforms. This 
section aims to answer in what way the mediation show responded to the authority’s 
political appeal. Fourthly, I will discuss Chinese cultural traits, i.e. the saving face culture 
and influences from Confucianism and the Maoist eras, in order to explain why mediation 
on TV was controversial in these terms. And finally, I will discuss the development and 
effect of people’s mediation in China, as well as its relationship with the central 
government’s goal in building and maintaining a harmonious society. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a general picture of the social, cultural, and political context in which 
the mediation show sprung up. 
Chapter Three, the Theoretical chapter, consists of four sub-sections. In the first, 
‘media system and politics’, I will discuss the role of the media in authoritarian political 
regime models by reviewing major typologies of media and politics. This provides a clear 
idea of the relationship between mass media and political authority. In addition, I will 
review the literature on television and politics, particularly within the Chinese context. In 
the second sub-section, as the global commercialisation of the media industry has given 
rise to entertainisation, I will review the literature on entertainment and politics to 
elaborate how the two relate to each other. A review of studies on the entertainment 
industry and politics in China is also provided in this section to present a picture of 
relations between politics and entertainment in a transitioning Chinese context. Thirdly, I 
will discuss the main literature with respect to audience studies. Particularly, I will focus 
on the uses and gratifications approach, which provides the theoretical framework for my 
research. In addition, I will review the limited number of studies on audience effects in 
the Chinese context. In the last sub-section, I will discuss the limited existing studies on 
mediation shows. This chapter also elaborates the contribution of this study to academic 
fields including media studies and political science.  
In Chapter Four, the Methodology chapter, I will discuss the methods used in the 
two phases of my research. In the first phase, I studied the TV production process, using 
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document analysis of visual and written materials, observation studies of the actual 
programme making, and in-depth interviews with major players in the production process. 
I also carried out an initial analysis of topics covered by the show in 2013 to identify 
which issues frequently occurred. The aim of the first phase is to disentangle the social 
and political contexts for the emergence of the mediation show as well as to explore the 
aims of the show as seen by production staff. In the second phase, the audience 
perception part, a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods was 
adopted. During this research stage, I performed an online survey to collect audience 
responses regarding their uses and gratifications of mediation programmes as well as their 
perceptions of the programme content in terms of its entertaining, social and political, and 
cultural aspects. Having conducted the online survey and the subsequent statistical analysis, 
I then proceeded to carry out focus group analysis. I utilised this not only as a tool to 
investigate potential explanations for contradictions that the survey findings suggested, but 
also to substantiate viewers’ perceptions of the show. Both the online survey and the focus 
group helped to produce knowledge about the way audiences make sense of and use the 
mediation show in the different areas of life.  
The Production chapter, Chapter Five, focuses on the actual production process of 
the programme makers. In this chapter, I will discuss the aims of the show as seen by 
different production staff, and the production of the programme, showing the dynamics 
and contentions behind this programme; and I will follow this by an analysis of cases 
broadcast in 2013 to provide statistics of the content of XLNJ and identify common 
issues on the show. Like most recorded broadcasts, the programme adopted a three-phase 
production: collecting issues, making the show, and editing the filmed material. While the 
core production team played a main role throughout the entire process, two other 
groups—the hotline reception team and the studio crew—were involved in the 
pre-production and production phases, respectively. I discuss how the decision-making 
during the three phases manifest the inclusive aims of the show as well as its contentions.  
Chapter Six provides the survey data from the online survey conducted in May 2012: 
why people watched or not, the audience’s specific uses and gratifications that they sought in 
the show, and how audiences perceive and interpret the contradictions embedded in the 
show in the entertainment, social and political, and cultural aspects. To conduct my 
survey, I selected web-based rather than paper-based questionnaires for logistical, 
efficiency, and economic considerations. Given the increasing population of Chinese web 
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users (513 million by the end of 2011), web-based surveys potentially allow for reaching a 
large population. The survey intends to provide a representative view of the online 
mediation show’s audience and helps to set the scene for the subsequent focus group 
research.  
Figure 1.1 Overview of the empirical research (Chapters Five-Seven) 
  
Chapter Seven discusses the qualitative findings to further understand the audience 
of the mediation show. This chapter provides insights from focus group discussions, 
focusing on the viewers’ attitudes, perceptions, and opinions towards the mediation show 
in terms of its content, mediating approach, and legal aspects. The focus group has been 
used to generate qualitative information and substantive explanations complementary to 
Empirical Study Phase I:
Mediation Show Production
What do programme makers 










Empirical Study Phase II:
Audience Study
Why do viewers watch XLNJ and 
what gratifications do they (not)  
get out of it?
How do programme makers and the audience come to terms with the 
potentially contradictory and conflicting entertaining, social and political, 
and cultural aspects of XLNJ? 
What do local Chinese viewers get out of a mediation TV show that 
potentially conflicts with their cultural and political values?
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the survey findings: why and how do people watch, have their opinions towards the legal 
system changed, and how do they come to terms with the contradictions and tensions 
between the entertainment, political, and cultural aspects of the show? Since the findings 
of focus groups cannot be generalised to an entire population, the main intention is to 
provide useful reference and to inform and contextualise the data of the online survey 
questionnaire.  
In the final Conclusion chapter, I will review the entire research project and 
summarise the key findings from the two research phases—the production phase and the 
audience studies—and (try to) answer the research question that is guiding this 
dissertation. Based on the results, this chapter ends with implications related to 
entertaining mediation shows in an authoritarian regime. To close, the strengths as well as 
limitations of the study are reported, in addition to some reflections and directions for 
future research being provided.  
    
 
 
Chapter Two  
BACKGROUND 
 Introduction 2.1
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅 , XLNJ) show 
successfully attracted a large audience with its novel format and became the focus of 
social attention at the time. The Wenhui Daily (4th October 2008) commented that 
mediation television programmes have significant social meaning by bringing typical cases 
of civil quarrels to the studio, triggering sympathetic responses from the audience. And 
Shanghai Business Daily (24th February 2009) referred to this type of programme as the real 
reflection of common social issues, and considered it as an extended subgenre of legal 
programmes. According to the 2008 Media Annual Report by CTR Market Research Co. 
Ltd., Shanghai XLNJ ranked No. 1 for general comments as well as influence on moral 
awareness (Jiefang Daily, 28th October 2008). Apparently, the local government and the 
propaganda department were quite satisfied with the approach of televised mediation that 
combined ‘legal knowledge’ with ‘entertainment’. In 2008 and 2010, the Shanghai 
Propaganda Department and the Shanghai Social Science Association held two seminars 
titled ‘Mediating Citizens’ Disputes, Building a Harmonious Society’ and ‘Mediation: An 
Effective Way to Resolve Social Conflicts’, respectively (see Chapter Five) discussing 
what makes XLNJ so popular and the possibilities to maximise the approach of TV 
mediation. In their opinion, being ‘real’ and ‘close-to-life’ are the key factors that attract 
the audience, and they also believe that the show manifests mainstream values that 
viewers sympathise with (see Picture 2.1 for a scene of mediation on XLNJ). It was not 
common in China that social scientists, university professors, legal practitioners, 
government officials, and programme makers would gather to discuss the phenomenon 
of a popular TV show. This publicised approval from the Propaganda Department soon 
gave rise to the proliferation of similar shows on channels across the nation, among 
which some were well known nationwide, such as Golden Medal Mediation (Jinpai tiaojie), 
broadcast on the Jiangxi Satellite Channel, a provincial television network, and The Third 
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Mediation Room (disan tiaojieshi), broadcast on an educational and scientific channel of a 
Beijing TV station17. 
As every coin has two sides, before it received acknowledgement from the local 
government, the XLNJ show had been questioned by the audience (Ma and Xiao 2010) 
about the authenticity of the dispute cases, since they seemed too exaggerated to be real. 
During its early days, the show often faced a lack of volunteer dispute parties to accept 
mediation on TV, as people questioned the effectiveness of this new solution, while at the 
same time, they were concerned about ‘losing face’. While the programme makers18 
insisted that all of the cases broadcasted were real stories, they admitted that they applied 
some ‘dramatic touch’ when editing in order to make it more entertaining to watch. The 
show played a dual role in that, on the one hand, it responded to the central call of 
building and maintaining a harmonious society, advertising ‘don't worry about your household 
affairs, turn to us for mediation’ (jiachangliduan buyongchou, doulai zhao women laoniangjiu). The 
show claimed that it helped to promote social harmony by reducing the number of civil 
lawsuits, and its collaboration with the Shanghai Justice Bureau certainly had added value 
to its social influence. On the other hand, it pursued a large audience and commercial 
profits by presenting somewhat exaggerated and entertainised privacy to attract eyeballs.  
XLNJ is broadcasted daily on the Shanghai Entertainment Channel. The length of 
the show had previously been 25 minutes. There was a host and a mediator, and a pair of 
dispute parties in each episode. The host and the mediator sat in the middle of the studio 
facing the camera, while the two parties to the dispute sat at the left and right side, facing 
each other.  
The show began with the host telling the audience who is coming to participate and 
what the dispute is between them. Then both parties to the dispute would be asked to 
express their thoughts in turn. Usually, people would become very emotional when they 
told the host and the mediator about their painful memories. Sometimes, both parties 
would start to argue or fight with each other on camera. The mediator and the host would 
talk to the participants and ask them to calm down. The mediator would then attempt to 
resolve the conflicts by providing legal advice and using moral persuasion.  
                                                          
17 Beijing Science and Education Channel (北京电视台科教频道) 
18 Interviewees # 1 and #4 (see Appendix 4) 
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Picture 2.1 A couple on the mediation show 
 
* A couple sit on two sofas facing each other, wearing a hat and a pair of sunglasses respectively to disguise their 
appearance. In the middle sit the presenter (lady in white) and the mediator.  
Picture 2.2 Audience commentators on the show 
 
* Four volunteer audience mediators sit on the show, observing the process of mediation. On the right side of 
the screen shows a slogan saying ‘Treat others well; the Entertainment Channel and you are building harmony 




Now, the show has been expanded to 45 minutes and has moved to prime time, i.e. 
18:30 from Monday to Saturday. In addition to the existing host and mediator, the show 
now also includes audience participants who observe and comment on the mediation in 
the studio. In each episode, there will be 6 volunteering audience commentators who 
participate in the mediation (Picture 2.2 shows audience commentators on the scene). 
They will be asked to take a position in the argument, and they can also provide 
suggestions. The participation of audience commentators has added interactivity to the 
show and also enlarged its entertaining function. 
In this chapter, I further discuss the broader background in terms of the three 
aspects mentioned in Chapter One. In the following sections, I first discuss the social and 
political context of the mediation show—issues left over from the Cultural Revolution 
and side effects of economic reforms that have given rise to social inequality and 
discontent. This social and political background facilitates understanding about how the 
mediation show responded to the authority’s political appeal by pacifying citizens’ 
disputes. The second section lays out the history and development of mediation in China 
in three stages: mediation as a traditional dispute solution used since the Western Zhou 
Dynasty (1146BC – 771 BC) and influenced by Confucian philosophy; during the Maoist 
era, when mediation was used more as a propaganda tool; and today, when civil mediation 
has become an important part of ‘grand mediation’ (da tiaojie)—a scheme whereby 
people’s mediation, administrative mediation, and judicial mediation would support each 
other to settle disputes in a peaceful way and make a contribution to maintaining social 
harmony (Li 2014b). Following this, I will talk about the marketisation and 
commercialisation of the Chinese television industry to explain how the mediation show 
occupies a niche position in the market to meet both its audience’s needs and the political 
call for harmony.  
 Socio-Economic and Political Context 2.2
Since Party Chairman Deng’s economic reform in 1979, vast socioeconomic changes have 
affected China. The reform aimed at rendering sufficient surplus value to finance the 
modernisation of the Chinese economy. A price-driven market economy took the place 
of the former administratively driven planned economy, which allowed some people to 
earn large amounts of money (Deng 1993). Rapid infrastructure constructions such as 
highways, airports, and ICT facilities have considerably improved people’s living 
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standards and quality of life quality. In the late 1990s, as China prepared to enter the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the CCP as China’s only party also faced challenges as 
China’s economy increasingly integrated into the world economy. Recognising that 
high-technology goods and services were crucial for the state to improve its economic 
power, the party leader at the time, Jiang Zemin, repeatedly emphasised the importance of 
technology and encouraged the development of the high-tech and information industries 
by providing a series of infrastructure improvements such as building up high-tech 
industrial parks. He also called to admit entrepreneurs into the party, which was seen as a 
gauged effort to maintain the relevance of the party in the global economy (Fewsmith 
2002). Under the support of the CCP, the high-tech and information industries rapidly 
grew, and the private economy exploded by the beginning of the 21st century. While 
Chinese people benefited from the large material and financial progress, they gradually 
suffered from the consequences of these reforms, as well. During the same period, there 
was a huge cut in the labour force of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) and urban 
collectives; the official number of laid-off workers increased from 3 million in 1993 to 
17.24 million in 1998 (China Labour Statistical Yearbook 1999, 441), but the actual 
number around that time could have been as high as 23 to 31 million (Solinger 2001, 672). 
In the 10-year period from 1993 to the end of 2002, more than 63 million workers were 
laid off from the SOEs between 1993 and 2003, accounting for approximately 44 percent 
of the state sector workforce (Hurst 2009, 16). The market economy in China resulted in 
growing frustration and social issues in four dimensions. 
 Four Dimensions of Social Conflicts 2.2.1
The Chinese government was aware of the negative consequences brought by the market 
reform. The CCP’s Central Organization Department issued two books19 identifying 
potential problems associated with the downside of the reform. One was published 
internally in 1998, Talks of Research into Party Construction (Committee 1998), that recorded a 
                                                          
19 One of the books was published internally by the Party’s Central Organization Department. Despite the fact 
that the survey failed to provide clear information on the number and exact types of people polled, I use the 
survey results here to shed some light on the social situation at the time. The other survey is from Dangjian yanjiu 
zonghengtan. The result of this survey was cited in Fewsmith (2002). 
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survey conducted by the State Committee for Economic System Reform20. The other was 
an investigative report published in 2001 titled China Investigation Report 2000-2001 (Ketizu 
2001). In addition to the studies conducted by the government department, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), standing alongside the government in the ‘reform’ 
process, has also focused on issues concerning the development of a welfare state. In 
2008 and 2009, scholars from CASS published two books analysing the overall situation 
of social stability, relations between social groups, and social issues that affect social 
harmony21. One was the Report on China's Social Harmony and Stability (Li et al. 2008) based 
on the 2006 large-scale national public survey22. The other was the Annual Blue Book of 
China‘s Society – Analysis and Forecast on China‘s Social Development Year 2009 (Ru, Lu, and Li 
2009). Data from these four books suggest that most social conflicts resulted from the 
following four social dimensions in the 10-year period. 
First of all, the increasing income disparity, including intra-regional and 
inter-regional gaps as well as inter-occupational inequality, is seen as one of the main 
sources of conflicts. As the 1998 SCRES survey indicated, 80.6 percent of respondents 
were dissatisfied with the growing gap between rich and poor, and this suggested that the 
idea of getting rich legally is widely ridiculed (Fewsmith 2002). Although the economic 
reform helped to lift millions of people out of poverty and achieved remarkable economic 
growth, the increasingly unequal wealth distribution has, at the same time, contributed to 
social unrest. Social analysts have conducted studies on cross-national development and 
warned that China’s Gini Index had reached the zone of genuine danger of instability, 
where citizens are more likely to make their grievances heard through means such as 
illegal assembly and demonstrations, particularly when they have insufficient legitimate 
institutional channels (for instance, Zhang 2001). The widening income disparities existed 
between different industries, different occupations, different regions, and urban and rural 
residents. For instance, the top 10 percent of highest income families possess 45 percent 
                                                          
20 Zhongguo guojia jingji tizhi gaige weiyuanhui: this institution had previously been affiliated with the State Council of 
China. In 2003, it was restricted and merged into the National Development and Reform Commission.   
21 I use data from these survey here to provide a general idea of major sources of social conflicts and to shed 
some light on the social situation at the time. 
22 The survey was conducted during March to May in 2006, covering 28 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions, 130 counties (cities, regions), and 520 villages / neighbourhood committees, with a valid 
sample size of 7,061. 
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of the total urban wealth, while the families in the lowest 10 percent possess only 1.4 
percent23. The Analysis and Forecast on China‘s Social Development Year 2009 indicated 
that in 2008, only 28.58 percent of respondents perceived income disparity as fair, a 11.93 
percentage reduction from that in 2006.  
Unemployment is another source of social unrest, which results from the 
consequence of structural reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As an imperative 
procedure of the economic reform, SOEs were required to improve efficiency. Before 
reform, the socialist policy required full employment and job security (tie fanwan), which 
consequently led to overstaffing, little incentive to work, and low efficiency (Tang 2005). 
The streamlining policy in the post-Deng reform programmes (Mok 2000) has 
systemically eroded workers’ benefits by a series of tough measures including collective 
lay-off, forfeiture of welfare for employees, and deterioration of working situations (Lee 
1999, Tong 2006). Social welfare was reduced at the workplace, forcing people to rely 
increasingly on market forces and family self-support (Croll 1999). Consequently, a large 
number of middle-aged workers, the so-called ‘4050’ group24, have been laid off because 
of their lack of competitiveness in the labour market. According to the 1998 survey, 59 
percent of workers and staff questioned said that their status has declined in China, and a 
total of 87 percent expressed considerable concern about the social situation25 (Fewsmith 
2002). Although efforts have been made to boost reemployment, such as ‘Project 4050’ 
(Su 2003), researchers have found that the disintegration of the collective economy and 
support for privatisation have directly or indirectly led to a decline in living standards. 
This holds particularly true for disadvantaged groups and regions, and the living 
                                                          
23 See, for example, a report from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (the former Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security) cited in a Xinhua report (Ma 2005). Another study revealed that the wealth 
distribution in China turns out to show an extraordinary disparity, whereby one percent of the population owns 
70 percent of the total property. According a report published by the Chinese branches of the Boston 
Consulting Group on 17th October 2006, the top 0.4 percent of Chinese families (about one percent of the total 
Chinese population) owns over 70 percent of the nation's wealth; in contrast, in most developed nations, the top 
5 percent of the families owns around 60 percent of the total wealth. 
24 Females over 40 years old and males over 50 years old (Fairbourne, Gibson, and Dyer 2007). 
25 The term ‘social situation’ was not clearly defined in the text, but Fewsmith presumably uses certain specific 
concerns to measure social situation, such as people's feelings about corruption and public order concerns, as well 
as more abstract expectations about whether life is improving or not. I presume that social situation includes 
their financial, housing, welfare, and wellbeing characteristics.  
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conditions for most laid-off workers and their families remain unsatisfactory (see, for 
example, Khan and Riskin 1998, Solinger 2001).  
Thirdly, social unrest also arises from the tense nature of party-mass relations. 
According to the China Investigation Report of 2001, there were three reasons: an 
increased tax burden, the authoritarian work style of some cadres, and corruption among 
state officials (Tang 2005). Indeed, many instances of collective action stem from the 
abuse of power. By 1999, the number of state officials convicted of corruption had 
increased from 3,004 in 1993 to 4,436 in 1999, which was an 8 percent annual rise. As the 
2001 report put it, ‘some party and government departments and leaders put their 
department or individual interests ahead of the interests of the whole people and struggle 
with the people over interests’, and such action ‘shakes the faith of the masses in the party 
and government, thereby greatly weakening the ability of the party and government to 
resolve contradictions’, (Fewsmith 2002). The situation did not improve in 2008, as the 
Report on China's Social Harmony and Stability indicated that 69.84 percent of 
respondents viewed ‘cadres’ as the group benefiting most from reforms in the past 10 
years. With the image of the Party damaged by corruption, the resentment against state 
officials intensified.  
Fourthly, economic reforms lay challenges in front of the state ideology, triggering 
uneasiness in society. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Empire had inevitably 
shaken the belief in Marxism; on the other hand, certain Western market values such as 
individualism and a money culture had penetrated China, potentially influencing people’s 
opinions towards socialism (Tang 2005). Contrary to the official ideology of ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’, 40 percent of middle-aged intellectuals saw China as 
working towards ‘capitalism with Chinese style’, as indicated in the 1998 report. 
Additionally, Chinese intellectuals yearned for political democratisation, as more than 33 
percent of them believed that China should ‘carry out general elections’ and implement a 
‘bicameral, multiparty, tripartite’ political system (Fewsmith 2002). The reform also 
brought great changes in youths’ values. For example, before the reform, youths used to 
place their destiny into the hands of the government, while by the late 1980s, youths no 
longer exuded this same enthusiasm for serving the people, and it became unrealistic to 




 Other Sources of Conflicts 2.2.2
Apart from these sources of social conflicts, other sources triggering social unrests 
gradually manifested themselves in the recent decade. At present, an outpouring of 
grievances have originated from people who lost money in the stock market, pensioners, 
veterans, unemployed labourers, disgruntled peasants, and unhappy couples (Diamant 
2005). A survey conducted by the China Society of Economic Reform in March 2007 
(China Reform Editorial Office 2007) concluded the top ten social issues that required 
urgent solutions, which are mostly the same as those revealed in the Report on China's 
Social Harmony and Stability: high medical costs, unemployment (and few opportunities 
for individuals to make money), widening income inequality, corruption (tension between 
cadres and the masses), a secured pension system, arbitrary educational charges, inflation 
of (house) prices, public insecurity, the increasing gap between urban and rural 
populations, and severe environmental pollution. These issues reflected insufficiencies 
during the progress of economic reforms. Profits of reforms were not distributed equally, 
the mode of economic growth at the cost of the environment and high energy 
expenditures is unsustainable, and effective supervision of the government was absent.  
The situation of social issues continued to deteriorate, especially when the impact 
of the financial crisis hit: unemployment rose, which seriously affected migrant workers as 
well as university graduates. Approximately 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in 
2009 (Xinhua News 2009), and 27 percent of those who graduated in 2008 failed to find a 
job (Huang 2009a). The lack of employment and income stability has caused government 
concern for social security and stability. Huang Huo, Xinhua News Chief at the 
Chongqing bureau, pointed out the risk of the unemployment problem: ‘…As 
employment difficulties and a high unemployment rate cause crises for individual 
livelihood, social contradictions will likely come to the foreground’ (Huang, Guo, and 
Zhong 2010). At the same time, property prices in the housing market continue to rise in 
spite of control policies and regulations implemented by the central government26. The 
                                                          
26 For example, the sales price indices of commercial residential buildings increased 14.5 percent year-on-year in 
the first two months of 2010 (National Statistics Bureau of China, 2010). This illustrates the further expanding 
momentum of China's economic recovery in the First Quarter of 2010. See Annual Data 2010 for detailed 
statistics: http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_en_detail.jsp?searchword=house&channelid=9528&record=2 
[Retrieved 9th June 2010] 
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average price of an 80 m2 apartment in the centre of China’s premier cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai is at least 66 times as much as an employee’s annual salary27. Apparently, the 
soaring house prices have made it difficult for most people to afford an ordinary home. 
With respect to the rusticated youth generation (zhiqing) and their children, hukou is 
another problem they often have to confront in addition to housing issues. In most cases, 
they have to live with their extended family members in a cramped flat after returning to 
the city. Many of them feel that they are unwelcome when they move back. In some cases, 
the siblings of the rusticated youth are reluctant to welcome them back to Shanghai since 
their living condition is far from spacious to accommodate extra residents. In other cases 
where sent-down youth and/or their children were successfully registered to a relative’s 
house, they feel resented by other family members who consider them as financial burden 
and disapprove of the amount of attention or money directed towards them. As for the 
rusticated youth, they feel that they do not deserve the resentfulness after all they have 
sacrificed not only for the country but also for their families: after 1970, their migration 
meant that siblings could stay in the city, and their children also made sacrifices. Also, 
education in the countryside was usually not as rigorous as in the big cities. As in the case 
of Ms Yang mentioned in Chapter One, hukou registration remains a critical issue for 
these families, which often gives rise to disagreements over property distributions.  
Indeed, the quickly changing and unevenly developing market economy has 
disrupted the social fabric of the country and raised concerns with regard to a deepening 
wealth gap, unequal resource distribution, class stratification, and a decline in civic virtue 
(Sun and Guo 2013, 1-2). Growing up as the first one-child generation in the era of 
reforms28, the post-80s generations benefit from economic growth, but are also affected 
by its consequences. As this generation has reached the marriageable and childbearing age, 
they are faced with a common social issue—distribution of properties, not only housing 
                                                          
27 Average per square meter (sq. m.) price in US$ of commercial housing in the centre of the most important 
cities in China is as much as US$5,449 according to the Global Property Guide Research. By contrast, however, 
the average monthly salary of employees was US$544 in Beijing, and US$481 in Shanghai according to the local 
statistics bureau (Shanghai Statistics Bureau 2009, Beijing Statistics Bureau 2009). (see also: Square Metre Prices - 
China Compared to Continent, from: http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/China/square-meter-prices 
Retrieved 9th June 2010) 
28 China’s one-child policy, officially the family planning policy (jihua shengyu zhengce), was introduced in 1979, 
the same year when economic reforms started. 
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but also other property-related issues. As elsewhere, people in China tend to look for a 
spouse of higher status because of the habit of hypergamy (Blossfeld 2009, Glick and Lin 
1986, Kalmijn 1998, Presser 1975, Qian 2012). The social norm of status hypergamy 
motivates especially men (and their parents) to purchase a larger and more expensive 
house or apartment to increase their competiveness in the marriage market (Wei, Zhang, 
and Liu 2012), since in Chinese culture the groom-to-be should provide a marital home 
for the couple. To protect their only child’s interest in the marriage, many parents, 
unconsciously or deliberately, intervened in their children’s marriage. Disputes involving 
disagreements about house property are often seen on TV. In response to this growing 
emphasis on material wealth in the marriage, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued its 
third interpretation of China’s Marriage Law in 201129, addressing a number of marital 
property issues, which, however, trigger uneasiness in marriages, as most women worry 
about becoming homeless after divorce30.  
Meanwhile, the divorce rate has continued to increase in the recent three decades, 
which may partly influence the increase of social isolation and emphasis on individualism, 
and be influenced by the only-child policy, whereby young couples have four or more 
parents to support (Wang and Zhou 2010). Also, as China is witnessing an increasingly 
aging population, taking care of the elderly is an intensifying social issue. Ms Zhang’s 
situation in the previous chapter is not uncommon in urban cities.  
 Politics of Harmony and Conflict Control 2.3
As discussed above, market economic reforms in the authoritarian regime have resulted in 
social tensions. Increasing social conflicts have garnered attention from the central 
                                                          
29 The interpretation took effect on August 13, 2011. An English translation of the third interpretation is 
available here: http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402809_text (Retrieved 9th June 
2010). 
30 Before the ruling, divorced couples could usually split their property evenly if they were not guilty of 
misconduct. Under the new interpretation of the marriage law, the person whose name is on the deed will keep 
the property, meaning that the other party might receive nothing. Since in Chinese tradition, usually the 
groom-to-be provides housing for the family, this means that his name is already on the deed. In this light, the 
ruling appears have a potentially enormous effect on gender-based wealth distribution in the country. 
Researchers of sociology worried that it would lead to ‘a dramatic widening of China’s gender inequality in 
wealth as a result of skyrocketing real estate prices in recent years’ (Fincher 2014). See, for example, Li (2011) 
and Tatlow (2011) for detailed comments on the new marriage law. 
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government. In response to these social issues, in his report to the 16th Party Congress of 
Year 2002 (Jiang 2002), Jiang Zemin still placed much emphasis on the need to develop 
socialist culture and promote the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, and the important thought of Three Represents31. His successors, Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao, have put great emphasis on the construction and maintenance of a 
harmonious society in which public discontent is addressed and the stability of society is 
promoted. In October 2007, the 17th National Congress of the CCP was held in Beijing, 
where Hu Jintao stressed the importance of implementing the scientific concept of 
development and of building and maintaining social harmony and stability. The slogan 
‘Building a harmonious society’ has become a hot topic and can be seen quoted 
everywhere. During a press conference of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) in 
201032, Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged the existence of inequalities and stressed the 
importance of ‘pro-people’ policies: 
‘…I believe equality and justice form the basis of social stability……There is no 
denying that we still face the problem of unfairness in many fields, including in 
income distribution and the judicial system. This deserves our close 
attention……In pursuing economic and social development, we should always 
give high priority and pay more attention to poor people and disadvantaged 
groups in our society, because they account for the majority of the 
population……China's modernization drive is not only about achieving 
economic prosperity. It also includes our endeavours to promote social equality 
and justice and enhance our moral strength…’ (Ma and Xiao 2010) 
To address the growing volume of litigation and increasing social disputes, the Chinese 
government in the recent decade promoted mediation as an effective approach. Mediation 
                                                          
31The Three Represents is a guiding socio-political theory put forward by Jiang Zemin in 2000, which refers to 
what the Communist Party of China stands for: It represents the development trends of advanced productive 
forces; the orientations of an advanced culture; and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of 
the people of China. 
32 Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, met journalists from home and abroad and answered their 
questions at a press conference of the Third Session of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC), on the 
morning of March 14, 2010 in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing at the invitation of Li Zhaoxing, 
spokesman of the NPC Session (China News Report 2010). 
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has been used for a long time in China under the influence of Confucian philosophy, 
which has become a tradition of conflict control. In the following section, I will further 
discuss the tradition of mediation as a means of conflict control and the development of 
the mediation institution in China. 
 Tradition of Conflict Control through Mediation 2.3.1
When disputes occur in people’s daily life, parties to a dispute in China usually have 
adopted mediation rather than litigation as their primary means of resolution. China 
apparently has one of the longest histories in the world of using initialised mediation 
practices to resolve conflicts in both rural and urban parts of the country (Barnes 2007). 
Actually, mediation had long been widely adopted among Chinese citizens before the 
government officially legitimised the mediation system. In Chinese traditions, people 
valued ‘face’ (mianzi) as well as interpersonal relationships so much that going to court 
would be their last choice, as it signifies falling out openly and would inevitably ‘lose’ their 
‘face’ and jeopardise relationships (sipo lianpi). Therefore, Chinese people tend to keep 
domestic conflicts to themselves and solve them internally rather than going to court. 
Telling others your family issues was regarded as a face-losing action, because this 
brought about gossip and stirred up trouble for yourself and your family members. Of 
complaints or grievances, only a very small proportion finally became legal cases 
(Diamant 2005).  
Among complaints of grievances, only a very small proportion have finally turned 
to filing legal claims (Diamant 2005). In most cases when disputes occur, people would 
adopt mediation instead of litigation as their primary means of resolution. While people 
demand impartial justice, they do not want to put their faces and relations at stake. 
Besides, many civil disputes are similar to the aforementioned example, in that they are 
complicated and involve entwined interpersonal relations. Resolving disputes through the 
process of people’s mediation not only results in the least impact on relations, but 
sometimes even improves the otherwise deadlocked personal relations. In Ms Yang and 
Ms Zhang’s case, they recalled how they were looked after by the other during the early 
years. Therefore, people’s mediation maintains interpersonal relationships while providing 
reasonable solutions to disagreements.   
Mediation is influenced by both Confucianism and Maoism. I will discuss in the 
following sub-sections the traditional usage of mediation in villages, the propaganda tool 
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during the Mao era, and the contemporary adoption of mediation as a lawful way to solve 
various disputes.  
 Mediation as a Traditional Option to Solve Disputes 2.3.2
As a main means of dispute resolution, mediation has been culturally sourced from and 
profoundly influenced by Confucian ideology. Confucius’ thoughts, laying emphasis on 
the importance of a well-structured society and the standardised relationships within that 
society (Tang 2005), have penetrated deep into Chinese social culture. Central to 
Confucianism are five terms of conduct that depict individuals’ responsibility with respect 
to relationships in society: Zhong (loyalty) – people should be faithful to the ruler and 
support the ruler all the time; Xiao (filial piety) – children should take care of their parents; 
Ren (humanity and benevolence) – one should be kind-hearted and sympathetic to one’s 
husband or wife; Li (ritual and politeness) – politeness and compromise between sisters 
and brothers; and Yi (righteousness and sacrifice) – people should help their friends by 
self-sacrifice (Tang 2005). The book The Analects recorded Confucius’ thinking of personal 
morality, self-cultivation, the practice of government, correctness of social order, justice, 
and sincerity. In a broad sense, Confucianism pursues a high realm of truth, goodness, 
and beauty of human morality, where the value of interpersonal collaboration, harmony, 
and stability are highly treasured. In this light, litigation is seen to oppose these ideals. 
Confucius’ attitude towards litigation was incisive: 
The Master said, ‘In hearing litigation, I am no different from any other man. But if 
you insist on a difference, it is, perhaps, that I try to get the parties not to resort to 
litigation in the first place.’ (The Analects, Book XII, Verse 13, translated by Lau (1992) 
One Confucian verse well known among the Chinese people was ‘Harmony is 
most precious’ (he wei gui) (The Analects, Book XII, Verse 13, translated by Lau (1992)), 
which underlined the importance of the maintenance of harmony in all aspects of social 
life. Accordingly, one could conclude that the Chinese insistence on conflict avoidance is 
inherent in its persistent desire for harmony (Goh 2002, 25). ‘Harmony’ here contains 
varying levels of meanings, such as ‘being at one with one’s immediate environment’ (van 
der Sprenkel 1962), encouraging people to put oneself in somebody else’s shoes, and 
compromise to reach an agreement. Therefore, bringing a dispute to the judicial domain 
of a court was regarded as harmful to the harmonious relationship among people, and a 
practice one should be ashamed of.  
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In addition to the cultural explanation to account for the prominence of mediation, 
there are also geo-demographic factors. Migration was minimal in China’s early days. 
People would live in the same village within the same neighbourhood throughout their 
lives. They knew each other, and when disputes arose between two parties, other people 
would come to help solve the problems. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China, especially after the launch of the economic reform, increasing growth in 
population mobility occurred. Large numbers of migrant workers left their rural villages 
and towns to make money in urban areas, which has given rise to various disputes and 
conflicts. 
 Mediation in the Maoist Era 2.3.3
In Mao Zedong’s era, the use of mediation was reinforced and became more political, 
with mediation being used as a method to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy (Lubman 
1999, Peerenboom 2002) by educating people and implementing the policy of CCP. At 
that time, the People’s Republic of China had just been established and the authorities 
needed to stabilise and strengthen their regime’s legitimacy. Accordingly, the goal of 
mediation was not only to resolve disputes among the people, but also to strengthen the 
people’s patriotic observance of the law and to promote the internal unity of the people 
(Minzner 2006, 304). The Party had already articulated a policy of resolving civil disputes 
before their assumption of power in 1949. They tried to set up mediation organisations to 
involve the masses in settling disputes under government supervision (Cohen 1970). 
Based on the experience in governing the mediation of civil disputes, the CCP devised in 
1954 a mediation system and promulgated the Provisional General Rules of the People’s 
Republic of China for the Organization of People’s Mediation Committees33.  
The goal of the mediation in Mao’s time, as stated in the Rules, was to ‘promptly 
resolve disputes among the people, strengthen the people’s patriotic observance of the 
law, and to promote the internal unity of the people in order to benefit production by the 
people and construction by the state’34. The Party encouraged the masses to join the basic 
level of the mediation committees, because they would be familiar with local conditions 
                                                          
33 Promulgated on March 22, 1954, in ‘Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Central People’s Government’ 
(Zhongyang Renmin zhengfu faling huibian), 1954, pp. 47-48, cited in Cohen (1970) 
34 Rules, Art. 1. Translated and cited by Cohen (1970) 
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and could solve disputes quickly. Using mediation committees to solve disputes ensured, 
to a large extent, that government officials have sufficient energies ‘to concentrate on 
leading the people in the various kinds of production and construction’ (Cohen 1970, 
304).   
One stark difference between the Maoist ideology of mediation and the Confucian 
ideology was that, apart from the emphasis on regime legitimacy, the former expanded 
the meaning of mediation to include a range of interventions including adjudicatory 
actions taken irrespective of the will of the litigants (Huang 2009b, 203). During the 
Cultural Revolution, all courts were closed down, and many impartial and well-trained 
judges and lawyers were persecuted because of their so-called bourgeois liberalisation 
tendencies (Lubman 1999). The justice system was revived gradually in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
   Mediation in the 21st Century  2.3.4
While China has been experiencing social and economic progresses, various kinds of 
social conflicts have also been emerging. Meanwhile, the lack of financial and legal 
support, along with other factors, caused the decline of mediation and the rise of lawsuits 
in the 1990s (Halegua 2005). The government made efforts to improve the policy 
environment and the institutional structure of people’s mediation. To address the 
increasing social disputes and reverse the descending trend of mediation usage, a series of 
documents and decrees were issued by the SPC and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)35, 
emphasising the importance of people’s mediation’s role as the ‘first line of defence’ to 
solve civil disputes before they deteriorate. Seeing people’s mediation as ‘the first line of 
defence’ to ‘guarantee social stability’, and as ‘a constructive force’, and ‘a protective force’ 
                                                          
35 These documents include ‘Opinions of the SPC and the MoJ on Further Strengthening the Work of People’s 
Mediation in the New Era’ (issued by Ministry of Justice 2002), ‘SPC Provisions on Several Issues in the Civil 
Mediation Work of the People’s Courts 2004’ (Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Minshi Tiaojie 
Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti de Guiding), ‘Several Opinions of the SPC on Further Promoting the Positive Role of 
Mediation in Lawsuits in the Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society 2007’ (Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jin 
Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie Zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian), and ‘SPC 
Several Opinions on Further Implementing the Work Principle of ‘Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining 
Mediation with Judgment’ 2010’ (Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jin Yibu Guanche Tiaojie Youxian, Tiaopan Jiehe 
Gongzuo Yuanze de Ruogan Yijian). 
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in building and maintaining a harmonious society36, these decrees, issued by the highest 
level of the government and the Party, manifest the government’s determination to 
restore social stability and strengthen Party power.  
In the most recent decade, mediation has become a preferred mechanism for 
resolving a broad range of disputes, both private and public law issues, preventing them 
from escalating into full-scale public dissatisfaction or ‘large group incidents’ (quntixing 
shijian) disrupting social stability (Halegua 2005). A 2004 MoJ report indicates that each 
year People’s Mediation Committees prevent over 50,000 civil cases from escalating into 
criminal matters, as well as stopping nearly 100,000 group fights (Wang 2005). 
Nationwide, the average yearly number of mediated cases rose from 6 million in 2004 to 8 
million in 201337.  
As social conditions have become increasingly complex, many dispute cases are 
seen to require more coordination from government institutions than the people’s 
mediators’ approach of mixing the law with social pressure and moral persuasion. The 
SPC 2010 decree urges people’s courts to promote people’s mediation, judicial  
mediation, and administrative mediation38 to establish the working system of ‘Grand 
Mediation’ (da tiaojie) – a comprehensive stability maintenance and dispute resolution 
mechanism. It emphasises integrated, top-down stability maintenance practices and a 
synthesis of Party, government, and social resources to solve complex disputes at the 
basic level (Hand 2011, 143-144). The web of grand mediation was expected to play a 
                                                          
36 See Article 1 in the 2007 SPC decree. In the same document, Article 5 stipulates that local courts should 
make efforts to mediate disputes involving group interests that require the cooperation of government and 
institutional organs; collective disputes; difficult and complicated cases in which disputing parties stand 
emotionally against each other; disputes that involve unclear or inapplicable legal rules; or sensitive cases 
receiving high attention from society. 
37 Data reports by an MoJ official Wang Jue (2005b) and see also a report from the MoJ official website (Qin 
2013). 
38 Official definition of mediation types (as defined in China’s Judiciary 2002): 
‘People’s mediation: Mediation by People's Mediation Committees outside the court. 
Judicial mediation: Mediation by a court of law in civil and economic disputes and minor criminal cases inside the 
court. For marital cases, inside-court mediation is a necessary procedure. Whether or not to seek judicial 
mediation is for litigants to decide. Mediation is not a necessary procedure. A court's mediation document is as 
valid as its verdict. 
Administrative mediation: This can be outside-the-court mediation by ‘grass-roots’ governments such as a township 
government in ordinary civil disputes, or outside-the-court mediation by government departments in compliance 
with legal provisions in specific civil disputes, economic disputes or labor disputes.’ 
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proactive and reactive role to prevent potential conflicts from developing into violent or 
extreme cases.   
China’s legal scholars seem be concerned that by introducing government 
intervention into the otherwise autonomous mediation system, it might consequently 
challenge the judicial authority and undermine China’s still-underdeveloped legal 
institutions (Zhou 2007). Government officials and legal practitioners believe that legal 
reform improves the mediation organisations. Zhou Yougeng, the director of the 
Shanghai Baoshan Justice Bureau, indicates that people’s mediation is not mandatory, 
disputing parties choose people’s mediation voluntarily, and they can always turn to 
litigation if mediation fails to solve their problem. Additionally, he points out that in 
China, adjudication is not the best way to solve most civil disputes where who is right and 
who is wrong is not always black and white; as he questioned, ‘do you really think that 
only a clear judicial decision is fair to dispute parties, and really solves the dispute?’ (Wang, 
Tang, and Wang 2010). 
Indeed, during China’s transition to a full market economy, the situation for its 
legal system was complicated. While some scholars criticised the legal reform in China as 
‘turn against law’ (Gallagher 2006, Minzner 2011), others would agree with Zhou that 
there are other ways to solve civil disputes. One such option that emerged in recent years 
was the mediation show. Being itself an outcome of channel restructure due to media 
marketisation, which I will discuss in the next section, mediation shows have integrated 
this institutional legacy as a means to solve family disputes, responding to the 
government’s call for harmony.  
 Media Marketisation and Control of Content 2.4
Ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the mass media have 
been playing the role of the mouthpiece of the party. Hence, the development of the 
media and communication system has received great attention from the national 
government. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have recognised the value and 
importance of using the mass media as an effective means to communicate the crucial 
ideas to their ‘revolutionary objectives’ from the very beginning (Hong 1998, 41). As Mao 
Zedong stressed, the mass media have four tasks: they ‘should propagandize the policies 




Since the initial economic reform in 1978, China has witnessed a rapid and 
successful move towards a market economy. Media marketisation in the Chinese context 
refers to the deregulating, commercialising, and (partial) privatising of media outlets 
(Stockmann 2013, 7-8). Both press and television reflect this move in terms of changes in 
structure, ownership, and media content. In the past three decades, the role of China’s 
media has been transformed from government mouthpiece to profit-oriented propaganda 
units. That is to say, party ideology is being expressed through the marketise d media, 
whereas the media’s profit-making privilege was predicated on fulfilling their political 
functions (Lee, He, and Huang 2006). On the one hand, media received more autonomy 
in their economic operation and became increasingly market-oriented (Wu 2000, Zhao 
1998). On the other hand, it was clear that the Party would continue to control the 
content of the media in detail through the Central Propaganda Department and its local 
branches at all levels (Tang 2005). Let us look at this in more detail.  
 Transformation of TV Industry 2.4.1
The traditional institutional television system in China was previously a ‘Four Levels’ 
framework—central government, province, prefecture or municipality, and county—that 
was established in the 1980s, meaning that each level in the hierarchy assumes the 
responsibility to manage and administrate the television stations within the same level 
(Zhao and Zhou 2006, 113).  At that time, China still applied the planned economy 
system; in other words, news media had to rely entirely on national appropriation. It was 
the regional government that allocated funds and social resources to its subordinate 
television stations monthly or quarterly (Li 2005, 3). TV programmes during that period 
were made mainly for the purpose of publicising the policy and establishing the leaders’ 
authoritative and trustworthy images among the public. This ‘Four Levels’ framework had 
four advantages: firstly, it could guide the public opinion effectively; secondly, it could 
ensure the safety of broadcasting, i.e. not be interrupted, especially when some 
unexpected incidents occurred; thirdly, it was effective for extending the broadcasting 
coverage; and fourthly, it was good for integrating the internal resources (Lee, He, and 
Huang 2006). Undoubtedly, the ‘Four Levels’ system spurred the development of China’s 
television industry.  
However, under such a system, a huge waste of the resources was inevitable. There 
appeared large amounts of repetitive production and transmission among television 
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stations at each level, which consequently resulted in increasing costs. Lacking the 
financial resources to create or to purchase programmes, most TV stations found it 
difficult to operate as usual, not to speak of making profits. On the other hand, at the end 
of the 1970s, the reform of the Chinese economy began, when Deng Xiaoping 
established the ‘socialist market economy’ and advocated for opening China to the global 
market (Hong 1998, 57). Facing the pressure of financial shortage and the opportunity of 
economic reform, China’s television industry entered an urgent crisis of transformation. 
Since the 1980s of the last century, with China’s economic reform and openness, 
Chinese television has experienced a series of significant transformations. The operating 
mode of the television industry has changed from a purely government-sponsored mode 
to a more marketised and industrialised mode. The embrace of a free-market economy 
gave rise to a proliferation of media outlets and a diversity of information formats in the 
media system.  
Taking the television industry in Shanghai as an example, on January 25, 1979, 
Shanghai Television (STV) asked for the Shanghai Municipal Government’s permission to 
broadcast TV advertisements (Xie 2006, 28). Three days later, on the Chinese New Year's 
Day, STV broadcasted China’s first television advertisement—a 90-second commercial of 
a medicinal wine produced by the Shanghai Medicinal Material Company. Later that same 
year, in November, the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China 
Central Committee officially allowed the news organisations to broadcast advertisements 
(Hong 1998, 147). This indicated that China’s media had entered the advertisement 
period. Since then, China’s television institution has found another source of finance 
beyond state subsidies.  
With the growth of the revenue from advertising, the government gradually 
reduced the financial allowance for its television station (Lu 2002, 85). In 1986, STV 
introduced the nation’s first English news programme and held China’s first international 
television festival, the Shanghai International Television Festival (SITF). Before the 
economic reform, the central propaganda department had monopolised television 
programme imports. Even major cities like Shanghai had been prohibited from importing 
television programmes (Hong 1998, 60). It was at the third SITF that TV programmes 
were traded for the first time. Subsequently, increasingly many foreign programmes were 
imported by Shanghai Television. Following STV, other regional and local television 
stations started to look to other countries as programming sources (Hong 1998).  
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In the 1990s, the first cable television station and the first commercial television of 
the country, Shanghai Cable Television (SCTV) and Oriental Television (OTV), 
respectively, started broadcasting in Shanghai (Hong 1998, 148). Oriental Television was 
also the first TV station that, free of the government-allocated funds, assumed sole 
responsibility for its profits or losses. As Jiang Zemin (1996) once commented when he 
inspected the People’s Daily newspaper in 1996: ‘under the socialist market economy 
system, news media should be good at propaganda as well as in business management’.  
 Structural Changes of Shanghai Television 2.4.2
With the implementation of nationwide media marketisation, the Chinese television 
sector has been adjusting its structure and ownership to adapt to the market. Before 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), media 
conglomeration—merging different media institutions into one (usually state-owned) 
larger and stronger group—was implemented across the nation as a preparation for the 
cross-nation market competition brought about by globalisation. As a result of 
commercialisation, Chinese television has generally become a government business with a 
binary structure that comprises a political administrative hierarchy and a business vehicle 
(Zhong 2010b, 17)39. For example, a diversified multimedia company, Shanghai Media 
and Entertainment Group (SMEG, Shanghai Wenhua Guangbo Yingshi Jituan), owned by the 
Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, was founded in 
200140. In the same year, the Shanghai Media Group (SMG, Shanghai Wenhua Guangbo 
Xinwen Chuanmei Jituan) was formed under the SMEG as the result of a merger between 
the STV, OTV, People’s Radio Station of Shanghai, and East Radio Shanghai. SMG was 
                                                          
39 Taking an economic approach, Zhong’s (2010b) study of three largest media conglomerations in China— 
among which one is at the national level, and the other two are at the provincial level—is based on publicly 
available information. He confirms that China Central Television, Hunan Satellite Television, and Shanghai 
Oriental Satellite Television all assume the binary hierarchical structure and that the three listed companies, 
China Television Media Ltd, Shanghai Oriental Pearl (Group) Co. Ltd, and Hunan TV and Broadcast 
Intermediary Co. Ltd, are related to CCTV, OSTV, and HSTV, respectively. 
40 SMEG is a multimedia television and radio broadcasting, news, and Internet company. The company 
employs around 5,200 people, with capital assets of RMB 11.7 billion. The group operates in television, film, 
and radio broadcasting as well as newspaper and magazine publishing, content production, internet, and new 




in charge of operating and administering local television and radio production and 
broadcasting.  
Figure 2.1 Structure of Shanghai Media Group since its transformation in 2009 
 
On 21 October 2009, in response to broadcast industry restructuring plans laid out 
by SARFT, the Shanghai Media Group split into two legal entities: Radio and TV 
Shanghai (RTS) and Shanghai Oriental Media Group (Shanghai Dongfang Chuanmei Jituan). 
This move symbolised the separation of production and broadcasting of content in the 
Shanghai broadcasting industry. RTS retained the operational structure of the former 
SMG, and was managed by the Shanghai Municipal Administration of Culture, Radio 
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Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department. News operations and the broadcasting 
platform remain at RTS and are not commercialised. The Oriental Media Group 
continues to use the English acronym SMG, and is in charge of all non-news-related 
assets and departments. RTS is comprised of news, technology, and public broadcasting, 
while the new SMG, with its shares held by RTS, is more market-oriented, in charge of 
advertising, production, distribution, and investment. Li Ruigang, president of SMG, 
stated that the move is a trend for the TV industries to react more efficiently and quickly 
to the market (Zheng 2015). Figure 2.1 provides a general picture of the structure of RTS 
and SMG since the 2009 transformation.  
Clearly, the marketisation and conglomeration did not change the nature of media 
ownership. Both SMEG and SMG remain as government-controlled businesses, and they 
are also staffed by a number of party cadres and professionals who hold official positions 
at the municipal Propaganda Department or other government offices (Zhong 2010a). 
They must fulfil missions allocated by the central and municipal governments before they 
can seek to make profits from various commercial activities. 
Moreover, there has been a gradual commercialisation of media in the People’s 
Republic of China, with the result that media organisations survive by stimulating 
consumer demand. For these media entities, advertising has been indispensable, and it 
could bring substantial profits (Pan 2000). Their business model, particularly their 
dependence on advertising revenues, to some extent has given rise to a commercial 
culture that is often apolitical, but may nonetheless challenge the traditional relationship 
between political authorities and the public (McCormick and Liu 2003).  
 Influence of Control and Content 2.4.3
Did media commercialisation liberalise media content and weaken media control by the 
authorities? This question generated debates among scholars regarding the implications of 
media reform for the state’s authoritarian regime. They converged on the significant 
importance of liberating the market in an authoritarian party-state, and diverged on the 
role of the commercialisation in liberalising the political control over the media. One the 
one hand, some scholars celebrated the power of commercialisation in liberalising 
political discourse and facilitating public supervision of the CCP (Chan 1993, Hao, Huang, 
and Zhang 1998, Yang 2013, Zheng 2007). In their opinion, media commercialisation in 
China imposed structural pressure on the CCP to decrease its ideological persuasion and 
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allow more autonomy over media operation, and Chan (1993) believed that ‘such erosion 
of the CCP’s control over ideology will intensify’. Similarly, Hao, Huang, and Zhang 
(1998) argued that ‘the development of a market economy invariably weakens the political 
control of the Communist Party or vice versa’, and as a result, ‘a non-state controlled 
public sphere is emerging’. Zhong and Wang (2006) have indicated that the commercially 
driven content somehow weakens political propaganda on Chinese television. 
On the other hand, scholars studying the transformation of different media sectors 
in China have noted that the state retains the ability to consolidate and control media 
power through marketisation (Esarey 2005, Stockmann and Gallagher 2011, Stockmann 
2013, Zhao 2008). The party-state has actively incorporated market forces and initiated 
media conglomeration for the purpose of facilitating media capitalisation and preparing 
for global competition. But meanwhile, the authority is enhancing political control of the 
media content (Zhao 2000). The market mechanism has improved the effectiveness of 
the media’s role as the party’s mouthpiece and ‘eyes and ears’ (Gordon 1997). Therefore, 
the media, particularly television, still have to play the role to respond to the central call. 
It seems that Chinese media are faced with a dilemma related to being a 
commercialised unit and a propaganda tool at the same time. As Lee (2000, 89) suggests, 
the process of ‘commercialization’ has done more than giving rise to alternatives to the 
state-run media: it has also changed the form and content of the state-run media 
programming. Taking the Chinese television industry as an example, marketisation 
brought by economic reforms has led the media into a competitive marketplace, making 
them compete for profit. The separation of production and broadcasting undoubtedly 
pushes TV production towards a more diversified development, meeting the various 
demands from audiences. Just like other major media production companies in the 
country, television is owned by the state but at the same time is profit-driven. Under the 
impact of marketisation and commercialisation, television content has shifted from 
political to pure entertainment-based content (Keane, Fung, and Moran 2007, Shoesmith 
1998). For example, Super Girl, a popular talent show from Hunan Satellite TV, swept 
national screens. Following its success, increasingly many entertainment programmes of 
various styles have proliferated on provincial and local TV stations. In this light, the 
inherent entertainment function of television that Postman (1985) observed, is said to 
displace public attention not only among the audience in the U.S. but also in China 
(Shoesmith 1998, Weber 2002). Gradually, commercialisation seems to bring about the 
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popularisation of media content, transforming the role of the media from a tool of the 
party to move in a more market-driven and entertainment-oriented direction.  
Meanwhile, the Party continues to control the media using various methods, 
including institutional, political, and financial approaches. Television stations, like other 
media sectors in China such as newspapers, remain as public institutions (shiye danwei), 
meaning that they are tied to the state and under the control of SARFT and the 
Propaganda Department (PD). The appointment of the conglomeration management 
rests with the government. And from a financial perspective, corporate organisations are 
under the direct control of government businesses that hold the controlling share of the 
listed stock, which means that they are not genuinely exposed to the capricious 
commercial world of the capital market (Zhong 2010a). Therefore, the state maintains its 
capacity to exert control over the media organisation, personnel, and editorial process 
through administrative institutions and most importantly the PD (Stockmann 2013, 73). 
The combination of various control methods can be exemplified by Shanghai Television 
below. 
The two managers of the conglomeration in Shanghai, Ye Zhikang, Head of 
SMEG, and Li Ruigang, CEO of SMG, were appointed by the Shanghai Municipal Party 
Committee. Their appointments at least nominally gave the centre supervision over key 
management positions. As a result, managers of television and radio stations selected by 
Ye and Li were nearly all Party members, who were able to produce popular programmes 
not politically sensitive in nature (Esarey 2005, 31). As shown in the Figure 2.1, RTS owns, 
controls, and manages the new SMG (taishu, taikong, taiguan), meaning that it has the 
power to make decisions over major issues, appoint and dismiss leaders, censor and edit 
programme content, and guide the direction of cultural safety and publicity. According to 
Zhu Hong (2009), director of the general office as well as spokeswoman for SARFT, RTS 
has established control organisations such as the Programme Editorial Committee, News 
Centre, etc. to enhance its capability of guiding public opinion. Clearly, CCP holds that 
the media are still their mouthpiece and continue to exercise forms of media censorship 
(Zhao 1998). In the case of television transformation in Shanghai, it has been clearly listed 
that the first rule of the media transformation is ‘sticking to the Party spirit’ (dangxing 
yuanze); its function of the Party’s mouthpiece remains unchanged (Tong and Zhong 
2011). Specialised departments controlling and censoring television content were created 
to ensure that the rules are followed. For instance, programmes were ‘examined’ before 
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publication or broadcast, to receive certification that they do not contain any 
counter-revolutionary content (Lynch 1999).  
Consequently, Chinese media must not only remain the mouthpiece of CCP, but 
financially support themselves as well, despite dealing with different forms of censorship 
and the elimination of state financing. Similar to any other marketised media, Shanghai 
Television then expanded to cater to a vast range of different tastes for advertising 
revenues. Media content is sometimes a result of negotiation and bargaining between 
profit-seeking media companies and the government’s effort to maintain control (Tang 
2005). The market-oriented media have to chase profit by attracting audiences and playing 
up to the central government’s appeal at the same time. There are instances where 
commercialisation worked to enhance propaganda as a commercialised outlet in an 
attempt to enhance programme makers’ interests by aligning them with those of the 
government (Zhong 2001, Zhong 2010a). Seen in this light, transforming civil mediation 
into a reality entertainment show appears to be a typical and representative case, 
considering that mediation is not only a legacy of tradition due to its long history, but is 
also used as an effective propaganda method adapted by the CCP.  
 Conclusion  2.5
Within the specific context of China—the inherent Confucian culture of mediation and 
the frequently emphasised political goals, as well as the industrial reform of 
television—the basis was established for fostering the emergence of a special pattern of 
social communication that aimed to please both the audience and the authorities. Driven 
by internal and external factors, the first mediation TV show, XLNJ, appeared on 
television from early 2008. While it seems apparent that various topics were discussed on 
the show, ranging from family conflicts to social issues, these cases and the participants 
were selected carefully in order to avoid sensitive issues that would disturb social stability 
and play up to the audience’s ‘voyeuristic demand’ at the same time (see Chapter Five).  
This chapter has discussed the broad background of the XLNJ show. Three 
aspects—the political context, media marketisation, and deep-rooted mediation 
institution—formed the broad environment for the emergence of mediation reality shows. 
The market reform within the authoritarian regime brought the country not only 
economic growth but also side-consequences that needed to be pacified. As the 
government decided to address these social issues with the call for ‘harmony’, the media 
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have appeared to seize the opportunity to achieve market success during the media 
reform by promoting mediation—the traditional approach of conflict control—to 
respond to the needs of both government and the public.  
It seems that the media in an authoritarian regime more or less maintain their 
‘mouthpiece’ role as a means to secure their position in the market. Given the complex 
relation between the media and politics, which I will discuss in the next chapter (Chapter 
Three), the role of the media in an authoritarian regime is swinging like a pendulum. On 
the one hand, the market reform brought changes to its role by becoming more 
audience-oriented and more entertainised. On the other hand, however, the Chinese 
government, like governments in other authoritarian regimes, attempts to maintain its 
control. The following chapter will review studies on media, the political regime, and 
relations between television entertainment and politics. While most studies are conducted 
in Western democratic regimes, the available number of studies on Chinese 
(entertainment) media might suggest a different relationship with the government in an 
authoritarian system. The audience, as the receiving component of the entertainised 
media, may also have different perceptions in Western and authoritarian nations, which 
will also be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Chapter Three  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction  3.1
In the context of economic reforms, media commercialisation, and regime changes, 
mediation reality shows find a niche in the competitive marketplace playing up to both 
the audience and the government. My research looks into the production of mediation 
shows and the audience’s perception of intrinsic contradictions triggered by this particular 
format. Studies on media and politics can generally be divided into three main categories 
in terms of media sphere (Oates 2008): the production, content, and audience of a media 
product. In this chapter, I will firstly discuss the role of the media in authoritarian political 
regime models by reviewing early typologies of media and politics. Particularly, I will 
review the literature on television and politics, and I will additionally include the Chinese 
context. Media in authoritarian regimes, according to normative theories, should 
subordinate their freedom to the obligation of carrying out the goals of the party or the 
government. Some scholars are concerned that commercial profits might surpass other 
responsibilities in a competitive marketplace, leading to the convergence of entertainment 
and politics, which would generate political apathy among citizens and jeopardise 
democracy. Others have argued that TV entertainment programming or popular culture 
in general plays a role to encourage rather than suppress citizen engagement. Empirical 
studies in China have revealed a different situation from those in the West. By and large, 
entertainment media seem to pursue profit by appealing to the audience and appeasing 
the authorities. 
Secondly, the global commercialisation of the media industry has given rise to 
entertainisation, which also happens in China. Mediation reality shows emerge as an 
outcome of media commercialisation and entertainisation. While the collaboration with 
the Justice Bureau symbolises the endorsement from the local government, there are 
contentions between media entertainment and politics. Accordingly, in this section, I will 
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review the main literature on ‘entertainment and politics’, elaborating how they maintain 
an uneasy relationship.  
The contentions between entertainment and politics raise questions related to how 
the audience perceives such programmes like mediation shows. As a result, thirdly I will 
discuss the literature on audience studies. Particularly, I will review the uses and gratifications 
approach to provide a theoretical framework for my research. In addition, I will review 
the limited number of studies on the audience in China. Finally, being aware of an 
increasing academic interest in mediation shows, or more generally, life-counselling 
programmes41 (bang mang lei jiemu) in China, I will briefly review recent studies in this 
field.  
 Media System and Politics 3.2
 Media and Political Regimes  3.2.1
One classic work examining the relationship between media and political structures is the 
Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956). The authors believe 
that mass media ‘takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures 
within which it operates’ and reflects the ‘basic beliefs and assumptions that the society 
holds’ (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956, 1-2). Based on this notion, they proposed 
four ideal models of mass media-political relationships: the Authoritarian, Soviet 
Communist, Libertarian, and Social Responsibility models. According to the authors, the 
Authoritarian model requires the media to work for the state’s needs; the Soviet 
Communist model holds that media must serve the benefits of the working class and 
support the Marxist-Leninist ideologies; the Libertarian model provides full autonomy to 
the media so that any kind of opinions can be aired freely; and the Social Responsibility 
model suggests that the media should cover all parts of society responsibly and include 
the public interest (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1956). These four models describe an 
ideal or typical way for a media system to perform under certain political and social 
conditions. 
                                                          
41 Life-counselling programmes are used by Chinese television professionals to refer not only to mediation 
shows but also to others that provide help or solutions to people’s difficulties in life.  
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Established in the Cold War era, the Four Theories has its root in Western liberalism 
and bi-polar thinking, and the ‘global expansion of the U.S. model of privately owned 
for-profit media’ (Nerone 1995, 8). The boundaries between the models are vague. In fact, 
Siebert and his co-authors themselves indicated in the introduction that the four theories 
can be summarised as two basic types: a libertarian tradition of free press and an 
authoritarian one of censorship, while the Social Responsibility and the Soviet 
Communist models are their respective variants. Nerone saw this inadequacy of 
classification as the fundamental conceptual problem with Four Theories: ‘it defines the 
four theories from within one of the four, classical liberalism because it is specifically 
within classical liberalism that the political world is divided into individuals versus society 
or the state’ (Nerone 1995, 21). In addition to the questionable typology, the Four Theories 
has also been criticised for its narrow scope of selected media, neglect of developing 
countries, oversimplifications of media systems, ethnocentric perspective, and 
inconsistent structure (see Curran and Park 2000, Hardy 2010, McQuail 1994, Merrill 
2002, Nerone 1995).  
Building on the Four Theories approach, subsequent normative theorists sought to 
redress the deficiencies and extend the framework to address a wider range of regions. 
For example, Merrill and Lowenstein (1971) renamed the Soviet Communist model as the 
social-authoritarian, attempting to depict the political situation more appropriately. Given 
the rise of independent states in Asia and Africa after World War II, Hachten and 
Hachten (1981) and McQuail (1983) have suggested that new categories should be added 
alongside the liberal and Marxist variants. Hachten and Hachten (1981, 169-170) 
relabelled the original four models and introduced a revolutionary media theory42, defined as 
illegal and subversive mass communication utilising the press and broadcasting to 
overthrow a government or wrest control from alien rulers. McQuail (1983) added two 
new categories: a democratic-participant theory for stronger models of democracy and a 
development theory for countries at lower levels of economic development and with limited 
resources, in which the media play the role of carrying out or supporting positive 
developmental programmes and accepting restrictions and instructions from the State. 
                                                          
42  In 1981, Hachten proposed five dimensions: Western, Communist, authoritarian, revolutionary, and 
development or third world.  
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The media should subordinate themselves to the requirements of political, economic, 
social, and cultural development. 
Some authors moved further away from the original four theories and developed 
their own. Altschull (1984, 1995) proposed an alternative typology. He identified three 
models for media systems: market – where media operate without external intervention, 
Marxist (communitarian) – where media serve according to the desire of the authority, and 
developing (advancing) – where media operate as the partners of governments. Picard (1985, 
67) has proposed another media theory, the Democratic socialist model, in which the media 
should ‘provide an avenue for expression of the public’s views and to fuel the political 
and social debates necessary for the continued development of democratic governance’. 
This model emphasises that media should have autonomy from economic and 
governmental power and legitimises state intervention when necessary. 
These subsequent schemas, however, are subject to the same deficiencies of the 
original normative models and face new challenges such as media proliferation, media 
convergence and digitalisation, and transnationalisation (Hardy 2010). They have paid 
little attention to media practices in other socialist states such present-day China. They are 
grounded in the four theories, which as Hallin and Mancini (2004) say, is like ‘a 
horror-movie zombie’ that ‘has stalked the landscape of media studies…for decades 
beyond its natural lifetime, and it is time to give it a decent burial and move on to the 
development of more sophisticated models based on real comparative analysis’ (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004, 10). Thus, they contend that we should take a close look at actual 
connections between media and the state. They adopt a ‘most similar system’ design that 
focuses on only a set of relatively comparable cases to assess whether ‘systematic 
connection between political and mass media structures’ can be identified (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004, xiii). Based on their analysis of 18 Western democracies, they identify four 
key dimensions that characterise national media systems including development of the media 
market, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state. Their conceptual 
framework also consists of five political system variables: the role of the state, type of 
democracy, type of pluralism, degree of rational-legal authority, and degree of pluralism with reference 
to the political contexts of media systems. Using these sets of dimensions, they explore 
relationships between the political system and media structures, and propose three models 
of media and politics: a Polarized Pluralist Model, where media are linked to party politics, 
weaker commercial media, and a strong role of the state; a Democratic Corporatist Model, in 
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which commercial media coexist with media outlets tied to organised social political 
groups and the state has a small but active role; and a Liberal Model in which media 
operate according to the principles of the free market and there are no formal 
connections between media and politics, and minimal state intervention occurs (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004).   
The theory of Hallin and Mancinis is a major framework to understand 
complicated connections between political and mass media structure. While their theory 
has extended and repudiated the Four Theories tradition, it also shares similar limitations of 
the earlier normative models. One inadequacy, among others, is the problem of 
classification—to what extent can the suggested framework, based on 18 Western 
democracies, be used to understand variations between different systems in the rest of the 
world, located within different cultural, social, and political contexts? 
 China’s Media System in a Global Context 3.2.2
These theories developed in the West are less applicable to media systems in the 
non-West, such as Asian countries. Many of the philosophical underpinnings of Western 
theories have to be redefined to fit Asia’s cultural and philosophical heritage (Yin 2008). 
How to fit Asian countries, particularly China, into the debate about media and polities? 
Ostini and Ostini (2002) seek to answer this question by incorporating the individual 
journalists’ autonomy into political and social structural factors, contending that China’s 
media system is authoritarian-conservative compared with Hong Kong’s 
authoritarian-liberal system. However, their analysis is of a micro-level that fails to avoid 
the problem of undue generalisation (Hardy 2010).  
Another effort to remedy this deficiency has been undertaken by Yin (2008), who 
proposes a two-dimensional model of freedom and responsibility. This model integrates the 
key Asian cultural emphasis on the concept of responsibility into the Western 
preoccupation with freedom. The Asian concept of responsibility, as Yin argues, is the 
result of both Confucian moral influence and socio-economic realties of Asia. She uses 
‘Free’ and ‘Responsibility’ as two dimensions to measure the relation between media and 
state. According to her, Chinese media are categorised as ‘Responsible but not free’. The 
responsible part manifests itself in the rise of news coverage on officials’ corruption and 
the media’s attention to those living at the ‘grass-roots’.  
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According to Yin, the Western models are embedded in individualist cultures that 
value independence, personal freedom, and rights of the individual. The Asian ones 
emphasise being responsible and loyal to the state and family rather than being free. 
Whereas most Western societies are egalitarian, emphasising public participation, 
Confucian societies are hierarchical and vertical, believing in meritocracy instead of 
democracy, and where equality in human relations is a foreign concept. Unlike the media 
in Western countries that takes pride in being a watchdog of the government, in 
Confucian societies, people are expected to be obedient and to respect the government so 
as to keep social order, and social stability takes precedence over civil liberties (Yin 2008).  
She says that cultural values are important to both the West and the East, and 
bringing this concept to the dimension of responsibility makes the typology applicable 
not only to the Western but also to the Asian countries. Her models facilitate the 
understanding of Asian media systems in a global context. However, Yin’s models seem 
confusing when applying them in practice, as she distinguishes her concept of 
responsibility from that of the social responsibility media model (Jakubowicz 2010). It is 
also not clear which model fits Chinese media. While many media organisations can be 
classified as Free and not responsible, the forces from developing technology and market 
competition are, as Yin herself says, ‘pushing the Chinese press toward more freedom and 
responsibility’. It might not be easy to clearly pigeonhole the Chinese media system, 
which, as early scholars concluded, is characterised by ‘commercialization without 
independence’ (Chan 1993) and ‘professionalization without guarantees’ (Yu 1994).  
After reviewing these theories on relationships between media and politics, the 
present author does not attempt to classify the Chinese media system into a certain model. 
Rather, these previous theories shed some light on how political systems may have impact 
on media structure and may shape the media content. But normative theories are not 
sufficient to understand the specific media in China. In fact, the changing media in a 
changing China has been a recent interest for empirical scholars (Shirk 2010). They would 
agree that media in China play a very important political role, which is often seen as 
instrumental to regime stability (see, for example, Street 1997, Womack 1987, Zhao 1998). 
Media were not considered a politically independent or neutral enterprise. Rather, as Hu 
Yaobang, a former General Secretary of the Party, expressed in his speech at the Central 
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Committee Meeting43, the purpose of the media was to serve as the ‘mouthpiece of the 
party’ and the media ‘are all under the leadership of the party and must follow the party 
lines, principles and policies’ (Hu 1985). The party used to hold comprehensive control 
over the media through legal, financial, and administrative means, prescribing that: 1), the 
news media must accept the party’s guiding ideology as their own; 2), they must propagate 
the party’s programmes, policies, and directives; and 3) they must accept the party’s 
leadership and adhere to the party’s organisational principles and press policies (Zhao 
1998).  
With the start of the economic reform, advertising has become the main funding 
source for television, and thus the party lost one of its means of control. Television 
stations began to produce market-oriented programmes so as to pursue profit through 
their advertisement income. As Zhao (1998) writes, ‘The new types of stations 
counterbalance the lopsided political and propagandist orientation of the official model 
and give fuller play to the economic, cultural and entertainment functions of 
broadcasting’. China’s entry into the WTO has no doubt put pressure on the domestic 
media, as they would be faced with challenges from a more open marketplace. Under 
marketisation, the Chinese television industry has been undergoing significant 
transformations in programming, production, ratings, and policies, making relations 
between visual media and politics more complex. These transformations, as Chu (2008) 
contends in her study of Chinese television documentaries, are not only changes in style 
‘but generic shifts that reveal substantial modifications in the attitude of the Chinese 
government towards the media under market pressure…these changes are indicators of a 
society in a gradual process towards “democratization” and regime modification, a 
process in which the media are playing an increasingly significant role’ (Chu 2008, 49). 
According to her, the ‘democratic’ potential of the television programmes is beginning to 
be realised in a variety of ways.  
At the same time, television in China, particularly national television, maintains its 
political function. Chang (2003) compared the coverage of presidential summits on 
Chinese and U.S. national television, i.e. China Central Television (CCTV) and 
The American Broadcasting Company (ABC). While both national television networks 
                                                          
43 Held on 8 February 1985 
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featured diverse reports of the events, the presentation on CCTV seemed to be couched 
in a specific framework to favour the central authority and institution controlling Chinese 
society and the news media (Chang 2003, 134). For example, CCTV covered the Beijing 
summit of the year 2003 in a way that motivated a sense of national pride or nationalism 
(see Chang, 2003, p. 135). 
Indeed, in this ‘patriotic nationalism’, the media and the authorities collaborate in 
reinforcing regime legitimacy. As Lee (2003) states, Communism no longer exists in 
China, but the Communist Party remains, attempting to maintain its monopolistic control 
over coercive power and resources. ‘The propaganda-weary Chinese do not trust 
fraudulent Party rhetoric; they treat it with indifference, ridicule, or situational compliance 
to protect their self-interest. The only exception occurs when national sovereignty is at 
stake: the populace joins forces with the regime to achieve “patriotic nationalism”’(Lee 
2003, 2).   
In the context of commercialisation, Chinese media have been developing in a 
more market-oriented direction. Yuezhi Zhao (2012) indicates that the commercialisation 
is constrained, and that it has not undermined political instrumentalisation in any 
substantial way. She contends that: 
‘In China, although the party media model remains “structured in dominance”, it 
is perhaps useful to move beyond a single model to understand Chinese media 
institutions and practices in the dynamic and creative tensions among political 
instrumentalization, commercial instrumentalization, professionalization, and 
pressures for popular participation in the era of digitalized and socialized 
communication’ (Zhao 2012, 172). 
Indeed, with the economic development, the role of the media in China has also been 
slightly changing. China’s media still please and follow the authority; as in the Soviet 
theory, the mass media are subject to state control and serve the party. Meanwhile, the 
media have no longer been financed by the government, which has cut their subsidies, 
leading them to pursue profit in the market through programmes that attract large 
audiences, notably entertainment programmes.  
So far in this section, I have elaborated previous works on media and political 
regimes, describing different frameworks for a media system to perform under different 
political and social conditions. As the economic reform proceeds in China, the role of the 
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media has changed in response to the shifting political environment. It suggests a 
different relation between media freedom and government control from what is assumed 
in early theories established in Western democracies. The economic reform also brought 
about marketisation and commercialisation, which have led the media towards the 
direction of entertainment. Accordingly, in the following section, I will review and discuss 
the relation between entertainment and politics.  
 The Role of TV Entertainment in Politics 3.3
The debates about entertainment in relation to politics are dominated by two main 
arguments concerning whether televised entertainment plays an undermining role to 
modern democratic practices. The pessimistic debates can be traced back to the last 
century. The ‘crisis of democracy’, raised in the widely influential Trilateral Commission’s 
Report of the United States, Europe, and Japan44 (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 
1975), has triggered a wave of anxiety about civic engagement and media. This ‘crisis’ has 
inspired much research and debate, among which the media malaise thesis is dominant. 
The malaise theory was introduced by political scientist Michael Robinson (1976), who 
contended that people who rely for information on television only are victims of ‘video 
malaise’, suggesting that the viewing of televised public affairs programming results in an 
increased sense of malaise and hinders civic engagement, trust in government, and public 
participation in politics.  
The media malaise theory is by and large based on two core assumptions: firstly, 
the process of political communications has a significant impact upon civic engagement; 
and secondly, this impact has a negative direction (Norris 1998). Though the malaise 
theory is also applicable to other media, television—a medium seen as inherently suitable 
for entertainment and detrimental to democracy (Jones 2005)—has been frequently 
targeted. Scholars and critics repeatedly lay the blame for increased interaction between 
politics and entertainment at the feet of this particular medium. For instance, Robert 
                                                          
44 In this report, the authors Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joni Watanuki expressed concern 
about the crisis of democracy that the capacity of the state would not meet the demands from democratic 
government. They criticised that the rise of critical and autonomous news media has challenged government 




Putnam (2000) judges watching entertainment television as a factor isolating people from 
social activities and consequently deteriorating social connections. For Neil Postman 
(1985), the problem with television is epistemological – TV is a dangerous way of knowing 
and understanding politics. For him, only the print media can convey information 
objectively and rationally. Television offers merely amusement, entertainment, and 
distraction. It has made entertainment the ‘natural format for the representation of all 
experience’ and ‘the problem is not that television presents us with entertaining subject 
matter, but that all subject matter is presented as entertaining’ (Postman 1985, 87). 
Roderick Hart (1994) focuses on the phenomenological problem that television has 
transformed the way politics is experienced. He writes that television disclosure may 
give people an illusion of closeness with politicians and may allow us to feel engaged or 
empowered politically. However, he argues that such false and temporal feelings make 
people feel informed instead of being really knowledgeable about politics. In addition to 
Putnam, Postman, and Hard, numerous scholars also argue that entertaining politics on 
television has increased disaffection among citizens, as measured by homogenised 
opinions, political apathy, declining voting rates, loss of political trust, and declining 
confidence in government45.  
Yet, other scholars hold a more optimistic opinion towards the relations between 
entertainment and politics, arguing that the role of entertainment is not necessarily ‘all’ 
bad. Based on their empirical evidence, they challenge the television malaise thesis from 
various angles. For instance, Pippa Norris (2000) argues that news programming in 
conjunction with political party activities is not responsible for civic malaise; on the 
contrary, television viewing can be an activating force to strengthen civic virtue and 
encourage political interest, efficacy, and knowledge. She explains that politically engaged 
people are more likely to watch television news, and the exposure then reinforces these 
characteristics in a virtuous circle. Similarly, Kees Brants (1998) contends that the 
premises of an ‘infotainment scare’ are problematic. He has reviewed studies on television 
news and politics and suggested that television journalism in Northern Europe is by and 
large serious and deliberative. Together with his colleague Neijens (Brants and Neijens 
1998), they have carried out a content analysis of 16 programmes prior to the 1994 
                                                          
45 See Newton (2006) for a detailed and helpful overview of media malaise literature and arguments. 
57 
 
elections in the Netherlands, and found that a talk show may be more informative than a 
news programme in terms of reflecting a candidate’s qualities, and that programmes on 
private channels are not necessarily more entertainment-focused in their portrayal of 
politics than those on public channels.  
Furthermore, Liesbet van Zoonen (2005) argues that the malaise thesis is 
supported by the elites as a means to position themselves above the ordinary masses who 
enjoy popular culture. She says the authors of the video malaise discourse ‘implicitly 
proclaim themselves as the authorities who are able to see through the tricks television 
plays upon “us”, and who will guide us out of the darkness’ (van Zoonen 2005, 15). She 
connects fandom with citizenship, arguing that they share three similarities in terms of 
process: first, both fan communities and political constituencies come into being as a 
result of performance; second, their cognitive and participatory activities are very much 
alike; and third, they both rest on emotional investments.   
In the same vein, Jeffrey Jones (2005) proposes that citizenship can be engaged in 
and encouraged through televised popular culture. He carried out an analysis of 
humorous political talk shows in the light of Dahlgren’s (2000) six pre-conditions that 
include discussion, practices, values, knowledge, affinity, and identities. Jones (2005, 196) 
contends that television ‘provides a public space where preconditions of citizenship can 
be cultivated, displayed, affirmed, and maintained’. 
Apparently, these scholars accept the key role that television plays in democracy, 
and they also acknowledge that the boundary between entertainment and politics is 
increasingly blurred. By and large, these studies mine news and information programmes 
or political talk shows for case studies. The process of politics being ‘communicated in 
order to acquire the interest and involvement of its external referents, the average citizens’ 
(van Zoonen 2005, 7), might well happen through television genres other than 
conventional political communication. Indeed, the seemingly apolitical content of 
television entertainment might have a powerful influence on the way we define 
socio-political problems and embrace ideology (Parenti 1992). An increasingly important 
genre in the global context is reality television.  
The genre of reality TV is relatively young, with scholarly discussions on it having 
become rich and varied only in the recent decade. Early studies have attempted to define 
the genre, where Hill (2005) argues that there is not one definition but many competing 
definitions of the reality genre. She explores the various ways in which television 
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practitioners, academics, and audiences categorise reality TV and finds that the genre is 
hybrid. For her, the defining characteristic and key attraction of the reality genre is ‘the 
capacity to let viewers see for themselves’ (Hill 2005, 55). She indicates that audiences use 
a fact/fiction continuum to evaluate the ‘reality’ of the reality television. In her early study 
of Big Brother viewers, Hill (2002) suggested that audiences are tired of performative 
documentaries. They want to see programmes that capture someone’s story behind the 
scene or those filmed with hidden cameras, where people have no opportunity to act 
before the camera. Audiences possess a seemingly paradoxical and critical attitude 
towards reality TV: they criticise the genre for being ‘mindless entertainment’ and 
meanwhile criticise themselves for watching it (Hill 2005).  
Valentina Cardo (2011) uses Celebrity Big Brother 2007 as a case study to investigate 
how this reality show encourages audience engagement around issues raised in the 
programme. She sees the show as a forum where vertical political communication takes 
place. The result of her content analysis suggests that the show drew upon the same 
language and procedures as politics and thus promoted ‘a type of participation that 
counted as political’ (Cardo 2011, 242). Such participation is articulated through the 
viewers’ voting action to support or oppose a contestant, by which viewers/citizens can 
influence the outcome. Another empirical study of Wife Swap by Todd Graham (2011a, 
Graham 2011b, Graham and Hajru 2011) suggests that reality shows can trigger political 
discussion on the Internet. He investigated the use of expressives (humor, emotional 
comments, and acknowledgments) in viewers’ online discussions, and contends that 
active audiences engaged in political talk are often deliberative. These studies of popular 
reality shows in the U.K. or the U.S. provide evidence that entertainment reality television 
can play a positive role in enhancing civic engagement. In the context of China, as I will 
review in the following paragraphs, reality television or entertainment more generally 
plays a subtle role in terms of engaging audiences and enhancing the existing power 
structure.  
 Entertainment and Politics in China 3.3.1
While there have been book-length studies on reality TV in the Western context, studies 
from non-Western perspectives are scarce (Meng 2009). In this section, I will review 
studies on reality TV and also those on entertainment and popular culture in general. 
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Addressing entertainment and reality television in China, the unprecedented 
popularity of Super Girl in 2005 created a fever phenomenon among Chinese television 
viewers. The show bears much resemblance to Fox’s American Idol in the U.S. or ITV’s 
Pop Idol in the U.K. (Meng 2009). At its final contest, it attracted approximately 400 
million viewers, and the figure exceeded that of the China Central Television New Year's 
Gala earlier that year (Macartney 2005, Yardley 2005). Its voting mechanism allows 
audiences to participate in the judging process by sending messages from their mobile 
phones to vote for their favourite girl, which was seen as a ‘democratic’ exercise in 
mainland China and triggered heated debates on its social impact and political 
implications (Cui 2005, de Kloet and Landsberger 2012, Lynch 2005, Macartney 2005, 
Marquand 2005, Yardley 2005, Zhou 2005). It seems to have been unprecedented in the 
history of Chinese television that an entertainment show would invoke discussions on 
politics, democracy, and citizenship (Meng 2009). In academia, Meng (2009) attempted to 
examine the Super Girl phenomenon through the lens of media spectacle, and she reveals 
that in the process of the production, participation, and interpretation of the spectacle, 
three myths were reinforced:  
‘First, “free” market being an antithetical force against state control and delivers 
“people’s” choice. Second, media offer privileged access points to reality and 
authenticity, which are further enhanced by the interactivity that reality TV 
allows. Third, shows like Super Girl provide a platform for people to practice 
democratic deliberation and governance in an authoritarian society’ (Meng 2009, 
268). 
She argues that these myths reinforced and naturalised the existing power structure. Jian 
and Liu (2009), however, argue that talent shows like Super Girl make use of contestants 
and audiences as cheap labour to generate profit. Fans and participants are charmed by a 
certain amount of apparent democracy during the singing contests and they are 
symbolically paid in ‘dream-fulfilment’, which the authors call a ‘democratic entertainment 
commodity’ (Jian and Liu 2009, 525). 
Hartley (2007) sees talent shows like Super girl as ‘politiciotainment’, combining 
reality with plebiscite. Such talent shows have a voting mechanism similar to that in the 
abovementioned Celebrity Big Brother. Hartley’s finding is to a large extent consistent with 
Cardo’s, that the entertainment industry has discovered that people love to vote, 
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sometimes even without expecting instrumental outcome (Hartley 2007, 51). While 
viewers in Western democratic regimes can support or disdain a contestant through 
voting action (Cardo, 2011), Hartley’s (2007) findings indicate that the craze of voting in 
the Chinese context can, but will not necessarily, amount to democracy.  
While talent shows remain popular on Chinese television, another genre, the dating 
shows have proliferated on provincial as well as local channels following the success of If 
You Are the One (feicheng wurao) since 2010. The show If You Are the One became popular 
not only because of its innovative format and humorous conversations, but also because 
it taps into Chinese people’s attitudes and anxieties about love, relationship and marriage 
(Sun, 2015). The show features blunt and sometimes controversial social commentaries 
made by young female contestants on the stage, which both shock and resonate with the 
audience. These remarks reflect the prevailing materialistic values in the society46, which 
undoubtedly incurred the accusation of promoting ‘incorrect social and love values such 
as money worship’ (SARFT 2010). Behind the concerns of corrupted moral standards, as 
Sun (2014) argued, the government panics for the reason that such programmes may 
intensify conflicts between the rich and the poor and consequently ‘accentuate’ social 
tensions.  
The above studies illustrate how seemingly apolitical entertainment can be a field 
for political warfare. These entertaining reality shows actually provide a prism through 
which to understand the subtle relation between entertainment and politics in China. 
While talent shows like Super girl benefited from their ‘plebiscite’ mechanism that 
‘apparent democracy’ has been strategically used as a means to establish booming 
viewership and to generate great profit, dating shows like If You Are the One achieved high 
ratings for its controversially blunt content presenting undisguised materialistic values. It 
is undoubtedly true that profit is what the show’s producers care about, whereas in a 
specific media environment in China, entertainment inevitably connects to politics in 
various degrees. Both Super Girl and If You Are the One became the target of SARFT’s 
series ‘Clean up the Screen’ campaign (Bai 2014), which manifests the government’s 
determination to maintain control over media content. In the eyes of the government, 
                                                          
46 One notorious example is a remark made by Ma Nuo, one of the contestants, who said that ‘I would rather 
cry in a BMW than smile on a bicycle’.  
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entertainment programmes shall not only pursue their own interests, but also fulfil the 
mission to ‘provide moral education in the form of entertainment’ (yu jiao yu le) (Sun 2015, 
see also Chapter Five).  
 Television Audience Analysis 3.4
The above studies probe into complex relations between entertainment and politics in 
different cultural and political systems in Europe and the U.S., and some studies exist on 
the case of China. Authors examine the role of entertainment by studying the 
phenomenon, the production, and/or the discourse. How audiences perceive or make use 
of the media is another important component of this research. In this section, I will 
particularly review the uses and gratifications approach, which provides a theoretical 
framework for my research.  
In order to understand why people watch mediation programmes and what people 
can get out of watching that sort of programme, it is necessary to research audiences and 
explore their interpretations of media content as well as their uses of certain messages 
transmitted through television. Uses and gratifications theory (U&G) has been developed to 
explain reasons why individuals seek particular types of mass media programming and 
what gratifications they may receive from the attendance or use of it (Fuller 1996). Uses 
and gratifications theory focuses on the audience and explores ‘what do people do with the 
media?’ (Katz 1959). U&G tends to explore the motivation and needs behind the 
audience’s use of the media, adopting a sociological and psychological perspective.  
Early scholars and researchers have taken different approaches to research into 
audiences. For example, Jensen and Rosengren (1990) summarised five traditions of 
audience research: studies of effects; uses and gratifications; literary criticism; cultural studies; 
and reception analysis. McQuail (2005) saw three main schools of audience research: the 
structural approach, which focuses on the media system and the social system as primary 
determinants; the behavioural (functionalist) approach, which devotes attention to 
individual needs, motives, and circumstances; and the social-cultural approach, which 
emphasises the particular context in which the audience is located.  
Blumler (1979) summarised three motivations of audiences and their effects: 
‘First, we may postulate that cognitive motivation will facilitate information 
gain... Second, media consumption for purposes of diversion and escape will 
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favour audience acceptance of perceptions of social situations in line with 
portrayals frequently found in entertainment materials... Third, involvement in 
media materials for personal identity reasons is likely to promote reinforcement 
effects’ (Blumler 1979, 18-19). 
As a functionalist approach, the uses and gratifications approach is helpful in providing an 
open framework for this research, as its origins lie in the search for answers to why 
people use media and for what purpose. The first uses and gratifications research can be 
dated as early as the 1940s when scholars were interested in investigating people’s uses of 
different radio programmes and newspapers (McQuail 2005). This approach has five 
assumptions: 1. The audience is active; 2. The initiative in linking gratification and a 
specific medium choice rests with the audience member; 3. The media compete with 
other sources of satisfaction; 4. Many of the goals that media employ can be derived from 
data supplied by the individual audience members themselves; and 5. Value judgments 
about the cultural significance of mass communication should be suspended while 
audience operations are explored on their own terms (Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 1973, 
510-511). 
After their study of different radio and TV programmes in Britain, McQuail, 
Blumler, and Brown (1972) proposed four main gratifications that people can get out of 
media use: (1) Diversion: escaping from personal problems and routine; emotional release; 
(2) Personal relationships: using the media for companionship; social utility; (3) Personal 
identity: using the media as reference for identifying; gaining reinforcement for values; and 
(4) Surveillance: seeking information that facilitates the understanding of the world.  
Based on this general approach, Livingstone (1998) explored TV audiences’ usages 
of soap operas. In her book Making Sense of Television, she categorised and summarised that 
audiences have different uses of and gratifications from television. She argued that some 
people watch TV as a daily routine and discuss the issues on TV with other viewers. 
Some people watch TV soap operas mainly for entertainment and relaxation, while others 
find that the situations and problems portrayed in TV programmes reflect the facts in 
their real life. She further indicated that some audiences learn to solve problems through 
watching how other people on TV solve their difficulties. 
People’s uses of traditional media such as radio, television, and print publications 
can be grouped into five categories on the basis of previous research (Livingstone 1998, 
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McQuail, Blumler, and Brown 1972, Palmgreen, Wenner, and Rosengren 1985, Rubin 
1985, 2002):  
1. Surveillance: seeking information / education that facilitates the 
understanding of the world  
2. Personal identity: using the media as reference for identifying and 
reinforcing values 
3. Personal relationships (social utility): using the media for companionship 
or to enhance social interaction  
4. Diversion: escaping from personal problems and the stresses of daily life 
as an emotional release 
5. Entertainment: using the media to obtain enjoyment, for fun and/or 
relaxation 
These early studies using the U&G approach have revealed some common major 
gratifications that audiences obtain from using media. However, the uses and gratifications 
theory has come under criticisms from a number of scholars. Swanson (1979) indicated 
that U&G is too general to be viewed as a framework of theories, which may lead to 
conceptual ambiguities and inconsistences. Moreover, it raises questions in terms of 
reliability and validity as most uses and gratifications research relies on self-reports based on 
respondents’ memory (Infante et al. 1997). Similarly, Becker (1979) also pointed out the 
difficulty in measuring ‘gratification’ because each individual may interpret the media in 
their own terms. It also has inadequacies in that it fails to provide much successful 
prediction or causal explanation of media choice and use (McQuail 1983) or overstates 
the real autonomy of the audience (Elliott 1974).  
Admittedly, its individualistic nature prevents the approach from exploring a more 
critical discourse of audiences’ perception. Despite these limitations, however, this 
approach is useful for comparison and description, and is widely and increasingly applied 
(McQuail 2005). Moreover, looking at communication apprehension with the U&G 
perspective and focusing attention on individual audiences is useful in understanding why 
people may watch a particular type of programme among hundreds of choices. Bearing its 
strengths and limitations in mind, the present author adopts the approach as a 
data-collecting and analysis strategy (cf. Severin and Tankard 1997, McQuail 1994), and 
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the above findings of audiences in Western democracies can be used as a benchmark to 
explore the audience’s uses and gratifications of television in China.  
 Studies on Mediation Shows 3.5
In recent years, the popularity of mediation shows on regional channels has attracted 
interest from Chinese scholars, though the literature is still limited and lacks empirical 
research on these shows’ audiences, and their uses of and gratifications from the 
programmes. Hawes and Kong (2013) have carried out a discourse analysis of mediation 
shows in China and indicated that while such shows help to solve people’s family disputes, 
the effect is too limited to really address social issues in Chinese society. Legal scholar Li 
(2012b, 2009) considers mediation on TV as the ‘fourth mediation paradigm’ in addition 
to judicial, administrative, and People’s mediation. He contends that while the pattern of 
mediation is influential in terms of promoting social ethics and psychologically pacifying 
disputing parties’ pressure, its intrinsic legal procedure and legitimacy are problematic. A 
legitimate alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the author advocates, should be 
established on the basis of rules and principles. Other scholars seem to be concerned 
more about the privacy issue of mediation shows. For instance, Liu and Yan (2012) state 
that programme makers should protect the disputing parties’ privacy in order to prevent 
negative social influence and trouble for these people. Similarly, Wu (2013) indicates that 
mediation television shows play a role of ‘magnifier’, amplifying social problems as well as 
social identity, and he is concerned that such shows solve personal disputes at the cost of 
individuals’ privacy. Zheng (2012) points out several limitations of TV mediation: the 
types of disputes in this genre are constrained to a narrow range, mediation on TV places 
too much emphasis on moral persuasion, and it lacks a proper promotion of legal 
knowledge. She also argued that there is a contradiction between the entertaining nature 
of television and the dispute resolving purpose of mediation. Yin (2012) studied 
mediation shows in terms of their public and private discourse, and concluded that a 
reasonable, appropriate, and effective communication pattern sets the necessary premise 
of the healthy development of mediation shows. These studies done so far have mainly 
been conducted along legal and content lines. Studies on why people watch and what they 




 Conclusion  3.6
This chapter has discussed three bodies of literature. According to the normative 
framework established by scholars in the Western democracies, media in authoritarian 
societies should subordinate their freedom to the obligation of carrying out the goals of 
the party or the government. Media marketisation brings about competitions in the 
marketplace that give rise to two different views: some authors believe that 
profit-orientation surpasses other responsibilities, bringing about commercialisation and 
excessive entertainment. They are concerned that the convergence of entertainment and 
politics on TV would generate political apathy among citizens and jeopardise democracy. 
Other scholars have carried out empirical studies to test this media malaise concern, 
contending that TV entertainment programming or popular culture in general plays a role 
to encourage rather than suppress citizen engagement. Unlike the findings in liberal 
democracies, where discussions on entertainment and politics often focus on soft news, 
empirical studies on Chinese media reveal a somewhat different outcome. On one hand, 
entertainment television such as reality shows manages to provide audiences a ‘democratic’ 
feeling by engaging them in the production process. On the other hand, these authors 
argue that the ‘democracy’ on the surface does not actually promote democracy nor does 
it challenge the authorities; on the contrary, it helps to enhance the existing power 
structure. Similar findings are also observed in newspapers in China (see, for example, 
Stockmann 2013). In the Chinese context, the studies on media entertainment and politics 
might lead to a different discussion from the Western context. By and large, 
entertainment on media seems to pursue profit by appealing to the audience and 
appeasing the authorities. A recent popular genre, mediation reality shows, seems to 
manifest such characteristics, as well.  
Mediation reality shows have been proliferating on local and satellite channels in 
recent years. As a first show of this genre, XLNJ has been featured by its collaboration 
with the local justice bureau, which symbolises the endorsement from the local 
government. While claiming to promote a harmonious society, the show appears to 
contradict the ‘saving-face’ culture by publicly presenting domestic disputes. What attracts 
audiences to this show, and what do they get out of it? Do they watch it for education, 
information, or just for fun? Answers to these questions will enhance our understanding 
of Chinese audiences. In this light, the U&G approach appears to be useful in exploring 
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the audience’s perception of such programmes in light of cultural, entertainment, and 
political contentions. 
To the author’s knowledge, studies on the relationship between Chinese media, 
politics, and audiences are still in their early stages. More attention is needed for 
entertainment reality shows and their audiences, and therefore I endeavour to add a 
missing link by pursuing a study of this particular programme. In addition to the U&G 
approach, I adopt a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the 






Starting in the beginning of 2008, the mediation show Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, 
XLNJ) has been widely popular not only among the audiences in Shanghai, but also in 
neighbouring cities and towns. Having labelled itself ‘helping to establish harmonious society’, 
the show responded to the political ideology proposed by the government at that time 
under the Hu-Wen administration. Its innovative and bold demonstration of mediation of 
real family disputes steadily captured the attention of a curious audience. It is to some 
extent extraordinary that such a specific format continually ranks high in audience ratings 
and even leads to imitations47. XLNJ found its niche in a competitive television market, 
catering to the demands of both the audience and the authorities.  
This study devotes attention to the phenomenon of mediation television shows, 
aiming to provide insights into why people watch the show, what they take out of it, how 
the production of the XLNJ show compounds civil mediation with cultural, political, as 
well as entertaining elements, and correspondingly how producers and the audience 
perceive and deal with the potential contradictions provoked by that combination. In 
order to address these questions, I adopted a multiple method design taking advantage of 
the strengths of different research methods. The research overall was divided into two 
phases, the first focusing on the programme production and the second looking into 
audience perception. Before the initiation of this research, I conducted a preliminary 
participant observation along with a documents analysis as part of the preparation for the 
later research design. The preliminary observation was used to make initial forays into the 
new phenomena of the mediation show, with the purpose as much to observe the 
                                                          
47 Following XLNJ, similar programmes such as Happiness Magic Cube (Xingfu Mofang) from Dragon TV and 
Disputing Parties (Jiafang Yifang) from Channel Young emerged in 2010 and 2011, respectively.  
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production procedure as to obtain relevant documents and identify likely interviewees for 
qualitative in-depth interviews. At the time, I had close contact with the XLNJ 
production team and became acquainted with several programme makers. I followed the 
entire process of programme production, from receiving cases through the telephone 
hotline, case selection in the pre-production meetings, studio shooting, to the final 
post-production editing. The preliminary observation period proved considerably helpful 
for my later research. I also familiarised myself with the format and content of this 
particular show through studying broadcast videos. Meanwhile, I gained access to certain 
internal documents such as regulations and notifications from the State Administration of 
Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), from which I identified potential restraints facing 
the programme makers. This, in turn, facilitated my design and the subsequent conduct of 
in-depth interviews. 
In the first phase, I carried out the analysis of visual and written materials and 
in-depth interviews with major players in the production process. The goal for the first 
phase was to untangle the social and political context of the mediation show as well as to 
explore aims of the show as perceived by the various production staff and mediators. I 
managed to cover a range of players involved in programme production: the programme 
producer, episode directors (editors)48, hotline receptionists, presenters, mediators on 
television, and production crew members. For the purpose of understanding their 
interpretations of the aims and goals of this show, I also interviewed audience 
commentators who are not involved in the decision-making process of the programme 
production and non-TV mediators working in actual life. In addition, I also conducted a 
basic content analysis of episodes broadcast every other week in 2013 to identify the 
frequency of topics that appeared on the show and to explore the relationship between 
topics and audience ratings.  
In the second phase, the audience perception part, a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods was adopted. I used an online survey to collect the 
                                                          
48 Episode directors and editors are interchangeable in this thesis, because for studio-based TV programmes, 
episode directors are responsible not only for directing the studio filming but also for subsequent editing. It 
usually takes at least two hours to film one single case; episode directors will have to cut most and shorten the 
story to fit the assigned time slot. There are post-production technicians who apply special effects, captions, and 
voice-overs. Episode directors are the staff members who make the first decision about what can and what 
cannot be shown on TV.  
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audience’s responses to a series of questions regarding their motivations to watch, their 
uses of and gratifications from mediation programmes, as well as their perceptions of the 
programme content in terms of its entertaining, social and political, and cultural aspects. 
Having conducted the online survey and the subsequent statistical analysis, I then 
proceeded to carry out focus group research. I utilised focus group analysis not only as a 
tool to investigate potential explanations for contradictions that the survey findings 
suggested, but also for the purpose of seeking substantive and insightful remarks to 
understand participants’ perceptions of the show. Both the online survey and the focus 
group helped to produce knowledge about the way in which audiences make sense of and 
use the mediation show in their daily life.  
In the sections that follow, I will present and exemplify the research design of the 
three methodological tools mentioned above: in-depth interviews, online survey, and 
focus group discussions. I will also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the three 
approaches respectively.  
 Preliminary Fieldwork 4.2
As part of the preparation for my research, I conducted preliminary fieldwork in 
December 2010 that combined observation with preparatory document analysis as well as 
some informal interviews. The main purpose of this fieldwork was to gain an 
understanding of programme makers’ activities and beliefs. The observation concentrated 
on the production of XLNJ, including its preparation and editorial phases. I followed the 
entire process of programme production, from receiving cases through the telephone 
hotline, case selecting in pre-production meetings, studio shooting, and post-production 
editing. The aim of this observation period was to clarify what factors played a part in the 
production procedure of the mediation show. The pre-production was in effect a 
decision-making phase, during which programme makers selected dispute issues and 
corresponded with the mediator. The production stage referred to the recording phase 
when disputes were disentangled by the mediator, presenter, and audience commentators 
in the studio. And in the post-production phase, directors performed editing of the 
programme, such as cutting off disputants’ conversations that they considered irrelevant, 
adding captions, and creating trailers.  
The early stages of observations were mostly non-participatory; I watched, listened 
to, and made notes of the production team’s regular meetings from a bystander’s 
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perspective without talking much with the production staff. At that time, I restrained 
myself from intervening in an attempt not to influence their daily work. It was not long 
before I established direct rapport with the production crew members, and after that, I 
began to engage in informal conversations with them. That is to say, the degree of my 
observation during the research shifted from ‘non-participation’ to ‘passive participation’ 
(Schwartz and Schwartz 1955). My role in the beginning was that of a ‘complete observer’, 
who watched from the sideline without becoming involved. During the later stage of the 
observation, I chose the role of ‘observer-as-participant’, in which I was able to ‘observe 
and interact closely enough with members to establish an insider's identity without 
participating in those activities constituting the core of group membership’ (Schrøder et al. 
2003, 380). Such a degree of participatory observation allowed me to observe more 
closely and make more detailed notes on what happened during the production course of 
the mediation.  
I had prepared an observation checklist49 listing questions worth attention to 
ensure proper and complete collection of necessary data. The checklist functioned as a 
memo, as well, so I was able to grasp a general idea of the production phase by ticking the 
items or taking down notes on it. Questions on the checklist mainly focused on: whether 
disputes on the show are real or being scripted, the source of dispute cases, decisions 
being made over the dispute content, what has been eliminated during post-production 
editing and on what ground, and whether there are any tensions during the production of 
the show.  
I had the opportunity to access certain internal regulatory documents50, including 
editorial instructions from the producer and documents by the SARFT (guifanxing wenjian) 
informing TV stations about decisions, orders, and directives. I downloaded all of the 
accessible documents at the time and reviewed them to learn the requirements and 
constraints on editing, with the purpose to identify potential problems and challenges 
facing the programme makers. I watched a large number of XLNJ shows (TV broadcast 
                                                          
49 See Appendix 2. 
50 The XLNJ production team staff used a shared mailbox, where they uploaded the paperwork for the 
programme such as transcripts and outlines. The producer also uploaded some instructive or regulatory 
documents from the higher TV station authorities or the SARFT. I was given permission by the producer to 
access this mailbox.  
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and online archives) to obtain a further understanding of the structure and format of the 
show in order to observe the presenters’ and mediators’ speeches and behaviours. During 
the later stage of the observation, I initiated casual conversations with several production 
staff member in an attempt to obtain more specific information. Gaining a thorough 
familiarity with the show was a crucial part of the preparation for the later research. 
The onsite observation was helpful in identifying and guiding relationships with 
interviewees; helping to get a feel for how activities are organised and prioritised and how 
people interrelate; and providing me a source of questions to be addressed with 
participants (Dewalt, Dewalt, and Wayland 1998). But as with any research technique, 
participant observation has limitations. The researcher’s appearance, age, gender, ethnicity, 
and class may affect the extent to which she is accepted in the group under study (Dewalt, 
Dewalt, and Wayland 1998, Spradley 1980). Moreover, the existing mores in the group, or 
the so-called structural characteristics (Dewalt, Dewalt, and Wayland 1998), may also 
inhibit researcher’s acceptance. There are various reasons for researchers to be excluded: 
a lack of trust, the use of a language that is unfamiliar to the researcher, or their changing 
from one language to another that is not understood by the researcher (Schwartz and 
Schwartz 1955). I managed to minimise these influence and enhance my acceptance by 
taking advantage of dialect commonalities and by my familiarity with some of the 
production team. As a native speaker of Chinese born in Shanghai, I engaged in most 
conversations in Shanghainese in order to put the interviewees at ease. In this way, it is 
also helpful to establish rapport with production staff members.  
 Phase I: In-Depth Interviews  4.3
 Aims & Limitations  4.3.1
During the preliminary fieldwork, I had learned the production of a mediation show: 
criteria for case selection, meetings where dispute cases are discussed, the recording of the 
mediation in the studio, and the editing to make an episode ready for broadcast. In 
addition, I developed my understanding of the aim of the show through some casual and 
more structured talk with the production staff. Based on the data and my initial 
understanding, I held in-depth interviews to investigate further to acquire more detailed 
information. As Fraenkel and Wallen (2003, 440) noted, ‘Interviewing is an important way 
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for a researcher to check the accuracy of—to verify or refute—the impressions he or she 
has gained from observation’.  
The purpose of interviewing the production team members and the mediation 
committees was to determine what is on their minds—what they see as the aim of the 
mediation show and what they think about possible tensions in combining civil mediation 
with a television format in general and entertainment in particular. To address such 
questions, I interviewed those involved in the programme production with the purpose of 
exploring the decisive factors during the course of the production and obtaining an 
insight into the intended aims of the show as seen by various interviewees. As a 
qualitative research method, in-depth interviews are useful for researchers to elicit 
information in order to achieve a holistic understanding of the interviewee’s point of view 
or situation (Berry 1999). Indeed, through interviews, we could learn from people those 
aspects we cannot directly observe (Gobo 2008). 
A critical problem in interview research is interviewer bias, which according to 
Selltiz and her colleagues ‘can more correctly be described as interviewers differences, 
which are inherent in the fact that interviewers are human beings and not machines and 
they do not work identically’ (Selltiz et al. 1965, 583). This means, for example, that two 
interviewers might come out with different results after they interviewed the same 
interviewee with the very same questions, because interviewers could emotionally engage 
to a different degree in conversations. Interviewer bias or interviewers’ differences may 
give rise to the insufficiency of between-interview comparability, which would in turn 
affect the validity and reliability of the data. As I conducted all of the interviews myself, 
this was not a problem.   
Admittedly, it is precarious to find a balance between ‘prejudicing the answers to 
questions, establishing a relationship that would allow the interviews to be successful and 
holding a civilised conversation’ (Corbin 1972, 305). In order to carry out productive 
interviews whilst minimising bias, I offered minimal guidance during interviews and tried 
to bring out ‘the affective and value-laden implications of the subjects’ response’ (Merton 
and Kendall 1946). I carefully managed my relationships with the interviewees. Though in 
theory it would be possible to gain trust from the interviewees by showing interest, in 
practice, the degree of difficulty varies depending on an individual’s character and 
experience. In the interviews for this study, I occasionally met with people who were 
suspicious of what I was doing. They gave ‘an icy reception’ when they felt that they were 
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the objects of a study. Such a situation usually happened with people who are unfamiliar 
with formal interviews. In that case, I spent more time on casual chatting to warm up the 
atmosphere. In those interviews, I was conscious of the importance and delicacy to 
establish a friendly yet detached relationship with interviewees.  
 Research Protocol 4.3.2
The composition of the group of interviewees aimed at covering major players in the 
programme production, notably the producer, episode directors, presenters, and 
mediators. They formed the production team of the show. Most interviews were carried 
out with those intellectually involved in the production process and the decision-making 
of the content. In addition, I also conducted an interview with a technical crew member 
to gain technical insight. The production team was involved in regular pre-production 
meetings to discuss and deicide which cases would be selected for televised mediation, 
whereas the technical crew only participated in the shooting phase. Off-screen mediators 
refer to those who work in sub-district offices and town mediation committees (jiedao 
banshichu) or neighbourhood committees (jumin weiyuanhui). Onsite audience 
commentators were volunteers or interested viewers who sit on the sideline watching and 
are asked to give their opinions during the mediation. 
Bearing in mind that the composition of interviewees consisted of people of 
different professional backgrounds, I decided to conduct relatively systematic, but partly 
different, semi-structured interviews in the interest of flexibility without sacrificing 
comparability. Interviews were carried out according to an interview guide that consisted 
of a series of questions designed to obtain interviewees’ thoughts and opinions towards 
the mediation show. I prepared separate interview guides51 for programme makers, 
on-screen mediators, ordinary mediators, and audience commentators respectively. These 
interview guides contained the same opinion questions for all, and were designed to gain 
information that can be compared and contrasted later, as well as different demographic 
and experience questions aimed at determining specific information that the respondents 
from different professional groups possess.  
                                                          
51 See Appendix 3. 
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The purpose of using in-depth interviews with programme makers and mediators 
on TV was to determine, first of all, what they see as the aim of the mediation show; 
secondly, why they have chosen the entertainment format and what they see as the pros 
and cons of this choice; thirdly, what they perceive as the impact on viewers and Chinese 
society in general of televised and entertained mediation; and finally, how they deal with 
the intersection where the personal and the private becomes political. Interviewees’ 
answers to questions were then analysed to explore answers, latent discursive goals of the 
show, and potential tensions by identifying their opinions and reflections on these four 
aspects. 
As for the ordinary mediators not involved in the TV programme, interviews were 
conducted with the purpose to obtain an idea of how those involved in TV differ from 
‘ordinary’ mediators. Particular questions were asked to understand whether they perceive 
televised mediation as an interference in their roles; whether the show changed the format 
and the mediation process; and what differences there are between televised mediation 
and ordinary mediation.  
Although they were not on the show before 201152, I decided to include the 
audience commentators in the interview process. These participants do play a part in the 
show although they are not involved in the pre-production phase. Most questions 
remained the same as for ordinary mediators, while a couple of questions were modified 
to learn their opinions from a television viewers’ perspective.  
 Conducting In-Depth Interviews 4.3.3
In the fall of 2011, I carried out interviews with a total of 20 interviewees, consisting of 
eight programme makers, seven mediators, and five audience commentators53. Thanks to 
the prior fieldwork, I had already become acquainted with most of the production staff, 
which allowed this stage to proceed smoothly. Most interviewees from the production 
team had been identified primarily through the fieldwork observation. Off-screen 
mediators were selected through snowball sampling methods, through a local interviewee 
already part of the network. I got to know Interviewee #9, a mediator working at 
a sub-district disputes mediation office, through my personal network, who later 
                                                          
52 The show started to include audience comments on the site in May 2011. 
53 See Appendix 4. 
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introduced me to Interviewee #10 from a neighbourhood committee. Upon the 
conclusion of interviews with them, I asked whether they knew other mediators at 
sub-district offices or town mediation committees. Among the contacts they provided, I 
then identified the other two ordinary mediators54 for interviews. The on-site audience 
participation was still on trial, so there was no regular audience commentator at the time. 
Therefore, these interviewees55 were selected later, on the spot.  
Sixteen interviews were conducted in Shanghainese, and four in Mandarin Chinese. 
The number of interviews does not include the casual conversations. Since I frequently 
visited the production site during the interview stage, some unplanned conversations with 
the producer and other production staff took place when I encountered them; I obtained 
helpful information from these unintended talks.  
In accordance with the interview guide protocol, I began each interview by briefly 
introducing myself and my research topic56. For ethical considerations, I also informed 
the interviewees that their personal information would be kept confidential and they 
would remain anonymous in any research report. I asked for interviewees’ permission to 
record the interview as well as their oral consent to proceed with the interview. I began 
the interview with some easy questions such as the interviewees’ role in this show and 
their opinions on issues related to saving face. Usually, following the discussion on these 
cultural topics, some rapport could be achieved. Then I would move to questions 
regarding social and political aspects, such as the relation between the Shanghai Justice 
Bureau and the show and what sort of disputes are included and excluded. At this point, 
provided that the interviewees felt comfortable with the conversation, I would ask them 
(particularly the programme makers) if they had encountered any difficulties or pressure 
from the authorities.  
The majority of interviews were conducted on the spot, in meeting rooms inside 
the Shanghai Television and the mediation committee office. A few were conducted in 
some relatively public places—mostly in cafes—chosen by the interviewee.  
                                                          
54 Interviewees #11 and #12 
55 Audience commentators onsite: #13, 14, 16, 17, and 20 
56 Considering that politics is a relatively sensitive topic in China, I placed less emphasis on my political science 
background but more on media studies when I explained my research topic to participants, so as to encourage 
them to talk rather than being cautious. 
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At the analysis stage, I transcribed all of the interviews and categorised transcripts 
into three groups: programme makers (mediators on TV were included in this group), 
audience commentators, and ordinary mediators. I studied and compared their answers to 
the same questions, looking for similarities as well as differences. I also looked into 
implications of conversations, especially when politics-related questions were asked. 
Whilst some interviewees had no problem with these topics, others became cautious in 
choosing the right words to answer. For example, Interviewee #3 gave an indirect answer 
to the questions by using a metaphor about the realness of the show, which suggested 
that it was somewhat staged in the very beginning since some disputants refused to go on 
TV, but he then emphasised that the stories on the show ‘have always been genuine’.  
 Phase I: An Analysis of Disputes Topics   4.4
 Aims & Limitations  4.4.1
During the interviews with programme makers, I had an impression that they tend to 
avoid disputes related to the distribution of properties because the audiences are believed 
to be fed up with this kind of argument57. According to the producer and directors, 
house-related disputes appeared on the show quite frequently during the early days. They 
worried that this recurring topic would influence the audience’s interests in watching, and 
therefore claimed to emphasise emotional cases so as to promote moral standards in 
society. To the programme makers, episodes involving house-related issues are likely to 
earn lower audience ratings than other cases. If programme makers place less emphasis 
on programmes addressing housing issues, what topics are frequently covered in the show? 
I therefore decided to conduct an initial content analysis of broadcasts in 2013 to explore 
what topics are covered in the show and to determine whether, in reality, the programme 
makers managed to reduce the emphasis on house-related issues. Although the 
programme makers argued that the public is not interested in housing issues any more, 
this may well reflect their anxiety about the regime’s attitude because, as we will see in 
Chapter Five, this turned out to be the main topic.  
                                                          
57 Interviewees #1, 3, and 4 
77 
 
A simple or basic media content analysis classifies what is included in categories 
that can be statistically analysed. The advantage of basic media content analysis is that it 
provides an overview of dispute topics throughout a year, and thus provides valuable 
insights over time through analysis of media content. The purpose of using content 
analysis was to identify issues involved in various cases and explore the relation between 
dispute topics and audience ratings.  
 Protocol & Realisation  4.4.2
Before I conducted the coding and simple analysis of broadcast cases, I had obtained a 
detailed list of broadcast episodes from the producer. In the document, it recorded 
broadcast date, presenter, mediator, episode title, and audience rating for each episode 
aired from 2008 to the present. Based on this list, I choose dispute cases broadcast in 
2013 for the simple content analysis. This choice was made for two reasons: firstly, all 
episodes for this year were available online, while broadcasts in earlier years were difficult 
to access58. Secondly, I conducted my interviews with the programme makers in 2011; if 
they did indeed cut down the number of house-related issues, the broadcasts two years 
later would manifest this change.  
Considering that content analysis would be very time-consuming, I decided to carry 
out analysis of broadcasts every other week instead of over the whole year. I selected 
episodes broadcast every other week in 2013, starting from January 1 (for a full list, see 
Appendix 5). In total, 183 episodes were selected, covering 140 dispute cases59. Special 
programmes were usually interviews with mediators or presenters about their experience 
in helping people to solve their issues. Therefore, special programmes were not selected 
for coding. Regarding cases that were broadcast in two episodes, I only coded the second 
episode to avoid bias caused by repeated coding.  
Since mediation on the show generally focused on family disputes, I therefore 
created four categories to describe the relationship between disputants: (married or 
unmarried) couples, siblings, parents and children, and/or in-laws. I also established in 
                                                          
58 Broadcast from June 2012 to the date are available on the Internet: 
http://www.iqiyi.com/a_19rrgua2ip.html#vfrm=2-3-0-1 [accessed on 7 May 2015] 
59 Among the 183 episodes, there were 5 special programmes produced for holidays such as New Year’s Day, 
Spring Festival, and May Day. There were 38 cases that were divided into two episodes. 
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total eight categories of frequent conflict sources that included (real estate and movable) 
property disputes (such as disagreement on the distribution of heritage or family income, 
or the ownership of a house), disloyalty (extramarital affairs or being unfaithful to one’s 
boy/girlfriend), supporting the elderly (usually disputes between siblings regarding who 
should take care of their old parent(s)), child rearing (such as arguments on the proper 
educational method for the child in question; they usually happen between couples, old 
parents and adult children, or in-laws), domestic violence, gambling, opinion difference 
(disputes triggered by disputants’ different opinions or attitudes towards a topic), and 
other (disputes involving causes other than the mentioned seven types above). The first 
five types were created based on interviews with programme makers, and the last three 
were identified during the coding stage. Furthermore, I also created five dummy variables 
to code the mediator: Wei Lan, Pei Zhen, Huang Feijue, Wan Feng, and Bai Wanqing. 
When coding the selected episodes, I first watched the first three minutes, where the 
presenter would usually provide a brief introduction of the disputants and their appeals. 
This helped me to learn the relationship between disputants and obtain a general idea 
about the dispute between them. Then I skipped to around 17-20 minutes into the show, 
when the mediator steps in and provides suggestions to the disputants (see Chapter Five 
for the structure of the show). Solutions provided by the mediator gave clear clues of the 
disputants’ requests and revealed the main causes of the dispute. Some cases happened 
between more than two disputants, involving more than one type of relationship, such as 
disputes between young couples that can also involve parents (in laws). Most cases 
involved more than one cause and thus were categorised into at least one or more of the 
eight categories.  
After coding, I analysed the occurrence of each disputed topic by calculating the 
frequency. I conducted T-test and R-test analysis to explore the correlation between 
audience rating and dispute topics. I also carried out regression analysis in studying the 
relationship between audience rating and independent variables such as mediators, 
disputants’ relationship, and dispute topics. 
 Phase II: a. Online Survey  4.5
Having learned the production course and explored the intended aims of the mediation 
show during the first research phase, I started the second phase of research by looking 
into why people watch, the audience’s perception of the show, as well as their uses and 
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gratifications. From the interviews, I found that the programme makers credited the show 
for its helpfulness in various aspects. Therefore, one purpose of the survey was to explore 
whether the television viewers perceive the show in the same way as those insiders. 
Particularly, I was interested to explore the demographic characteristics of the audience: 
their uses of and gratifications from the show and possible contradictions contained in 
the show as perceived by the audience in terms of entertainment, social and political, and 
cultural aspects.  
The online survey served two important functions for this research. Firstly, it 
operated as investigatory exercise that allowed me to examine the relationship between 
the audience’s sociodemographic characteristics, habitual behaviours, and their perception 
of the mediation show.  Second, findings generated from the survey served as a base 
from which I was able to formulate a better set of questions and a more efficient protocol 
to be used in the focus group. 
 Aims & Limitations 4.5.1
To conduct my survey, I used web-based rather than paper-based questionnaires. First of 
all, web-based surveys save time. With quality websites, one can download accumulated 
responses in various formats quickly, such as an Excel file or an SPSS dataset. 
Paper-based surveys may take several weeks or several months to distribute, collect, and 
input to computerised form for analysis. Secondly, the web-based surveys allowed me to 
potentially reach a large population, considering the fact of the increasing size of Chinese 
web users: the number of China’s Internet users had reached 513 million by the end of 
2011 (CNNIC 2012). 
Yet, any research method has its bias, and the very nature of the web-based survey 
means that response bias is inevitable. First, there is the bias of self-selection. Although I 
have made efforts to circulate the survey link as widely as possible, some people would 
still be left out. Second, a limitation of web-based surveys is that they require respondents 
to be literate, have basic computer skills, and have access to the Internet. Admittedly, the 
online survey cannot reach those who have no access to the internet. Taking the 
limitation of the non-random selection into account, the survey findings were not 
generalised to the whole audience of the mediation show. Rather, the survey served as an 




 Protocol & Realisation of Survey  4.5.2
The construction and wording of the questionnaire went through a careful and deliberate 
preparation period. After designing the web-based survey instrument, I pretested it with 
four acquaintances of different ages, educational levels, and professions; this pilot group 
consisted of one full-time housewife in her thirties, one retired accountant, one university 
student, and one bank clerk in his late twenties. The purpose was to get as much feedback 
as possible from different people. I sent them the link of the pre-test survey and asked 
them to record the time it took to complete the survey and to note down any questions 
they had when filling in the questionnaire. This helped me to identify confusions or 
inappropriate questions in the survey. Through the pre-test, I could ensure that I asked 
questions in an efficient way and used appropriate language that would not cause 
interviewees to grow concerned (for example, about political sensitivity), which might 
prevent them from completing the survey (Hildebrandt 2013). I established my online 
survey on Qualtrics.com whose servers are hosted in the U.S.; as a result, the pre-test 
process also allowed me to ensure that the web link was accessible to users in mainland 
China.  
At the beginning of the survey, a statement of confidentiality was provided 
including information that the survey was only for academic research purposes and 
demographic data that linked to the individuals would not be disclosed. To increase 
participation, the participants were told that anyone who completed the survey would be 
eligible to enter a free prize drawing. Interested participants could fill in their email 
address towards the end of the survey, and 20 prize-winners would be randomly chosen 
out of the total participants. This incentive proved to be effective for participants to 
complete the survey.  
The self-administered survey consisted of a total of 26 questions, including three 
questions to distinguish non-viewers from regular viewers60: ‘Have you heard of the 
XLNJ mediation show?’; ‘Have you ever watched XLNJ before?’; and ‘In the past week, 
how many times have you watched XLNJ?’. Those who had not heard of the show or not 
watched it before were not included in the final analysis. Survey questions covered five 
main aspects: demographic background; the viewers’ uses of and gratifications from the 
                                                          
60 See Appendix 6. 
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show, i.e. to what extent they watch the show so as to have fun, socially interact, pass 
time, seek information, or improve familiarity with dialect; and perceptions in terms of 
entertainment, cultural, and political aspects. Furthermore, there were other questions 
measuring independent variables such as watching habits, political culture, political 
efficacy, experience of mediation, satisfaction with society, interested sorts of dispute, and 
political interest. Towards the end of questionnaire, two vignettes were provided to 
explore participants’ choice of dispute solution and the underlying reasons. Questions on 
some topics were asked in several different ways in order to increase internal reliability.  
Almost all questions were closed, with only a couple being open-ended. By virtue 
of the online survey technique, respondents were forced to answer all of the closed-ended 
questions on one page as to proceed to the next; however, open-ended questions were 
optional for them to complete. As I had estimated, the majority of respondents 
completed all of the closed-ended questions and skipped the open-ended ones. However, 
the number of those who filled in the open-ended questions were more than I had 
expected. 
The survey link was distributed via social media, because according to a 2012 
McKinsey survey report, China’s users of social media services are among the most active 
in the world. ‘91 percent of respondents [said] they visited a social-media site in the 
previous six months...‘ and on average, Chinese internet users ‘spend 46 minutes a day 
visiting social-media sites’ (Chiu, Lin, and Silverman 2012, 1-3). These facts provided a 
solid ground for the online survey with the possibilities to draw samples from a large and 
active population. The target population for this study was television viewers who had 
watched or at least heard about the mediation show XLNJ. In order to reach my target 
population, I particularly distributed the survey link on several networking service (SNS) 
sites and bulletin boards (BBS) where these people are likely to gather61. I also asked the 
mediation show XLNJ to tweet the survey link to its followers through its official 
account on the Sina Weibo platform62, and they agreed to do so. In addition, with an 
attempt to create a snowball effect to increase the number of responses, I also asked 
friends to send the link to others they knew. Links posted through SNS sites, BBS, Sina 
                                                          
61 These sites are kaixin001.com, renren.com, tianya.cn, and douban.com 
62 Sina Weibo is a micro-blogging service provider, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter. 
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Weibo, or email circulation were given a numerical suffix respectively so that I could track 
the source of respondents. The results turned out that most respondents came from Sina 
Weibo, and from other sources I did not receive a great deal of response.   
The online survey received 201 responses in total. Among the total responses, 92 
percent (185) of respondents had heard of the show and watched it at least once in the 
past week. This is a fairly small N for generalisable conclusions, but sufficient for carrying 
out an analysis and interpretations. I utilised the ANOVA test to analyse the respondents’ 
demographics and logit regression analysis in studying the relationship between 
independent variables and audiences’ perceptions of the show in terms of the 
abovementioned three aspects.  
 Phase II: b. Focus Group 4.6
 Aims & Limitations 4.6.1
Online survey analysis based on quantitative results provided us with an initial 
understanding of the viewers’ uses and gratifications as well as their perception of the show 
in terms of entertainment, social and political, and cultural aspects. It was, however, 
insufficient to give an insightful and substantive understanding of reasons and 
motivations embedded in participants’ perception.  
As a complement to the online survey as well as to further interpret the audience’s 
points of view, I adopted a focus group approach to make up for the inherent flaws of 
the survey format that reduce reality to numbers (Morgan, Krueger, and King 1998). 
Focus groups became prevalent in the 1980s. In academic research, Merton and Kendall 
(1946), who are regarded the earliest researchers who used focus groups, see this 
approach as an addendum to the survey, a convenient aggregate of individual opinions. 
As for the composition of groups, Merton and Kendall initially used relative strangers of 
diverse social demographic backgrounds, a common practice in the 1990s that continues 
today (Javidi and Javidi 1991). Merton and Kendall’s (1946) method of conducting focus 
groups was regarded as establishing a standard approach. They recruited relative strangers 
of diverse sociodemographic backgrounds and used one-shot design rather than meeting 
the same group repeatedly. At the same time, however, some innovations in focus group 
design have also taken place, using a different approach from the survey sampling method 
to recruit ‘naturally occurring’ groups (Liebes and Katz 1992). Lunt and Livingstone 
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(1996) believe that focus groups can be used to overcome the disadvantages of 
ethnography and participant observation. They consider conversation, public discussion, 
and gossip as important processes in the production and reproduction of meanings in life. 
Focus groups provided another face of reality, since open-ended questions encourage 
interaction among the participants and allow them to respond in their own way. Focus 
groups were therefore conducted in an attempt to provide explanations to the survey 
findings as well as the audience’s interpretation of the show. The discussions correspond 
to the way in which attitudes, opinions, and practices of human beings are produced, 
expressed, and exchanged in everyday life, whereas opinions presented in surveys are 
detached from such a communicative and interactive reality (Flick 2006).   
Admittedly, there are limitations to focus groups. Firstly, small convenience 
samples limit the generalisability of the findings. The participants are not representative of 
the entire population. To minimise this bias, I increase the number of entry points, that is, 
asking as many people as I know to recommend potential participants. Secondly, a 
limitation of the focus group methodology (Kitzinger 1995) is that I cannot determine if 
differences identified in analysis resulted from in-group dynamics or environments, or 
whether they reflect true differences in attitudes (Basch 1987, Stewart, Shamdasani, and 
Rook 2006). For this particular study, possible recall bias is another concern. Participants 
were asked to recall dispute cases up to 6 months before the focus group was conducted. 
As the cases they brought up were mostly recent broadcasts, they might not sufficiently 
represent a general coverage of cases. 
 Research Protocol 4.6.2
My focus groups consisted of two sorts of participants, namely frequent and 
non-frequent viewers of the mediation show. By ‘frequent’ I mean people who watch the 
show on average twice or more a week, i.e. more than one-third of weekly broadcasts, 
given that the show is aired 6 days a week. Similarly, ‘non-frequent’ refers to those who 
watch XLNJ on average less frequently than twice a week. I excluded people who had 
never watched the show before, because they would not be able to contribute to 
discussion in the focus group. This categorisation was intended to discover how these 
two sorts of viewers perceived the aim of the show compared with that of the programme 
makers, and how they like or dislike the show in terms of its entertaining, social and 
political, and cultural aspects.  
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Questions asked in the focus groups aimed at disclosing viewers’ attitudes, 
perceptions, and opinions towards the mediation show in terms of its content, mediating 
approach, and legal status, with the purpose of facilitating the researcher to understand 
whether and how the televised (entertainised) mediation contributes to maintaining social 
harmony. The question guide was thus designed to cover the perceived goals of the three 
mentioned aspects63. Particularly, these questions aimed to investigate why they were or 
were not interested in the XLNJ as well as to develop explanations of the contradictions 
found in the survey analysis. I intended to find answers to the above questions through 
the focus group discussion. The focus group was conducted to explore what the 
respondents considered as tensions and contradictions between the entertainment, the 
political, and the cultural aspects, and how they deal with these tensions and 
contradictions.   
Focus group discussion was carried out with four groups in total, two consisting of 
frequent viewers and two consisting of non-frequent viewers. Because researchers 
generally agree that six to ten participants in a focus group work best (Lunt and 
Livingstone 1996), I recruited six participants for each group. Moreover, participants were 
divided into four groups in terms of their education level, frequency of watching the show, 
and age. This extra element in the categorisation was used for four reasons: firstly, to get 
an idea about whether saving face might be a generational issue; secondly, to determine 
whether audiences’ perceptions and uses of the show as suggested by survey findings 
were somehow related to their education background; thirdly, to consider that people of 
lower educational level might become less encouraged to talk when in a group with those 
of higher educational level; and fourthly, mixed-gender groups aimed to balance the 
composition of the focus group. This leads to the following four groups:  
1st: frequent viewers, higher education group: frequent viewers of the XLNJ, 
educational attainment is college or higher, three women and three men. 
2nd: frequent viewers, lower education group: frequent viewers of the XLNJ, 
educational attainment is high school education or lower, three women and three men. 
3rd: non-frequent viewers, higher education group: less-frequent viewers, 
educational attainment is college or higher, three women and three men. 
                                                          
63 See Appendix 7. 
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4rd: non-frequent viewers, lower education group: less-frequent viewers, 
educational attainment is high school education or lower, three women and three men. 
Another criterion for selection was that participants should have lived in Shanghai 
for at least five years. In this way, group discussions could be held in the local dialect and 
participants should be able to understand each other better. Also, the five-year residency 
requirement was specified because the XLNJ show has been broadcast since 2008, which 
was approximately five years prior to when the focus groups were conducted.  
Participants were recruited mainly through the internet and snow-balling. As 
mentioned before, the online survey offered a prize draw that respondents could enter by 
filling in their email address or mobile phone number at the end of questionnaire. Among 
the total 201 responses received, 109 provided their contact information. Considering that 
those who had responded more actively to open-ended questions might be more 
interested in participating in group discussion, I therefore selected 30 active respondents, 
including the 20 prize-winners, to increase the possibility of participation. I contacted 
them via email or phone, and asked them to participate in a group discussion on the topic 
of the show. I also told them that a reward would be offered, but not the specific amount. 
In addition, I also posted recruitment advertisements through Sina Weibo, since this 
platform had proved relatively effective in the survey research. I tweeted the ad post via 
my Weibo account and asked my friends to forward it to their networks. In addition, I 
also asked the XLNJ official account to repost and forward the ad to its followers. I 
received 11 positive responses from the former survey respondents and 26 responses 
from the Weibo post, including both frequent and non-frequent viewers. The final 12 
frequent-viewer participants consisted of seven former survey respondents and five 
Weibo users.  
I categorised the selected participants into four groups according to their viewing 
habits and educational level. According to the survey, the average educational level was 
between college and bachelor’s degree. Therefore, college/university education was made 
the dividing point between the higher and lower education groups, i.e. the higher 
education groups included university students and participants who had obtained a 
college/bachelor or higher degree, while the lower education group included those with 
high school education or lower.  
Focus groups were carried out on a weekend; each group discussion lasted on 
average for one hour. Before starting the discussion, I welcomed and thanked the 
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participants for coming and informed them that the discussion was for a research study 
on television and its audience. I was careful not to mention terms relating to political 
studies so as not make them sensitive and become cautious in the discussion. According 
to research ethics, I told them that the discussion would be recorded but the data would 
only be used for academic purposes. I then asked for their consent before proceeding.  
Before starting the focus groups, it is important to make the participants feel at 
ease with each other and the situation so that they will speak out freely from the 
discursive resources available to them in the area of study (Dewalt, Dewalt, and Wayland 
1998). I started the discussion with easy questions, such as: Did you watch television 
yesterday, and what did you watch? In the first group, I asked participants to introduce 
themselves to others, but I noticed that they did not seem to be very comfortable to do 
such self-introduction. As such slight discomfort might affect participants’ enthusiasm to 
talk, I skipped this introduction in the subsequent discussion groups.  
The number of four focus groups makes it feasible to analyse discussions in an 
old-school yet thorough way rather than a more time-consuming way using 
computer-based tools that are often adopted in quantitative content analysis. This analysis 
approach allowed me to ponder participants’ words thoroughly so as to identify not only 
common themes but also unique minor opinions before categorising and presenting 
comprehensive interpretations of group discussions.  
Transcribing is one of the most time-consuming parts of the analysis because of 
the free flow of conversation, interruptions from time to time, and varying volumes of 
voices. Particularly in this case, some dialect jargons have been transcribed into Mandarin 
with the best effort to maintain its original meaning and suggestive tone.  
I read the transcripts several times and then separated transcripts of frequent 
viewers and non-frequent viewers respectively, so that I had two master transcripts at 
hand. I then reorganised these discussions by putting discussions along questions asked 
on a topic and contentious themes64. I subsequently went through the two master 
transcripts to mark out similar and different opinions and to highlight typical quotes. 
                                                          




After this, I went through the marked discussions again to categorise them into different 
themes in terms of how they related to entertaining, cultural, social, and political aspects.  
 Conclusion 4.7
The entire research effort adopted a multiple-method design, including both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. By combining in-depth interviews, online survey, and focus 
group in one study, I attempted to minimise bias and in turn make use of the inherent 





PRODUCTION OF XLNJ 
 Introduction 5.1
As discussed in Chapter Two, media commercialisation in China urged the media outlets 
to produce more market-oriented programmes to attract the audience and generate profit. 
In the television sector, there was a tendency to exploit private and sensational stories to 
satisfy the audience’s voyeuristic fascination, or at least a fascination with the emotional 
side of life. During the early 2000s, confessional (emotional) talk shows (qingganlei jiemu) 
and psychological advice shows (xinli zixunlei jiemu) were prevalent across the TV channels 
in the nation. These shows featured ordinary people revealing conflicts and emotional 
confusions in personal and emotional life. Shows like Renjian65 focused on various issues 
people encountered in their lives, such as in-law disputes, faithless relationships, and 
extramarital affairs.  
Initially, these seemingly ‘close to life’ shows were very popular among viewers, and 
also strategically answered to a 2003 CCP doctrine requiring that television programmes 
shall be ‘close to reality, close to livelihood, and close to people’. (Hu Jingtao speech; see 
Miao 2011, 113). In the pursuit of higher profit, these shows frequently picked up 
sensational topics to attract viewers. Issues often seen on TV were mostly family disputes 
and relationship turmoil including conflicts between in-laws, disloyalty in relationships or 
marriages, disagreements on child rearing, and disputes between siblings over property 
distribution and caring for elderly parents (Miao 2011). As it turns out, these so-called 
reality shows have been mostly staged and exaggerated to satisfy audiences’ curiosity 
about others’ lives, which was seen as a voyeuristic need by the State Administration of 
                                                          




Radio, Film and Television (SARFT)66. The SARFT criticised these shows for exploiting 
vulgar and sensational affairs or even fabricating exaggerated stories to attract eyeballs or 
to satisfy people’s voyeuristic needs67, which results in a negative influence on society and 
opposes ‘socialist morality’ (Zhang 2008). This organisation required that TV shows on 
human emotions should deal with personal feelings and family relationships with a more 
positive attitude (Liu 2009). In 2011, the SARFT (2011c) issued another directive, 
‘Opinions on further regulating television programs on general-interest satellite channels’, 
limiting the number of entertainment programmes especially on the satellite television 
channels in China and requiring that each channel should have at least one ‘ethics 
building’ programme to promote ‘traditional virtues and socialist core values’ (SARFT 
2011c). The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) laid emphasis on moral construction of 
social morals, and the SARFT respondingly translated this broad concern into concrete 
policies. 
It proved to be just the right time for Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, XLNJ) to 
broadcast on the Shanghai Entertainment Channel in early 2008, responding to the call 
for harmony from the government (which I will discuss in the next section). Learning 
from the lesson of confessional talk shoes, XLNJ carefully advertised itself as ‘real people, 
real stories’68. It developed a unique type of television programme that incorporated 
elements from confessional talk shows, psychological advice shows, and reality shows. 
This hybrid character made it difficult to be clearly categorised. At the time, some 
Chinese scholars categorised it using general labels such as talk or reality show (Cao 2009, 
He 2009), whereas others classified it in terms of the content or meaning conveyed by the 
show, such as ‘programmes with the purpose to help’ (bangmanglei jiemu) (Zhao 2011), 
‘programmes focusing on human feelings’ (qingganlei jiemu) (Chen 2009b, Li 2010a, Wu 
2011), or ‘programmes caring about people’s livelihood’ (minshenglei jiemu) (Fang 2013, 
Yang 2012). Until recently, in the wake of the proliferation of mediation shows, scholars 
and researchers in China seem to have reached consensus to give such kind of 
                                                          
66 In a press release in October 2011, the spokesperson of SARFT, Wu Baoan, indicated that some programmes 
tend to satisfy people’s voyeuristic pleasure by showing others’ issues but fail to provide helpful solutions or 
establish positive life attitudes. See SARFT Q&A on further regulating television programmes (SARFT 2011b). 
67 For example, the programmes Super Emotion (Chaoji Qinggan Duiduipeng) from Shenzhen Satellite TV, Mind 
Garden (Xinling Huayuan) from Shanghai Television, etc. were named and shamed. 
68 This slogan is shown on the upper right-hand corner of the screen during the show.  
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programmes a synthesised label: Emotional Mediation Talk Show (Ding and Xu 2014, Lu 
2013, Wang 2012, Xiao and Yu 2013a, Xiao and Yu 2013b, Xiao 2014). But this label 
misses an important element that programme makers have laid emphasis on, that is, 
realness69. So, I would follow some other scholars (Jiang 2012, Tao and Cheng 2012, Wu 
2011, Yang 2010) and call them Mediation Reality Shows. In this study, for the sake of 
similarity and clarity, the term ‘mediation reality show’ and ‘mediation show’ are used 
interchangeably. Despite these different names and labels, the show has not experienced 
difficulty in attracting an audience.  
One specific feature of XLNJ was the collaboration with the Shanghai Justice 
Bureau (SJB) as a source for cases and mediators. People’s Mediators were widely 
distributed in every community and district, and they had extensive experience with 
disputes coming from ordinary people. The SJB was also happy about the cooperation, as 
in this way more people could get accustomed to civil mediation as a possible option for 
them. The other source for XLNJ’s cases was the programme hotline. The audience was 
welcomed to call the programme production team with their own problems. Programme 
directors would select from call-ins and invite the audience to participate in the studio 
filming. However, most people called only to inquire and were not willing to show their 
face on television70. Therefore, the resources for cases were limited, and the programme 
did not have many alternatives when selecting cases to be televised71.  
Although mediation on TV was new, it received an immediate reputation. What 
made it so popular among the audience and, as a first programme collaborating with the 
SJB, what does the show aim to achieve? Bearing such questions in mind, I have 
conducted my Phase I research looking at the production of the mediation show. In this 
chapter, I will firstly discuss the production context, notably the aims of the programme, 
revealing the dynamics behind this emergent programme. Then I will examine the 
production process of the show that includes three phases: collecting issues 
(pre-production), making the show (production), and the final editing (post-production). 
The three phases involve different groups of television workers. While the core 
                                                          
69 Interviewees #1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
70 From the interview with programme makers, interviewees #1, 3, and 4. 
71 Interviewees #1, 3, 4.  
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production team72 plays their role throughout all three phases, two other groups – the 
hotline reception team and the studio crew – are only involved at the pre-production and 
production phases, respectively. Finally, I will discuss the contentions that arose during 
the three production phases and explore whether interviewees see contradictions within 
the stated aims. 
 Origin and Aims of the Programme 5.2
By the end of October 2008, XLNJ had become the most watched programme among 
variety shows broadcast in Shanghai at the time. What made this programme so popular? 
When asked, the producer Yin Qingyi73 said that the show was blessed with ‘tianshi, dili, 
renhe’74 – being in the right place, at the right time, and in harmony with the people. In 
other words, the success of the programme was attributed to opportunities of the right 
political economic climate, support from the television station, a cooperative production 
crew, and a responsive mediator. These circumstances contributed to the creation of the 
XLNJ. 
Additionally, the television climate was helpful. The show obtained its name Xin 
Lao Niangjiu from a popular situation comedy Lao Niangjiu (literally Elder Uncle) that the 
same channel used to broadcast. The latter used to be a very popular entertainment 
programme broadcasted by the Shanghai Oriental TV station (OTV) from the late 1990s 
until mid-2000. As part of a media conglomeration (see Chapter Two), OTV had merged 
with Shanghai Television, Shanghai People’s Radio, and other media outlets to form the 
Shanghai Media Group (SMG) at the end of 2001. Media conglomeration proved to be 
effective in ensuring the central control of media resources (Yu 2009), and has generated 
opportunities for diverse programming and maximising profits (Lee 2003, Zhao 2000). As 
a consequence of conglomeration, the integration and the sharing of resources gave rise 
to a number of entertainment programmes in various formats, providing the audience 
                                                          
72 The core production team is generally made up hierarchically of a producer, an editor-in-chief (zong bianshen), 
and five directors. 
73 Interview #1 with Yin during a field observation in December 2010. 
74.’tianshi, dili, renhe’ is an old Chinese saying from the works of Mencius. Mencius said, ‘Opportunities of time 
vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of 
situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men.’ 
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with the feeling of freshness and creativeness. Viewers of predictable sitcoms like Loa 
Niangjiu had been seemingly tired of its clichéd plots. After broadcasting twice a week, 
Lao Niangjiu started on a daily basis in late 2005. Under pressure of production load, the 
quality of the comedy declined; it had been criticised for poor production and unrealistic 
plots. Eventually, after 12 years, the programme ended its run in December 2007.  
Meanwhile, due to the structural reform and convergence of resources of SMG, the 
former ‘News & Entertainment Channel’ (Xinwen Yule Pingdao) has been reorganised and 
renamed as the ‘New Entertainment Channel’ (Xin Yule, literally meaning ‘new 
entertainment’) in the beginning of 2008. Since the news component has been split off 
and merged with the Comprehensive News Channel, there appeared empty time slots that 
needed to be filled in. The leadership of the New Entertainment Channel began to 
conceive of a programme to replace OTV News (Dongshi Xinwen). The channel manager 
intended to keep the programme title Loa Niangjiu, because it was already widely known. 
At that time, based on his past experience in making television talk shows, Yin proposed 
an idea of a mediation show in Shanghainese that would not only fit the name but also 
have the intention to cater to the political goal advocated by the central government, i.e. 
building and maintaining a harmonious society. The proposal was approved by the vice 
president of the SMG, who came up with the name of the programme: Xin Lao Niangjiu 
(literally meaning New Elder Uncle). In Chinese, the term Lao Niangjiu traditionally refers 
to maternal uncles who usually act as mediators in conflicts in the family (Cohen 1966, 
Goody 1990), and it is also used generally to refer to those helping neighbours to solve 
their disputes in a neighbourhood community (Lin 2013). Utilising the meaning contained 
in the title, the show invited experienced professionals to play the role of Lao Niangjiu, 
namely the mediator who helps to resolve people’s family disputes. Mediators on the 
show adopted a combination of relevant regulations and policies to make disputants 
understand which are applicable to their situation; they also employ moral persuasions to 
calm the participants down and make them understand each other’s difficulties. 
The Department of Variety Arts (Zongyi Bu)75 as well as the SJB also provided a 
favourable ground for the show. Yin regarded the show as the result of the department’s 
                                                          
75 Zongyi Bu (the Department of Variety Arts) was a functional department under the SMG, established in 




continuous encouragements of creativity. XLNJ started its co-operation with SJB in 2008. 
The latter mobilised its affiliated district and sub-district (jiedao) judicial administrative 
organs to provide disputes cases for the programme. As a programme broadcasted on a 
daily basis, it was almost inevitable for XLNJ to experience a lack of cases, which led the 
department Vice Director to suggest all XLNJ directors76 to look for first-hand cases 
from judicial administrative organs in sub-districts and communities. All directors then 
began cooperating with local mediators in the field.  
While the XLNJ came out in the right place at the right time, according to Yin, its 
youthful production team also contributed to its success. When XLNJ was first 
established, the programme recruited young directors from other programmes in the New 
Entertainment Channel, who already knew each other. On the one hand, these young 
professionals adjusted to the new programme quickly and brought in fresh ideas. Most of 
them, however, did not have experience in making talk shows, let alone a newly-invented 
mediation show. As one of the directors told me, before joining the XLNJ programme 
team, they had worked on other shows that were mainly entertainment-focused77. They 
used to work with actors or celebrities, but XLNJ was the first time these young directors 
saw so many real disputes and met different kinds of people from a different level78. 
Moreover, during the first months of the programme, directors had to work closely with 
their cooperative district Judicial Administrative Stations (sifa chu) or sub-district offices 
(jiedao ban), observing and working together with mediators and looking for dispute cases 
for the show. 
Indeed, the perfect timing and the cooperative team have been crucial for the 
success of the show. But in addition to these internal or structural factors, the external 
political context also appeared to be in its favour, which might explain why even the local 
government paid attention to the show (see Section 5.2.4 and Section 5.5). In October 
                                                          
Xiju Channel (Colorful Traditional Chinese Opera). In October 2009, it has been reorganised and established 
Shanghai New Entertainment Media Ltd. Company.   
76 In the television sector of China’s media industry, ‘Directors’ of recorded broadcasts are sometimes also 
called ‘editors’, because in practice, they are also in charge of editing their own programme of a series. They are 
called ‘bian dao’ in Chinese, literally meaning director and editor. The terms, ‘director’ and ‘editor’ are 
interchangeable in this dissertation. 
77 Interview #4. 
78 Many interviewees (including Interviewees #1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8) mentioned that most of those people who 
came to the programme are from a relatively low level of education, occupation, and income. 
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2007, at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party in Beijing, Hu Jintao 
stressed the importance of implementing the scientific concept of development, building, 
and maintaining of social harmony and stability. The slogan ‘Building a harmonious 
society’ had become a hot topic and could be seen everywhere. Within this particular 
context, the programme was designed to cater to the government’s mission. By televising 
the mediation of disputes among ordinary people, the show claims to be helpful in 
promoting social harmony, as it demonstrates an option to deal with family conflicts. In 
this light, the show appears to be more than a result of structural reorganisation of the 
SMG. Attracting the audience with dramatic issues and advertising itself as promoting 
social harmony, the show seems to be one that attempts to play up to both the audience 
and the authority.  
Perspectives on the aims of the show vary from production staff to mediators, but 
there appears to be a general consensus that the show is to present real social issues to 
attract the audience while at the same time being careful to avoid politically sensitive 
issues. In other words, the show is seen to ensure social harmony while boosting audience 
ratings. By and large, programme makers and mediators see four inclusive and related 
aims of the show: marketing, social harmony, political, and educational aims. I will discuss 
these in their order of importance as seen by programme makers.  
 Marketing Aim 5.2.1
The marketing aim seems to take up the first position as seen by the programme makers 
who often refer to the audience rating as a parameter for the success of the show. Indeed, 
since the media transformation, the fate of a programme is subject to its audience ratings 
and market share. Bearing in mind the marketing aim, the production team of XLNJ 
proposed the specific format of the show to target the audience’s curiosity. But drawing 
the lesson from another local talk show focusing on individuals’ emotional lives, The 
Spiritual Garden79 (Xinling Huayuan), that was banned in 2008 by the SARFT for making 
up exaggerated, vulgar stories, XLNJ appears to exploit the audience’s ‘voyeuristic’ 
demands in a cautious manner and found itself a niche in the market by collaborating 
with SJB.  
                                                          
79 The show invited a psychologist as co-presenter to help participants in relieving their mental stress. Stories in 
this show were found to be staged in order to attract an audience. 
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As initiator of the idea of a mediation show, XLNJ producer Yin has his particular 
rules in making television: ‘What in your programme makes people feel they “must” 
watch it? Why does the audience, who you never met before, has to watch your 
programme at this time and not watch fifty or sixty other channels, but only yours?’80 In 
his opinion, a good show should take the perspective of the common people and address 
what people are interested in. He feels that among various and diverse programmes, few 
have paid close attention to the actual lives of the people. He thinks that audiences need a 
programme that speaks for them, such as the first TV talk show81 The East Studio 
(Dongfang Zhiboshi)82 that focused on hot topics related to human sympathy and laws.  
As reflected in the entire production phase, many decisions are made with the 
ultimate goal to attract the audience. The focus on family disputes, for instance, is the 
result of careful considerations to delicately balance between real-yet-sensitive social 
issues and sensational confessions. In the early days, the production team held several 
meetings about the orientation of the show. At that time, they decided to confine topics 
to disputes between individuals on the basis of several considerations; firstly is 
‘watchability’ (attractiveness)83: topics about family disputes would strike a chord with 
many television audiences without arousing unnecessary troubles84; secondly, individual 
disputants certainly know their cases inside out and thus can tell a good story, while cases 
involving public institutions or organisations usually send legal representatives, who are 
usually not familiar with the dispute in question, to speak on behalf of them85. This 
‘signifies a boring conversation since these people usually talk nothing but clichés, and 
this will not attract audiences’, says Yang, one of the directors who took part in the 
brainstorming stage and provided useful ideas86. He sees that an appropriate scope of 
topics is the key factor to the programme. In the same vein, directors began to look for a 
                                                          
80 Interview #1, interview during my field research in Shanghai in 2010. 
81 Although there were some programmes that involved discussion, media practitioners and scholars on Chinese 
media studies generally regard the Oriental Studio as the first TV talk show in China, which was followed by the 
famous Talk Straight (shi hua shi shuo) of the CCTV (see, for example, Zuo 2009). 
82 Started broadcasting in 1993 by the OTV, it was a hit in Shanghai. 
83 They use the word ‘watchability’ (可看性), which could also indicate whether the case is worth watching.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
84 Interviewee #1. 
85 Interviewees #1, 2, 5, and 7.  
86 Interviewee #3. 
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diversity of cases when they realised that the audience may be fed up with purely house 
property issues.  
In addition to the careful selection of cases, the production team also integrated 
entertainment elements to meet both the demand from the market and the requirements 
from the television station. Like other programmes aired on the New Entertainment 
Channel, the show has been required to include entertaining parts to cover audiences of 
different ages87. As a consequence, since 2011 the audience commenters’ session has been 
added to the show. The composition of audience commentators covers viewers of 
different ages and professions, reflecting opinions from different generations as some 
programme makers see it88.  
Moreover, various editing techniques were adopted, not only to enhance the 
‘attractiveness’ but also to lay emphasis on the realness of the show. The producer 
believes that realness is ‘the necessary nature that makes a programme sustain its 
popularity’89. In its early days, some viewers suspected that certain cases in the show were 
staged by amateur actors who also appeared on other programmes. Since then, the show 
has been striving to convince its audience of its authenticity, for example, displaying a 
logo saying ‘real people, real issues (zhenren zhenshi)’ on the right top of the screen90.  
It seems vital for a show to reach a large audience in order to succeed in a 
competitive market. The XLNJ is not an exception, as the marketing economic aim is its 
primary aim. Its ‘close-to-life’ approach provides the audience with real stories they can 
easily sympathise with. In this way, they attract a large audience and subsequently make a 
profit, and consequently become more or less economically independent.  
  
                                                          
87 Interviewee #5 and also in an internal document circulated within the channel: it is required that programmes 
on the entertainment channel should integrate entertainment (zongyi yuansu) with the existing format. 
88 Interviewees #2, 3, 5, and 20. 
89 Interviewee #1.  
90 Interviewee #3 told that most people did not know much about the show and they often refused to seek 
mediation on TV. It was very difficult for them as a new programme to persuade troubled families to come on 
the show, so the editors had to use the alternative way to represent a story, suggesting that several early 
broadcasts were staged.  
Additionally, Interviewees #3, 5, and 7 have implied that a competing show broadcast on satellite channel 
Happiness Magic Cube (Xingfu Mofang) was staged by amateur performers.  
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 Promoting Social Harmony 5.2.2
Despite the increasing number of programmes addressing various aspects of people’s 
lives, according to the producer, little attention has actually been devoted to the life 
conditions of regular people, especially those living at the ‘grass-roots’ level. Since the 
2008 decree, the SARFT required television practitioners to make programmes that wield 
positive influence in society (Daily, 2009). XLNJ aims to make up for the insufficient 
attention by addressing different causes of common family disputes among the 
audience91.  
There is a consensus among the core production team regarding the aim of the 
programme especially in terms of its expected role in the society. As they see it, cases on 
XLNJ can, to a large extent, represent common issues in society, as mediating a case on 
television gives the audience in similar situations an opportunity to resolve their own 
issues by drawing inferences about other cases92. In this light, the show is not only 
intended to help people to solve problems but also to play an exemplary role. One of the 
directors, Yang93, uses an example to explain this role:  
‘Let’s assume someone had a dispute with his close relatives like siblings and he has 
no idea what he should do. But he happens to watch our programme and sees other 
people in a similar situation to his own, and then he might also find the mediator’s 
suggestions and advice are helpful to him. In this way the XLNJ guides him in the right 
direction to solving problems. Or let’s say, someone he does not have family disputes but 
his neighbours, friends or colleagues have, in this situation, he can give other people 
suggestions for solution because he has already known about this.’  
Other members of the production team94 hold similar views to Yang’s, believing 
that their programme has been playing an affirmative role in suggesting positive methods 
of conflict resolution. Some directors and TV mediators95 consider XLNJ a manifestation 
                                                          
91 In many families, disputes often involved issues such as unemployment or arguments over house properties, 
etc. These were regarded as consequences brought by the economic reform. The sky-high housing costs, for 
example, become increasingly unaffordable to many people with average income. See Chapter One for a detailed 
elaboration of the social and economic background from which emerged the XLNJ mediation programme. 
92 Interviewees #1.2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 18, and 19. 
93 Interviewee #3. 
94 Interviewees # 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.  
95 Interviewees #3, 4, 5, 18, and 19. 
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of the media’s social responsibility. Such an opinion seems related to their close, 
down-to-earth engagement with disputing parties through interviewing or mediating96. In 
their opinion, the media—especially programmes like XLNJ—should make use of their 
influence in society to raise social attention and help people with their difficulties. For 
instance, in one episode, the disputant’s difficult situation raised attention and generated 
public sympathy, and soon after the broadcast, they received help from the relevant 
institution and financial donations from the audience. In this way, the show builds up a 
caring and helping image in society, which conveys a message that disputes can be solved 
in a peaceful way and responds to the central call for a ‘harmonious society’. 
While the programme makers claim it as the media’s social responsibility to reflect 
people’s life status and help them with their disputes, the local government and 
propaganda department also play a role in setting this ‘social harmony’ aim. As mentioned 
in Chapter Two, Shanghai Television is owned by the Propaganda Department of the 
Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, meaning that programme production is under the 
guidance of the local municipal propaganda department. Collaborating with the Shanghai 
Justice Bureau, this aim of XLNJ therefore reflects the intention of the local authority. 
The Shanghai government and the Municipal Propaganda Department are satisfied that 
XLNJ plays an active role in promoting the ‘social harmony’ aim established by them (see 
Section 5.4 in this chapter). 
 Diverting Political Sensitivity    5.2.3
Another aim of the show, as reflected in the pre-production phase, is diverting the 
attention from political sensitivities. Disputes on the show include various issues 
reflecting conflicts in families and in society, but cases and participants are carefully 
selected to avoid sensitive topics that could upset the government. The aforementioned 
talk show The East Studio provided a lesson that XLNJ learned from. The show was 
highly welcomed by the audience for its closeness to daily life and heated discussions on 
hot social issues; however, such overt discussion of sensitive topics worried the 
government, which led to the show’s demise after less than two years.  
                                                          
96 Directors of the XLNJ kept close contact with disputants from the case collecting phase until the dispute has 
been solved. See Part 4 for a detailed description of the director’s job responsibilities. 
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A similar situation happened to another popular talk show, Discuss Together (You 
Hua Dajia Shuo). The show featured discussions between professionals and the live 
audience on various issues of public concern, and participants often provided sharp 
comments in critical discussions. About one year later, the programme received 
instructions from the leadership of the TV station requesting it to avoid overt discussions 
on ‘sensitive’ issues. But soon after redirecting its topic focus, the show experienced a 
large loss in ratings and ultimately went off the air. Yin97 previously used to work for this 
talk show, and he attested from such experience that the balance between audiences’ 
viewership and politics is necessary for a programme to survive. Under his leadership, one 
does not seem to have any difficulty in identifying ‘politically safe’ topics.  
As mentioned before, one selection rule is to include only disputes between 
individuals and not to involve institutions or organisations. The latter, such as labour 
disputes or medical disputes involving institutions or organisations, would make the issue 
sensitive because these organisations are likely to ‘use some networks (guan xi) to 
intervene, (in which case) you may expect a notice from your leadership in a higher 
hierarchy asking you to drop the topic as they find it is inappropriate’98. Such interference 
from higher up the television station’s hierarchy certainly affects choices of the 
production.  
Being aware of the subtle tension between politics and the market, the show set its 
goal to divert the audience’s attention from politically sensitive issues to non-sensitive 
family conflicts. In this way, the show is able to please not only the audience by 
presenting actual common issues in life, but also the authority by promoting mediation as 
an option for family disputes. In other words, the XLNJ played a role as facilitator and 
paternalistic guide to build and create a ‘harmonious society’. An added value of carrying 
out this aim is that it enables the show to survive by avoiding conflicts with authorities. 
Being in line with the government policy of social harmony, the show carried out the 
political aim through its collaboration with the Justice Bureau as well as by avoiding 
political sensitivities.  
  
                                                          
97 Interviewee #1.  
98 Interviewee #3. 
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 Educational Aim 5.2.4
Both programme makers and ordinary mediators share the opinion that the show can 
enlighten the audience about legal issues and policies relevant to their lives. They see 
people’s mediation on XLNJ as simple, economic, efficient, and beneficial for a 
harmonious relationship between people. Among the well-known TV-mediators, one is a 
member of the Shanghai People’s Congress99; she considers that the aim of the show is to 
publicise moral virtues and improve public moral consciousness. She finds that ‘moral 
values are deteriorating today’ as a consequence of economic reforms, and that the 
mediation show ‘is doing the correct thing to remind us the importance of our traditional 
virtues such as “respecting the old and cherishing the young” … (the aim of) XLNJ is to help 
ordinary people and also to improve social morality…’. 
Another mediator, Pei Zhen100, also a delegate to the Shanghai People’s Congress, 
indicates that the show educates the audience with basic legal knowledge. Pei used to be 
lawyer, and after his retirement, he has been working as a legal consultant in a local 
neighbourhood committee and finds that many disputants have little knowledge about 
regulations or policies. As he sees it, strengthening the publicity of policies 
and legal education is one of the aims of the show.  
Also from a legal perspective, in a 2008 seminar discussing the XLNJ show, Liu 
Zhongding, the Deputy Director of the SJB, expressed his approval of the show: ‘through 
the mediation of a typical case, XLNJ educates the audience about relevant legal 
knowledge and also points out where to turn to when disputes occur in life… mediation 
on television is a process of publicity of law’ (Cao 2009). Ordinary mediators101 share the 
opinion that the show enhances public awareness of laws and at the same time promotes 
the work of people’s mediation.   
  
                                                          
99 Interviewee #18. 
100 Interviewee #15. 
101 Interviewees #9, 10, 11, and 12. 
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 Production of XLNJ 5.3
With these four aims, the programme strives to play up to both audience and authorities. 
Audience rating is crucial to the show, as it may determine its broadcast life. So the 
marketing aim is to attract a large audience, while also at the same time gaining profit and 
keeping the show partially independent in financial terms. The fact that Shanghai 
Television is under the control of the Propaganda Department means the show has to be 
cautious. The show apparently drew a lesson from the precedent that it not only avoids 
sensitive topics but also caters to the authority by putting itself in line with the 
government’s ‘harmony’ call and collaborating with the local justice bureau, with the two 
more political aims (the second and the third aim) in mind. In the same sense, the 
educational aim tends to meet the needs from both sides, providing the audience with 
what they might need and promoting legal knowledge at the same time.  
These aims are integrated into the entire production, which consists of three phases: 
pre-production, the preparation stage where information about cases is collected; 
production, the studio filming stage where disputes are mediated; and post-production, 
the final stage before broadcasting where editors apply the final touches to the show. 
Figure 5.1 shows the production flow of XLNJ.  
 Pre-Production   5.3.1
The pre-production is the preparation stage for the programme, including case collection 
and case investigation. Collection of cases had previously been done by directors working 
in the field with local judicial branches, while now most of the time the hotline office has 
become the main facility collecting topics for XLNJ. The directors then carry out case 
investigation through telephone and in-person interviews to learn the causes of the 




Figure 5.1 Production Flow of XLNJ 
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branches to follow the work procedure and to find suitable cases102. In this light, the 
SJB-affiliated justice divisions functioned as channels through which suitable cases 
became visible to the production team103. Programme makers believed that judicial offices, 
as authoritative departments, were able to persuade disputants to try TV mediation as an 
option, and they also expected an abundant source of cases104. 
The intimate collaboration with local judicial offices at the time benefited the 
production team: firstly, it familiarised the production team with a concrete idea of the 
actual mediation work through practical work in the field105, which inspired them to 
simplify the procedure and adjust the style of civil mediation to suit the television 
medium106. Secondly, through working with local mediators, the production team was 
able to find suitable candidates who later became regular TV mediators on the show107. In 
addition, working at the scene allows the directors to make decisions more quickly 
depending on first-hand information and to build up their contacts with local mediators 
for information when new cases come up108. 
The collaboration with local judicial offices has, however, gradually diminished. 
This is partly because XLNJ began to receive numerous telephone calls every day 
following its increasing popularity among audiences109. But the main cause seems to be 
the bureaucracy in the judicial organisations that led to the end of the collaboration. 
When the SJB started the collaboration with XLNJ, they adopted an incentive mechanism 
                                                          
102 There were 17 administrative divisions in Shanghai (16 districts and one county); every director was 
responsible for collaborating with 3 or 4 local sub-district offices. Directors usually spent 3 or sometimes 4 days 
a week following and observing the mediator’s work. They had to pay several visits to those who have a dispute, 
talking to them and determining the appropriate solution for both dispute parties (Interviewee #4). 
103  China has established people's mediation committees in village (neighbourhood) committees, townships or 
towns (urban districts), and enterprises and public institutions, as well as industries and sectors with a high 
frequency of occurrence of disputes; see Chapter Two. 
104 Interviewees #1, 3, and 5. 
105 Most directors were not familiar with the actual mediation work before they started working for XLNJ. 
106 The civil mediation normally takes 7-10 days to solve one case, which often requires the civil mediator to 
visit disputants’ family or friends to collect information. It costs more time and work than the mediation on TV 
(Interviewees #10 and 12). 
107 In early broadcasts, mediators from almost all of the 17 administrative divisions have come to carry out their 
mediation work at XLNJ. While most of them appeared to be nervous when talking in front of the camera, 
there were several mediators who were doing professional work and subsequently became regular mediators at 
XLNJ. 
108 Interviewees #1.2, 2, 3, and 5. 
109 Interviewee #1.  
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to encourage the mediators to work actively with programme directors110. In other words, 
if a case recommended by the mediator was accepted and made into a programme, the 
mediator would receive a financial bonus. But later, the collaboration became complicated 
as the programme directors needed to contact personnel at justice offices before they got 
in touch directly with the mediators. The complicated and replicated processes have 
eventually led to mediators being less interested in collaboration. As a result, fewer cases 
were recommended by judicial branches. 
The programme hotline has acquired greater importance as a source of dispute 
cases111. The hotline crew, consisting of five middle-aged females, plays an important role 
in the pre-production phase in answering calls and choosing dispute cases. Some of these 
hotline receptionists had previously worked in neighbourhood committees and thus are 
experienced in dealing with different people and circumstances112. Their job is to take 
brief notes about the caller’s contact information, create a general outline of the dispute, 
and determine whether both parties to the dispute are willing to go on television. They 
would make initial judgements about whether the case could be used for television 
mediation or not. It was based on three unwritten rules113; though not mandatory, they 
guide the selection of cases: 1) parties to disputes should be individual people who are 
willing to go on the show, not involving official bodies and organisations; for example, 
disputes regarding house demolition issues would not be accepted for the show as they 
usually involve government departments like demolition offices; 2) disputes should not 
merely focus on housing problems with which, programme makers believe, audiences 
have been fed up already; 3) disputes need to be clear and possible to be mediated 
according to civil law.  
Hotline receptionists are not specifically trained to answer calls, nor does it seem 
necessary. They do not see any difficulty in answering calls and recording notes. Although 
                                                          
110 Interviewee #3. 
111 Interviewees #2 and 7.  
112 Interviewee #14. 
113  The receptionists say they have no exact standards or criteria for selecting topics. But based on my 
interviews with other members of the core production team (Interviewees #1.1, 1.2, 3, 4, 6, and 7), I noticed 
that there are actually unwritten rules that have been applied in selecting cases. 
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the four hotlines receive approximately 200 calls each day, less than 10 percent match the 
selection criteria and can be used for television broadcast114.  
Before a case is mediated in the studio, directors interview both disputing parties in 
person and then create a storyline for the subsequent filming and editing (see Sections 
5.3.2 and 5.3.3). According to the directors115, the cases selected usually include but are 
not limited to conflicts between in-laws, disloyalty in marriage, arguments between 
parents and children, disagreements between siblings over issues regarding supporting 
their parents and/or distribution of property, and children and property issues for 
middle-aged re-married couples.  
 Production Phase 5.3.2
Mediation of a dispute is carried out and filmed in the studio during the production phase, 
which consists of two parts: editorial meeting and studio recording. The editorial meeting 
is closely related to the production of the show, as it is when relevant decisions are made 
by the producer and the directors. Therefore, I include it here as part of the production 
phase. 
The producer, the chief editor, directors, show presenters, and the relevant 
mediator will have a regular weekly editorial meeting—the ‘storytelling meeting’ (jiang gushi 
hui),116--on the day before studio filming. The main purpose of the meeting is to discuss 
the mediation plan and prepare the presenter and the mediator for the filming next day. 
During the meeting, the directors on duty present the storyline of the case and explain the 
major issue and what disputants expect for the resolution. Usually the mediator will be 
assigned by the producer and the chief editor depending on his or her expertise, 
mediation skills, and intervention style117.   
The meeting ensures communication between the core production team, where the 
producer and the chief editor usually provide opinions and suggestions on the production 
plan. For instance, on a case about three brothers’ argument over the caring of their 
                                                          
114 Interviewee #14. 
115 Interviewees # 3, 4, and 5. 
116 As called by the production team; Interviewees #1.2., 2, 4, and 7. 
117 Interviewees #1.2, 2, 3, and 5. 
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mother and the distribution of house property118, both the producer and the chief editor 
suggested that the mediator should make more efforts to remind the disputants of the 
kinship, love, and affection they used to have, and place less emphasis on the property.  
After the editorial meeting, the presenter and the mediator usually agree on the 
mediation plan, which improves their co-operation during the studio mediation stage. The 
division of labour between the presenter and the mediator is clear-cut. The presenter is 
responsible for guiding the conversation to lay out the case to the audience, and then the 
mediator will start to mediate. As mentioned in Chapter Two, disputants sometimes fly 
into a rage and will literally fight with each other. Therefore, the presenter at this stage 
plays an important role in keeping the situation under control119. The director on duty 
holds the responsibility for the general control of the production; that is, keeping the 
length of recording time under three hours and ensuring that mediation does not diverge 
from the planned framework120.  
In addition to the core production team, the technical support team121 is also 
involved in the production stage. They work for XLNJ only on filming days. The studio 
crew appear to be largely indifferent to the programme content because the hours 
recording recurring disputes that ‘are all much of a muchness, arguing over money or 
house’
 122 might bore them. 
The organisational structure is characterised by a hierarchical division of labour 
between the intellectual and technical teams. The core production team is the driving 
force of the production, which has decision-making power, while the studio crew 
functions as a ‘mechanistic’ system, playing the role of technical ‘doers’ (Elliott 1972, 
Senge 2006).  
                                                          
118 This is a case that I observed during my field observation. 
119 Interviewees #1.2 and 7. 
120 Concluded by the author based on field observation and interviewees # 2, 5, and 7. 
121 Here, I refer to the camera crew and the technical support staff (for example, audio and visual control) as the 
studio crew since both of them participate in the studio production phase and are peripherally involved with the 
programme in terms of its content and implication. 
122 Interviewee #8. Mediation in the studio can take two to four hours for one case, which is unpredictable and 
largely subject to the case and disputants. Normally, four cases need to be filmed in one day, meaning that the 
technical team has to work in the studio for more than 10 hours. It might make them bored so that during the 
recording, some cameramen would read the newspaper or play games on their iPads.  
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 Post-Production  5.3.3
While it rests with the directors to achieve the final editing of each episode of XLNJ, they 
have to follow some rules. Firstly, they edit the lengthy mediation into a logical 30-minute 
programme according to the storyline and mediation plan. Generally, they keep the 
crucial clues related to the main issues of the dispute arguments, and cut out repetitive 
arguments and what they regard as less relevant parts. Besides, the higher level of 
hierarchy in the television station or the municipal propaganda department sometimes 
provides instructions in terms of the content of the show. The instructions are usually 
given in the form of internal documents or oral notice by the producer, which inform the 
directors to meet certain requirements when creating the show. There is indirect 
interference from channel directors, the SJB, and the political (propaganda) department 
during the production phase. But the directors do not see any difficulty in meeting these 
requirements, which suggests that they actually anticipate certain interference. The 
interference during the post-production is mostly related to the style of the programme.  
For instance, in an internal file, the producer shared with his editors clear 
instructions regarding the editing of the show, based on the general requirements for 
television production established by the SARFT. According to the guide, a single 
30-minute episode should comprise a trailer (about two minutes) at the beginning, and at 
least five captions highlighting crucial clues or suspense points. Advertisements will be 
inserted in the middle of the show, so in practice, the director would typically use five or 
more highlighting captions to link sections before and after the advertisement, reminding 
the audience about the plot of the previous section123. To attract a wide audience, the 
show is subtitled124 with phrase captions in a way that triggers the viewers’ curiosity, such 
as ‘are there any unknown secrets about the disputants (buweirenzhi de mimi)?’ or ‘what 
facts do our disputant wish to hide (nanyan de yinqing)?’ The show uses this method of 
editing as an effort to achieve the marketing aim. Driven by the social harmony and 
educational aim, the editing also takes into account the professional ethics such that 
                                                          
123 At the beginning of the show, a narrator would introduce both disputing parties and the disagreement 
between them. This voice-over is used throughout the show with the same purpose as that of the subtitles, 
linking clues together. 
124 The mediation is carried out in Shanghai dialects; the Chinese subtitles would help viewers from outside of 
Shanghai to understand the content.  
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participants’ real names will not be revealed and swearing, cursing, or insulting words are 
cut out or muted. 
Once the editing is finished, the tape needs to be checked and censored three times 
by the director, the chief editor and the producer, and the director of the channel, 
respectively, before it is broadcast. The directors themselves are to ensure that the edited 
episodes follow the editing instructions and that the storyline is logical. The chief editor 
and the producer play an important role in censoring the content; they must review the 
content in terms of technical and ideological aspects as instructed by the upper-level 
hierarchy of the television station and the municipal propaganda department125. They not 
only check if there are any typographical errors in subtitles or the use of captions, but also 
have to ensure that the show provides correct guidance to the public and a positive image 
of mediation126, responding to the call from the central government. The chief editor, as 
specified in an internal document, has the responsibility to review the programme tape, 
ensuring that the show gives correct and healthy ideological guidance to the public 
(daoxiang zhengque, sixiang jiankang). This reviewing work should be done every time when 
the show rebroadcast on TV127.  
 Issues of Contentions  5.4
The three phases of production reflect the aims of the show, from selecting cases to 
avoiding politically sensitive issues, collaborating with the SJB to promote social harmony 
and legal knowledge, to elaborate editing to attract audiences. The four aims as seen by 
the programme makers seem to be well integrated into every decision made during the 
production phase. Meanwhile, there are tensions during the entire phase of production 
from the collaboration with the SJB at the beginning to the final editing phase. In this 
                                                          
125 Interviewees #1.2, 2, and 5; According to the internal document I accessed during fieldwork, certain 
instructions may come from the SARFT and/or Shanghai Propaganda Department. Such as the aforementioned 
‘Opinion Concerning Further Strengthening Comprehensive Satellite Television Channel Programme 
Management’ issued in 2011 by the SARFT, also called ‘cutback on TV entertainment program’ (Xian yu ling). 
126 Interviewees #1.2 and 2.  
127 Also, according to the internal document I accessed during fieldwork, certain instructions may come from 
the SARFT and/or Shanghai Propaganda Department. This includes the aforementioned ‘Opinion Concerning 
Further Strengthening Comprehensive Satellite Television Channel Programme Management’ issued in 2011 by 
the SARFT, also called ‘cutback on TV entertainment program’ (Xian Yu Ling). 
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section, I will discuss the major issues of contention and how programme makers deal 
with such tensions.  
 Collaboration with SJB 5.4.1
As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, the show benefited from the collaboration with 
the Shanghai Justice Bureau to establish its reputation and credibility in the early days. At 
the same time, there were tensions rooted in the intrinsic differences of values and 
perspectives between television practitioners and officers from the judicial institution. 
The professional values could lead programme makers and judicial officers to have 
different opinions towards the same dispute. Local civil mediators tend to take care of all 
requests by the disputants, which therefore require much time and energy spent not only 
in the pre-mediation investigation128 and mediation phase, but also involve re-visiting the 
disputants after the mediation129. By comparison, the show directors cannot cover every 
appeal made by the disputants but have to select one or two main issues that can be 
presented on television. The previously mentioned selection criteria leave the directors 
limited space to make choices. For local civil mediators, there are fewer boundaries than 
in TV mediation. In fact, they deal with a wider range of cases in their everyday work, 
from inter-personal disputes to those involving social organisations such as 
house-demolition or labour disputes 130 , most of which are avoided in the XLNJ. 
Different understandings of mediation work and television production makes the 
collaboration less smooth than it appears. The directors rely on local mediators to identify 
and recommend cases, but often they reject the recommendations as they do not fit the 
selection criteria or lack representativeness to be shown on television131. In this sense, 
local mediators actually have the power to make choices, while the directors are in a 
passive position without having access to disputants directly or having much say in 
selecting cases.  
In this sense, the case selection process with local justice branches is 
time-consuming and energy-demanding for both sides. In spite of the incentive 
                                                          
128 Collecting information, visit disputants’ family, neighbours, and/or work unit to learn as much as possible. 
129 Interviewees #10, 11, and 12. 
130 Interviewee #10. 
131 Interviewee #3. 
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mechanism, the bureaucratic structure affects local mediators’ enthusiasm in searching for 
appropriate cases for the show. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the programme 
makers, the time and energy they invest into the case selection does not ensure a 
satisfying result. It seems that the production team desires to alter their role in the 
collaboration and attempts to gain control in case selection. Their reliance, after a few 
years, on the hotline to collect and select dispute cases suggests their desire to obtain 
decision-making power in the pre-production phase.   
The unspoken tensions led to the termination of the actual collaboration. It now 
exists in name only and works more as an endorsement than as a practical mechanism. 
XLNJ continues to advertise itself as ‘collaborating and co-produced with Shanghai 
Justice Bureau’ though there is almost no practical connection. Both the SJB and the 
show seem to benefit from such a ‘surface’ collaboration. For the production team, they 
not only save time and energy, but also successfully gain the autonomy to select cases 
themselves. For the SJB, the show continues to promote people’s mediation132. In fact, 
the Shanghai government and municipal propaganda department were satisfied with the 
show’s performance in educating people in society when they held several academic 
seminars to discuss TV mediation with academic experts and social scientists (see section 
5.5).   
 Insufficient Case Source and Producer’s Concern   5.4.2
While the production team gains the power of case selection and establishes hotlines as a 
source of cases, this does not mean that they have access to these cases in abundance. As 
a daily broadcast show, XLNJ has a large demand for such cases. The choices left after 
the filtration are not plentiful, especially in light of daily broadcasts. Most cases are turned 
down because they are beyond the selection range133. In spite of the limited sources, the 
programme makers claim the necessity of reducing house-related disputes for the sake of 
the audience’s preference. In order to have a general picture of topics covered in the 
show, I carried out a simple content analysis of XLNJ episodes aired in 2013 to check 
whether house-related issues are indeed limited, and if so, what topics are covered 
                                                          
132 Interviewee #10. 
133 Interviewees #3 and 5. 
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instead134. Among the 140 cases I collected, nearly 70 percent (97) of cases mediated on 
XLNJ involved arguments between couples135; a few cases occurred between parents and 
adult children (33) or involved in-law disputes (18); and there were only seven cases 
involving siblings. I identified eight common types of disputes that often give rise to 
domestic disputes (see Table 5.1), and family disputes on the show usually involve more 
than one issue. Although the programme makers claimed less emphasis on house-related 
issues, the result indicates the opposite – more than half (73) of cases were raised due to 
disagreements on the distribution of family properties. It seems quite close to the 
technical team’s observation that most issues are related to housing and money. After 
house-related issues, differences in perspectives or values and disloyalty in marriage are 
other frequent causes for family disputes. Additionally, domestic violence seems to be a 
noteworthy issue that occurs more than topics such as supporting the elderly or rearing 
children. 
As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, disputes related to property distribution 
originally seemed to appear so frequently on the show that programme makers feared that 
it would lower the audience’s interest in watching. The statistical analysis of Table 5.1 
indicates a seemingly opposite result of the producer’s concern, and there is a significant 
relation between property disputes and audience ratings. This suggests that, compared 
with other types of topics, financial disputes are more likely to attract audiences. Neither 
did the programme makers actually reduce the number of topics on houses, nor did the 
audience seem to lose interest. To my knowledge, until the time of my fieldwork 
interviews, no proper survey had been conducted on the audience of the mediation show. 
The programme makers’ misinterpretation of the audience’s preference was therefore 
subjective or suggested by the authorities, and not supported by substantial proof. In 
other words, it might not be the audience who was fed up with housing issues, but the 
programme makers possibly instigated by the authorities. This may well reflect the 
programme makers’ anxiety about the regime’s attitude. 
 
                                                          
134 Cases are selected every other week. In total, 183 episodes were selected, which consist of 140 cases. See 
Chapter Five for the methodology I used in analysis.  
135 A couple here includes both (re)married couples and unmarried ones. 
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Table 5.1 Analysis of XLNJ broadcast every other week in 2013  
 
But it seems difficult for the producer and directors to reduce the number of 
house-related conflicts. The tight supply of cases leaves little possibility to reject 
house-related issues. Hotline receptionists may play the role of gatekeeper in selecting 
cases for the show, but in fact they do not have much choice. In spite of the hundreds of 
calls every day, the usability of cases is less than 5 percent because some people call for 
suggestions, and some only wish to have private mediation136. This also reflects a real 
social issue in a large city like Shanghai, where house prices have increased rapidly in the 
                                                          































Disputes involving other topics 24 (17%)
Disputes involving housing and/or money 73 (52%)
Disputes due to different perspectives 38 (27%)
Disputes involving disloyalty in marriage 30 (21%)
Disputes involving domestic violence
Disputes due to gambling
Disputes involving child rearing 13 (9%)




recent years, making it difficult for ordinary people to afford a home. On the one hand, 
the city’s house demolition project often provides people with an opportunity to improve 
their life in terms of both living condition and financial status137. On the other, whose 
name shall be on the property deed can often be a potential trigger for family disputes. 
Arguments on financial matters seem to be a common issue in Chinese society, due to the 
rapid and uneven economic development. Under such circumstances, it would not be 
feasible for the production team to filter out all of the cases that involve house-related 
arguments. It seems, in some sense, not that programme makers select the cases, but that 
the cases seek them out, instead.  
The political tension here reflects the recurring house-related disputes and the 
programme makers’ anxiety related to the authority’s attitude. Housing-related issues 
often inevitably require policies and regulations. Learning lessons from similar 
programmes in the past, the producer is aware that discussions involving such topics 
might become sensitive for the government. Perhaps this also partly explains why he has 
been insisting that the show does not focus on housing issues. On the other hand, 
however, the lack of cases leaves programme makers little room to bypass disputes on 
house properties. They have to compromise and loosen the selection criteria, which 
therefore explains the frequency of house-related disputes. While housing issues seem to 
be inevitable, the mediation approach that TV mediators adopt seems to help to minimise 
the discussion on such topics by guiding disputants to walk in others’ shoes and 
emphasising harmony in the family.  
 Face Matters  5.4.3
In addition to the criterion of a topic range that confines the scope of the show, there is 
another factor that explains the low turn-out rate of hotline call-ins, which is the privacy 
concern, i.e. face issues. Although the show allows participants to disguise themselves by 
wearing hats and sunglasses, many people are still intimidated by the idea of showing their 
face to the public. In the early days, when XLNJ collaborated with the SJB, the concern 
of losing face was already a major reason preventing people from going on the show. 
                                                          
137 Families to be relocated are provided an apartment and/or a subsidy; the size of apartment and amount of 
subsidy is decided based upon the number of residents registered on the same hukou. See, for example, Deng, 
Hoekstra, and Elsinga (2014) for more information on the relocation policy in China. 
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Disputants hesitated to go for mediation on television though they could expect the same 
effect as mediation from judicial offices138. The reason seems apparent: ‘If one can get a 
problem solved in private, why bother telling it to the public?’139  
Perhaps this hesitation is understandable since people had not been accustomed to 
televised mediation at that time. However, the situation does not seem to have improved 
much now that mediation shows have become popular today. As the producer said, ‘less 
than 100 out of 300 callers might be willing to have televised mediation, and in the end, 
no more than 10 will actually show up’140. This estimate reflects the production team’s 
concern of insufficient cases. People might change their mind at the last minute, though 
they do not recognise ‘losing face’ as a problem for disputants as they ‘have nothing to 
lose’141.  
Essential for the making of a mediation show is that both parties to the dispute will 
present their case so that the mediator can hear both sides and show that the meditation 
is fair and just. However, the programme makers realise that the participants’ 
unpredictable decisions may affect the production of the show, so they compromise to 
minimise this influence. Among the 140 cases I reviewed, 39 cases (28 percent) lack the 
presence of the other party. Following the compromise on house-related issues, it seems 
that the production team has also come to terms with only one party’s presence to ensure 
that they have sufficient supply for the daily broadcast. On the one hand, the production 
team wants to present a fair and balance image of mediation on TV. On the other hand, 
they compromise to survive in the market.  
 Entertainisation & Market Needs 5.4.4
From the perspective of programme making, it is important to present disputing parties 
not only to signify fairness, but also to provide a balanced argument and drama that 
attracts viewers. Arguments between disputants sometimes escalate into outbursts of 
emotion or even literal fighting on the spot, which programme makers believe attracts the 
audience. In this sense, the missing presence of one party is likely to make the show less 
                                                          
138 Interviewee #2,5,7 
139 Interviewee #2. 
140 Interviewee #1. 
141 Interviewee #1. 
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interesting for the audience. With one aim of the show being to achieve success in the 
market, to make up for the unbalanced presence of both parties, the programme makers 
tend to entertainise the show as a means to enhance the audience’s interest.  
The directors of the show mostly have experience in creating entertainment 
programmes, so they seem to know how to make a story appeal to the audience’s needs. 
In order to sustain their interest in watching, directors place emphasis on the emotional 
aspects of the issue. The editing aspect thus becomes crucial where directors would cut 
hour-long mediation into a story reflecting complicated interpersonal emotions and 
human feelings and for the rest use sub-titles or voice-overs. This method of editing is 
similar to the once-popular confessional talk shows that were eye-catching and sensational 
by exploiting personal relationships, but they were often scripted. Directors use editing 
skills to generate voyeuristic curiosity among the audience and maintain their interest in 
watching the show.  
In a similar vein, XLNJ tends to play to the gallery by presenting stories about love 
and hate that resonate or trigger controversies (Yang 2012). The directors also make 
video clips filmed at the disputants’ home, to illustrate the background of the case to the 
audience as well as allowing for more ‘organised’ drama. Moreover, the show constantly 
adjusts its format by including entertaining factors to maintain its freshness. For instance, 
audience mediators introduced in 2011 to observe the process of mediation, provided 
opportunities to vote and to express opinions to play the role of a jury committee.  
The decision to include entrainment elements reflects the market-driven motive to 
sustain the audience’s interests. While all of these entertaining approaches make the show 
eye-catching, they trigger the debate about whether the show is voyeuristic at the cost of 
people’s privacy, dramatised at the cost of realness, and market-driven at the cost of 
pedagogy. This challenge might not be what directors expect, since they consider 
themselves socially responsible in educating, helping, and guiding their viewers142. But 
being a programme on an entertainment channel means that XLNJ has to entertain and 
enlighten the audience at the same time, integrating the marketing aim with the 
educational aim. The issue of contention here is the combination of marketing-driven 
entertainment with the otherwise serious and real civil mediation. Programme makers are 
                                                          
142 Interviewees #3 and 5. 
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aware of the consequence of an unbalanced combination of these two in that excessively 
sensational issues may arouse criticism like that associated with confessional talk shows, 
while too little entertainment may not intrigue the audience. Either of these two situations 
would put the show at risk, making it difficult to please both the authority and the market.  
 Self-Censorship, Political Sensitivity, and Harmonious Society 5.4.5
The media production process involves much more than just satisfying the audience. In 
fact, the public is not the first audience a producer has in mind. As Parenti (1992, 202) 
said, ‘if something is to be shown, it must first please its financial backers, its would-be 
sponsors, the studios, and the networks. It is with these interests that the producer has 
the most direct interaction’. In a similar vein, it seems to the producer of XLNJ that it is 
necessary to satisfy the leadership of the television station, the local propaganda 
department, and the local government. As part of the media reform, the production and 
broadcast of television programmes have been separated to encourage creative and 
diverse production, but this does not mean that shows like XLNJ can cover any types of 
issues without permission from higher levels in the hierarchy. In fact, the producer had 
several discussions with the channel manager and other senior colleagues regarding the 
content, format, and the range of topics of the show.  
The mediation show, as a consequence of the organisational restructuring of the 
television station (see Chapter Two), remains under the administration of the media 
group. Occasionally, the local propaganda department or the higher leadership in the 
television station would intervene in the production in terms of its content, style, and/or 
editing. The indirect intervention can take the form of written or oral notices, and is often 
accompanied by financial incentives. The director’s failure to meet the requirements 
would lead to a reduction of his annual bonus.    
From the programme makers’ perspective, they seem not unhappy with certain 
indirect intervention. They do not mind producing special issues during public holidays to 
respond to the general festive atmosphere and sing the praises of the harmonious society. 
In fact, they feel that it is necessary to provide the audience with ‘something different 
from the usual’143. It seems that the producer and the directors have become accustomed 
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to indirect intervention or censorship. When the producer Yin told me about how he 
learned from past experience in dealing with potentially politically sensitive issues144, he 
said, ‘There are different constraints for television workers, and I have long been used to 
that, we know what to cover and what not… we are trained to make television in a certain 
way.’ His opinions are shared by other television practitioners in CCTV, which reveal an 
underlying truth that self-censorship has become ingrained in Chinese television 
practitioners’ professional code (Zhu 2012). The producer does not attempt to push the 
boundaries and touch on sensitive topics; also, there is the pragmatic reason that such 
issues are too divisive for audiences and therefore potentially harmful to ratings. As 
Zhang Xiaoling (2007) expresses it, ‘Caught between stern decrees and restrictions on the 
one hand, and swimming in a “sea of commercialization” on the other,’ few media 
practitioners are inclined to risk their jobs to challenge the status quo.  
The above situation to a large extent explains why the show makers insist on 
confining the range of disputes to domestic inter-personal ones despite the frequency of 
house-related cases or the incomplete presence of both parties. Even in the face of a tight 
resource, they do not plan to go beyond this established boundary. Television 
practitioners are like businessmen in the sense that they avert political risk and work 
within the system in order to preserve economic profits (Zhu 2012). As for the XLNJ, 
the association with the governmental department has seemed to further strengthen its 
position in the market; the show’s producers do not perceive that as a contentious issue. 
 Conclusion  5.5
The production of television is a comprehensive process that requires consideration from 
different perspectives. Programme makers have a set of aims in mind when producing the 
show. These seemingly exclusive aims are in fact intrinsically related and potentially 
conflicting. The show attracts the audience by presenting sensational and non-political 
issues and/or sustaining their interests in watching by offering them the opportunity to 
get more than entertainment out of the show. In the same vein, the show reinforces its 
aim of promoting social harmony by avoiding politically sensitive issues but educating the 
public about the law. Under the Hu-Wen administration, media practitioners were urged 
                                                          
144 Interviewee #1, one casual conversation that took place spontaneously during my fieldwork.  
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to make a balanced representation and to contribute to the overall goal of societal 
harmony (Zhu 2008). The show’s presentation of solutions to ‘inharmonious’ social 
issues—though confined to a limited range—exhibits the programme makers’ response to 
the efforts made by the government to reduce the level of public unrest as part of the 
more general goal of ‘building a harmonious society’. By deliberately avoiding issues that 
will upset the government, the show avoids the fate of the precedent talk shows and 
therefore secures its place in the market. In this sense, the marketing aim and the social 
harmony aim are reciprocal. 
By and large, tensions exist throughout the production of the show in terms of the 
political, media marketisation, and face-saving matters. Firstly, there is tension between 
the pursuit of commercial profit and political sensitivities. Television practitioners in 
China exhibit a clear understanding of the subtle relation between programmes and 
politics. Rather than pushing the envelope to touch on heated social conflicts, the show 
strategically collaborates with the local justice bureau in the hope of securing its place in 
the market. Undoubtedly, the endorsement from the justice bureau not only enhances the 
show’s credibility among the audience, but also yields appreciation from the government. 
The last thing programme makers want is to upset the government as previous shows did. 
Therefore, programme makers and TV mediators manage to shift the emphasis away 
from the topic and onto the value of family and harmonious relations in society, while 
they realise that housing issues are inevitable in the show.   
The marketisation and re-structuring of the television sector required the show to 
blend in entertaining elements with otherwise serious civil mediation. It is clear that the 
show is made more interactive and attractive with the participation of audience mediators 
and the use of catchy titles during the post-production editing. For programme makers, 
the entertainment in the show functions as a useful means to weaken the potential 
politically sensitive nature, while at the same time increasing the audience’s interest. But 
the show’s producers have to be cautious not to cross the line to be over-entertainised or 
‘sensational and vulgar’, for which the SARFT criticised other programmes. In this sense, 
programme makers seem fine with the censorship if it is necessary to satisfy the 
Propaganda Department.  
Regarding the cultural aspect, the mediation show is somewhat paradoxical in 
nature in the sense that it promotes harmony by presenting domestic disputes to the 
public, which is considered ‘losing face’ in the Chinese culture. Rooted in Chinese 
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traditional culture, the use of televised mediation as a possible solution to wash domestic 
‘dirty linen’ highlights the tension between tradition and modernity. As for the show, it 
seems that individuals’ faces can be ‘sacrificed’ to the central call for social harmony. This 
is perhaps why the producer tends to downplay the face issue when he explains that 
‘people (who turn to mediation on TV) have nothing to lose’. With XLNJ and similar 
shows becoming popular, the face issue seems to be further fading out, as people seem to 
become accustomed to this ‘forth form of mediation’ (Li 2009). Therefore, although the 
show challenges the traditional value of ‘face’, as it publicises personal issues to please the 
audience’s voyeuristic demands, it justifies such an approach by placing emphasis on the 
assistance and likely satisfying result one can gain from TV mediation. 
However, the popularity of mediation shows might be a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it promotes civil mediation. The ordinary People’s Mediators145 from local 
judicial offices or neighbourhood committees feel that more people have started to come 
for advice since the broadcast of XLNJ. One of them146 thinks that people who 
previously did not know or felt reluctant to discuss domestic issues with neighbourhood 
committees now accept mediation as a way to resolve disputes. On the other hand, 
however, the mediation show gives the audience a mistaken impression that disputes 
mediation could be done in a couple of hours, an illusion of how mediation works. 
Mediators147 indicate that the mediation on TV is quite different from their real work. As 
Zhang148 says, ‘it seems very efficient that they (TV mediators) solve a dispute in 30 
minutes, but it is impossible in life… it takes much longer’. Other mediators also mention 
that it usually takes them at least one or two weeks to solve a dispute. In that sense, TV 
mediation is pseudo-scripted mediation. 
Despite the inherent contradictions of the show, it has apparently succeeded in 
attracting attention from the government as well as academia. Two seminars were held in 
2008 and 2010 respectively discussing the popular phenomenon of the XLNJ mediation 
show (Cao 2009, Li 2010b). The 2008 seminar participants included, among others, a 
reviewer from the News Inspection Group (Xinwen Ducha Zu) of the Shanghai 
                                                          
145 Interviewees #9, 10, 11, and 12. 
146 Interviewee #12. 
147 Interviewees #9, 10, and 12. 
148 Interviewee #9. 
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Propaganda Department (SPD), an official from the SPD, the Deputy Director of the 
Shanghai Justice Bureau, the Deputy CEO of the Shanghai Media Group, and two 
sociology professors. During this seminar, SPD officials and other participants saw XLNJ 
as a promising show and approved of its social influence in solving social issues and 
promoting mediation (Cao 2009). The 2010 seminar was held by the 
Shanghai Sociological Association and involved sociologists from universities to explore 
the possibility of strengthening television mediation. To enhance the mediation on TV, it 
was suggested that dispute cases should go beyond the scope of family issues and extend 
outside the studio (Li 2010b).  
By and large, it seems that programme makers, government officials, and mediators 
look upon the show favourably. Being at the receiving end of the show, the audience 
might or might not have the same impression. To explore their uses and perceptions of 





ONLINE SURVEY  
 Introduction 6.1
Since its first day, the mediation show Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, XLNJ) has achieved 
and maintained a high audience rating for more than 7 years. Over the past years, it has 
frequently been in the top three rankings on the Entertainment Channel149. As discussed 
in Chapter Five, the show is by nature characterised by a complex format: on the one 
hand, it collaborates with the Shanghai Justice Bureau (SJB) and claims to respond to the 
call of the Hu-Wen government to promote harmony in society150; while on the other 
hand, it is showing conflict and flies in the face of the traditional Chinese saving-face 
cultural value. In addition, the show blends commercial and entertainment elements to 
attract television viewers.  
As revealed in the previous chapter, programme makers and mediators perceive 
four aims of the show, to pursue market profit and maintain social harmony while at the 
same time educating the public about legal knowledge as well as avoiding political 
sensitivities. By and large, they believe that the show could help people to solve family 
issues and reduce the number of civil lawsuits. The show makers claim that most 
participants came to the show having nothing to lose. Rather, they feel that the show 
actually has the potential to promote traditional moral virtues such as respecting elders 
and cherishing what you have obtained.  
Do television viewers perceive the show in the same way as those insiders do? Why 
do they watch XLNJ, and what gratifications do they get out of it (or not)? The answers 
                                                          
149 According to the record of programme rankings from the Entertainment Channel, the show received an 
average 6.03 percent rating for the past 7 years from 2008 to 2014. 
150 At the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Hu Jintao emphasised the aim to 




to these questions will allow us to explore why a specific genre of television programme 
emerged at a particular time and became widely popular. The findings aim to add new 
insights to the existing literature addressing the Chinese television audience. 
To understand what the audience gets out of the show and how it perceives 
potential contradictions, I conducted a survey of XLNJ viewers to explore, firstly, what 
kind of people are watching the show, i.e. the demographic characteristics of the audience; 
secondly, what the audience gets out of the show, i.e. their uses and gratifications; thirdly, 
what they think of the contradictions contained in the show, namely their perceptions of 
the potential tensions. My research in this chapter aims to investigate how the audience of 
the mediation show comes to terms with these possible tensions between the 
entertainment, social and political, and cultural aspects.   
 Demographic Features of the Sample Audience 6.2
The online survey received 201 responses in total; 185 fell within the sample criteria. 
Three questions were used to filter out those who had not heard of the show or had not 
watched it previously151. Among the total responses, 92 percent (185) of respondents had 
heard of the show and watched it at least once in the previous week. Therefore, the 
sample population consisted of the regular users of the mediation show. 
Of the respondents, 93.5 percent (173) live in Shanghai and 88.6 percent (164) hold 
a Shanghai hukou. Accordingly, most participants of the sample population are local ‘fans’ 
of or are familiar with this mediation show. Among the sample population, approximately 
28 percent are male (52) and nearly 72 percent are female participants (133). The results 
also show that nearly half (43.2 percent) of our respondents were aged between 25 and 34 
years. Over three-quarters (76.8 percent) of respondents had received higher education in 
college or university; they were either currently students or had already obtained degrees. 
The remaining respondents (23.2 percent) had received high school education or lower. 
According to the official statistics of the audience composition for Shanghai’s New 
Entertainment Channel in 2010 (Wang 2011), the audience consists of 56.2 percent females, 
the majority (69.1 percent) is aged over 44 years, and only 15.5 percent have received 
                                                          
151 Three questions were ‘Have you heard of the XLNJ mediation show?’; ‘Have you ever watched XLNJ 
before?’; and ‘In the past week, how many times have you watched XLNJ?’. 
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higher education in college or university. In comparison, our sample populations are on 
average younger, highly educated, and mostly female adults152. Given that the survey was 
promoted via online social networking sites, this finding is unsurprising, and it is in line 
with the demographic characteristics of Chinese internet users (see the report by CNNIC 
2014). 
On average, our respondents watch television quite frequently—about 5.5 days a 
week153. In the week prior to the survey, they watched on average 4 episodes of XLNJ154. 
Given that the show broadcasts 6 episodes in a week from Monday through Saturday, it 
seems that our respondents are devoted to the show. Although more women in our 
sample watch, there is not a significant difference between our male and female 
respondents in terms of frequency of viewing155. 
Figure 6.1 shows the average days of watching XLNJ among three sets of groups, 
five age groups, four education groups, and four income groups156, with the horizontal 
line indicating the means of the entire sample population. It shows that viewers aged 35 
to 44 years spend more time watching the mediation show than other age groups. This 
result is comparable to that of market research that AC Nielsen did for the Shanghai 
Media Group (SMG) in 2009, indicating that 42 percent of its audience is aged 35 to 54 
years (Yang 2010). By contrast, respondents aged 25 to 34 years spend the least time 
watching the show157. This can probably be explained by XLNJ being aired at 18:30 when 
most people, particularly those aged between 25 and 34 years, just finished work and are 
not home yet. The elder age group (55 and above) also seems to watch less of the show, 
which is below the average. Due to the nature of the online survey, we did not have many 
respondents in this age group, and therefore this result was not significant.  
  
                                                          
152 Mean age for our sample is: N=185, M=34.29 years, S.D.=12.486  
153 N=185, M=5.49, S.D.=1.903 
154 N=185, M=4.1, S.D.=2.109.   
155 The result of an independent-samples t-test for Male (M= 3.67, SD= 2.42) and Female (M= 4.26, SD= 1.96) 
is t(78.675)= -1.571, p=0.120 
156 For comparable reason, age groups are divided according to the categorisation of that in the China TV 
Rating Yearbook (Wang 2011). 
157 N=80, M=3.96, S.D.=1.984 
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Figure 6.1 Frequency of watching XLNJ between age, education, and income 
groups  
 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA test) has been conducted to compare the 
differences of watching XLNJ for education and income groups respectively158. The 
result for education group reveals a statistically significant difference between education 
groups in terms of how often they had watched the mediation show in the past week159 
(see Appendix 8). The secondary education group (senior high school and under) watched 
XLNJ more frequently than other groups. The difference is particularly significant 
between the secondary education (senior high school and under) and the higher education 
                                                          
158 The one-way ANOVA is fairly robust to deviations from normality; it is carried out with the Tukey HSD 
post hoc test to determine which groups among the sample specifically have significant differences. 
159 Four education groups are: 1). Senior high school and under; 2). College; 3). Bachelor’s degree (graduate); 
and 4). Master’s degree and higher (postgraduate and higher). The result of one-way ANOVA is F(3,181) = 







































groups (college group and the bachelor’s degree group)160. Respondents of secondary or 
lower education appeared to be more devoted to the mediation show than those with 
higher education, although the latter do watch. Rather, people with different education 
might have a different reason for watching a particular show, which I will further discuss 
later to understand the audience’s different uses and forms of gratification. 
With respect to participants’ family income, 45.4 percent (84) of respondents have 
an average monthly income in the range of 2,000 to 4,999 RMB161, and the range of 5,000 
to 7,999 RMB came second (28.1 percent). Only 14.6 percent (27) of respondents have a 
higher family income, exceeding 8,000 RMB. I categorised family income into four 
income groups162 and conducted a one-way ANOVA test to compare differences in 
terms of how often respondents watched the mediation show in a week (see Appendix 9). 
Statistically significant differences are found across the four income groups in terms of 
weekly consumption of XLNJ163. Respondents belonging to the lowest income groups 
(lower than 2,000 RMB) watch significantly more of the mediation show than those in the 
two higher income groups (5,000-7,999 RMB, and 8,000 RMB and above)164. This 
matches the national statistics that approximately 63 percent of the audience of the 
Entertainment Channel have a monthly income lower than 2,000 RMB (Wang 2011). This 
finding also matches the programme makers’ expectation of their audience, i.e. those 
belonging to the mid-low income group in Shanghai165. It is noteworthy that a large 
number of those seeking dispute solutions on television come from the mid-low income 
group of around 2,000 RMB per month per head166. They are regarded as a low-income 
group in Shanghai, as they just meet the minimum wage standard of 1,450 RMB per 
                                                          
160 A Tukey post hoc test reveals that the days spent on watching XLNJ is statistically significantly lower for 
respondents who received college education (4±2.1 days, p=0.9) and university education (3.68±2 days, p=0.007) 
compared with the secondary education group (4.98±2 days). 
161 Current exchange rate, 1 Chinese Yuan (RMB) = 0.12 Euro = 0.16 US dollar. 
162 1). lower than 2,000 RMB; 2). 2,000-4,999 RMB; 3). 5,000-7,999 RMB; 4). 8,000 RMB and above. 
163 F (3, 171)= 2.923, p= 0.035. 
164 Tukey HSD post hoc result reveals that watching frequency of XLNJ for the income group 5,000-7,999 
RMB is 3.65±2 days, p=0.044; and for income group 8,000 RMB and above it is 3.74±2 days, p=0.097, which 
are both significantly lower than the lower income group (lower than 2,000 RMB), which has a viewing 
frequency of 5.42±2.4 days. 
165 According to the interview with the programme makers. 
166 Interviewees #1 and 7. 
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month167. It seems that disputants on TV and the devoted audience are mostly from the 
same low-income group, probably because the latter find the content closer to their own 
life.  
In summary, the frequent viewers of the mediation show in our sample have the 
demographic characteristics that are in line with the national statistics: 1) aged over 35 
years, 2) lower education, and 3) lower income168. In fact, these demographic features of 
the sample are, to a large extent, similar to the programme makers’ conception of their 
audience. That is to say, in the producers’ opinion, older television viewers with lower 
education and/or lower income have a greater rapport with the programme because they 
recognise that they could encounter similar situations. 
 What Makes People Watch the Mediation Show? 6.3
Having an indication of who watches XLNJ, I now turn to the question ‘why’? I adopt 
the uses and gratifications approach (U&G) to study why people choose to watch the 
mediation show and what they get out of it. The U&G approach (Katz 1959) addresses 
the issues of media selection and consumption, and its origins lie in the search for 
answers of questions: why do people use media, and what do people do with media 
contents?  
The U&G approach suggests that individuals play an active role in selecting media 
to gratify their specific needs or motives (Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 1973). U&G has 
been employed in investigating a wide range of media including newspapers, radio, and 
television, as well as new media. Early researchers have concluded a variety of uses and 
gratifications that the audience is often attempting to satisfy, such as surveillance, 
information seeking, entertainment, personal identity, passing time, social utility, diversion, 
or companionship (Dimmick, Sikand, and Patterson 1994, Lin 1998, Rubin 1983, 
McQuail, Blumler, and Brown 1972, Livingstone 1998). These social and psychological 
needs are described as cognitive and emotional in nature (Maslow 1970). 
                                                          
167  The minimum wage standard is set by the government. See 
http://www.gov.cn/fwxx/sh/2012-03/26/content_2100302.htm [Last access: 18th August 2015] 
168 According to the official statistics reported in the 2012 China Radio and TV Yearbook (Wang 2013): 53.2 
percent if the audience is aged over 35 years, 64 percent have lower education (middle school and primary 
school), and 71 percent have monthly family income higher than 3,000 yuan. 
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Drawing on previous studies on reality television using the U&G framework (Reiss 
and Wiltz 2004, Rubin 1983, Papacharissi and Mendelson 2007), I adopt the following 
sorts of possible gratifications related to why people watch the mediation show: (1) Passing 
time; (2) Social utility; (3) Entertainment; (4) Information seeking; and (5) Perceived closeness. 
According to early studies, many people turn on television just for background as they do 
something else such as housework, and some people watch television only because they 
have nothing better to do to pass time (Scannell 1996). Social utility refers to the television 
audience watching television since their family members do, as well, or to discuss issues 
on TV with others. Considering that the mediation show is broadcast through an 
entertainment channel, I also include Entertainment, to determine whether the audience 
watches the show for pleasure, relaxation, or emotional release. Both programme makers 
and television mediators hold the opinion that the show provides dispute solutions for 
the audience. Therefore, I also include Information Seeking as a gratification to investigate if 
the audience finds the show helpful as an educational tool in providing them with 
information that facilitates their understanding of the world or allows them to learn how 
others solve their problems. Last but not least, the mediation show is broadcast in the 
Shanghai local dialect, which is likely to bring the local audience closer to the show. 
Language, as part of the culture that helps to construct one’s identity (Joseph 2004), 
allows the audience to develop a more intimate relationship with the mediated. For this 
reason, the fifth gratification, Perceived closeness, is used here as a variant of Personal identity 
(see Chapter Three). 
I examined the audience’s uses and gratifications as dependent variables, and these 5 
items of gratifications were measured by statements169, using a Likert scale. Participants 
were asked to indicate on a 6-point scale up to what point they agree with the reason 
given for watching the mediation show170. People of different demographic backgrounds 
                                                          
169 These five statements are (1) I watch XLNJ because I find this programme interesting, it can make me laugh; 
(2) I watch XLNJ because my family members or other people I know watch it, so I can discuss it with them; (3) 
I watch XLNJ because it's a habit, and I have no other things to do; (4) I watch XLNJ because it shows how 
other people deal with the same problems I have, so I could learn about what could happen to me.; (5) I watch 
XLNJ because people speak Shanghainese on the show, which is close to real life and makes me feel very close 
to those people on television.  




might have different motives to watch the mediation show, as the programme makers 
assume; I therefore use the age, education, frequency, and income as explaining variables 
and hypothesise:171 
 Age, income, education, and TV consumption have an effect on the H1:
audience’s uses and gratifications of the mediation show. 
I expect that TV consumption would be positively correlated with all five uses and 
gratifications because an early study has shown significant association between time spent 
on the media and motives for use (Papacharissi and Mendelson 2007). In particular, I 
expect that viewers from lower income and education groups are more likely to learn 
from watching television programmes as programme makers have the aim to educate 
people from the ‘grass-roots’ level.  
The results in Table 6.1 show that the respondents exhibit great fondness for the 
dialect of Shanghainese used in the show, which seems to generate a cordial feeling for 
them (M=4.60, SD=1.380)172. With participants speaking this dialect on the show, it 
creates a daily-life-like scene that brings the audience closer to those on the show. Seeking 
information appears to be the second main reason that motivates the audience (M=3.98, 
S.D.=1.502). This result matches the programme makers’ expectation, as they aim to 
educate the audience about relevant laws and provide information helpful in solving 
disputes in their own lives. Companionship or social utility appears to be a third motive 
for the audience (M=3.39, S.D.=1.422); they watch in the hope of finding common topics 
to maintain relationships. In comparison, passing time (M=3.10, S.D.=1.434) and 
entertainment (M=2.88, SD=1.456) have lower means, which suggest that our respondents 
have fewer relaxation needs when watching the show. Notably, Entertainment gratification 
receives the lowest mean, which suggests that the explanation that they watch the show 
for fun is less likely to be a major motive. Being aired through the Entertainment Channel, 
the show might be less amusing than fellow programmes on the same channel. While the 
                                                          
171 Interviews with directors of the mediation show.  
172 It is noteworthy that while in general fewer respondents choose the extreme options, they did demonstrate 
strong attitude towards two statements. There were 22.16 percent who chose ‘Not like me at all’ for the 
statement ‘I find this programme interesting, it can make me laugh’; 33.51 percent indicated that ‘People speak Shanghainese 
in the show, which is close to real life and make me feel very close to those people on television’ was the reason that was very 
much like themselves.  
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respondents may not watch for fun and laughter, it does not necessarily mean that they 
do not watch it for entertainment; rather, they seem to watch it for its dramatic quality 
(see Chapter Seven).  
Table 6.1  Audience’s U&Gs of the mediation show 
 
Audiences’ uses and gratifications of the mediation show have a significant association 
with weekly television consumption173. There are significant positive correlations between 
weekly television consumption and all U&G items except Passing Time, indicating that 
respondents who spend more time watching television are more likely to watch XLNJ to 
obtain gratifications than those who watch less television. It might be that people do not 
like to admit that they watch the mediation show in order to pass time, regardless of how 
many days they watch TV in a week.  
Among our respondents, it seems those with lower education background are more 
likely to identify with the language used by the show. This finding, to some extent, 
verified early lingual scholars’ studies that people of the lower socio-economic class hold 
a more positive attitude with respect to dialect (Cheshire et al. 1989), though the 
correlation between income and users’ needs was not found174. Moreover, as mentioned, 
                                                          
173 Measured by how many days that one watched television in the past week.  
174 An ANOVA test also finds no differences between income groups in terms of participants’ use of XLNJ for 
entertainment, social utility, passing time, seeking information, and perceived closeness. Entertainment: F(3, 
171)=0.186, p=0.906; Social Utility: F(3,171)=0.396, p=0.756 ; Passing time: F(3,171)=0.060, p=0.981; 
Information seeking: F(3,171)=0.681, p=0.565; and Perceived closeness F(3,171)=0.305, p=0.821; see Appendix 
11. 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix




(1) Perceived closeness 4.60 1,380 0.026 0.072 -0.155** 0.205***
(2) Information seeking 3.98 1,502 -0.050 -0.115 -0.251*** 0.149**
(3) Social utility 3.39 1,422 0.014 -0.030 -0.116 0.227***
(4) Passing time 3.10 1,434 0.044 -0.145** -0.017 0.120
(5) Entertainment 2.88 1,456 0.025 -0.041 -0.003 0.238***
N=185; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




disputants on the show usually come from a lower educational background, so the 
language and slang they use are likely to create a stronger empathic bond with audiences 
who have a similar educational background.  
As I expected, there is a significant negative correlation between education and the 
use of XLNJ for information seeking. This suggests that respondents with lower 
education are more likely to learn from the mediation show. This finding also is in line 
with the programme makers’ aim for the show to educate the masses about legal 
knowledge. Particularly, significant differences are found between the four education 
groups in seeking information usage175. Respondents in the secondary education group 
(senior higher school and under) are more likely to gather information when watching the 
mediation show (M=4.56, S.D.=1.22) than other groups. This result suggests that when 
the respondents’ education level increases, they are less likely to seek information from 
XLNJ. People with higher education might be able to obtain information from other 
sources, while those of lower education tend to mainly rely on the mass media as their 
information source, as found in other studies (Carpentier, Schrøder, and Hallett 2013, 
Muusses et al. 2012, Zhao 2009). 
There is a weak but significant negative linear relationship between Age and Passing 
Time, suggesting that with the increase of age, the degree of watching XLNJ for Passing 
Time goes in an opposite direction. The ANOVA tests176 show a significant difference 
between the age group 14-24 years (M=3.64, S.D.=1.428) and 25-34 years (M=2.89, 
S.D.=1.232), revealing that respondents in the younger age group are more likely to watch 
XLNJ, possibly because they have nothing else to do compared with other age groups.  
So, H1 is partly rejected, with only education and watching frequency of television 
affecting the audience’s uses and gratifications. As the result suggests, the use of dialect plays 
a major role in attracting the audience and providing them with a feeling of perceived 
closeness. In fact, programmes in dialect have long been welcomed in many cities177, 
especially among female audiences aged between 45 and 64 years with secondary 
                                                          
175 ANOVA test F(3, 181)= 5.086, p= 0.002; see Appendix 12. 
176 F(4, 180)= 2.902, p= 0.023; see Appendix 13. 
177 Such as News Talk by A Liu Tou (a liu tou shuo xinwen) in Hangzhou, Let Me Tell You (jiang bo nong ting) 




education (senior higher school and under) (Chen 2009a). This can be explained by 
people having a language affiliation with the dialects and thus identifying more with it as a 
core marker of their identity (Block 2009) than the official unifying language of Mandarin. 
Introducing dialect in television programmes seems to enable the audience—especially 
those elderly who have adopted the dialect more thoroughly—to associate with the 
community where they grew up.  
Motivation for information seeking turns out to be second strongest reason that 
the audience watched XLNJ, especially for those that do not have higher education. 
Although entertainment was found to be associated with reality television by early 
researchers (see, for example, Papacharissi and Mendelson 2007, Reiss and Wiltz 2004), as 
for gratifications of this study, social utility rather than entertainment has been identified 
as a stronger motivation. Apparently, our respondents tend to claim that they get 
something out of watching the show rather than watching it for fun or simply to killing 
time. But they are certainly attracted to the show that they watch, on average, four 
episodes out of six per week. If it is only partly fun for them, then how do they perceive 
the show?  
 Perceptions of XLNJ  6.4
From a psychological perspective, perception is to understand the surrounding 
environment by organising, identifying, and interpreting sensory information (Gibson 
2002, Schacter et al. 2011). The viewer’s understanding and interpretation of the visual 
and oral information in a television show constitute their perception of it. In other words, 
what the audience sees and hears on TV conveys information to them, which has an 
effect on their understanding and opinions of the content. For example, when people 
watch XLNJ, they watch the disputants’ and mediators’ behaviour and facial expressions 
and listen to their conversations, from which they learn what happened between two 
disputants and why they arguing. The audience then processes such information 
according to their personal knowledge or experiences. In that case, their perceptions and 
opinions towards the same dispute may vary from one person to another. My survey 
research is aimed to explore their different perceptions of the same mediation show in 
terms of its entertaining, social and political, as well as cultural aspects. 
The production of the XLNJ show (see Chapter Five) integrates elements of 
entertainment to attract audiences, claiming to promote social harmony by latently 
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reducing the number of lawsuits, and while the show conveys moral norms, it also 
refreshes traditional views on the culture of losing face. In this research, the audience’s 
perception of the mediation show refers to their understanding and interpretation of 
these three aspects, i.e. entertaining elements, social implications, and cultural values; 
these are important dependent variables for my research.  
 Audience’s Perception of Entertainised Mediation 6.4.1
As indicated in Chapter Five, one major goal of XLNJ is to attract more viewers and 
increase its market share. Due to the show’s nature as an entertainment programme, 
various entertainment elements have been blended into the mediation show that 
sometimes make it look dramatic and sensational. Such rendering of entertainment does 
help in attracting viewers, but it may also trigger suspicion about its authenticity, as it 
seems too exaggerated to be true.  
The previous U&G section indicated that our respondents do not perceive XLNJ 
as an amusing programme. Is that because mediation is not fun, or do they find that 
mediation per se is not something to make fun of? I use two statements to measure the 
audience’s perception of the entertainment appeal of the show. Respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they agree or not with the statements that ‘Civil mediation is serious 
and should not be made into entertainment on TV’ – entertainment perception 1 (EP1)178 – 
and ‘I will not choose mediation on TV as a solution for my own issues, but it is fun to 
watch other’s disputes’ – entertainment perception 2 (EP2)179. Answers to these two questions 
should reveal whether the audience sees a difference between serious mediation and 
entertainised television, or if they can reconcile such a contradiction. In the following 
analysis, I will investigate the factors that are associated with these two entertainment 
perceptions180. 
Whether television viewers find the mediation show entertaining is likely to be 
associated with patterns of their television consumption, which includes the frequency of 
                                                          
178 EP1 is coded as: 1=strongly agree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=somewhat disagree; 4=strongly disagree 
179 EP2 is recoded as: 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree; 3=somewhat agree; 4=strongly agree. So that 
it goes same direction as EP1, that lower value refers to lower entertainment perception, and higher value refers to 
higher perception of entertainment.  
180 Since there is low consistency between EP1 and EP2 (Cronbach’s Alpha for these two items is -0.255), I will 
not establish a scale for these two items. Instead, they will be treated separately in this analysis.  
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watching the show and watching habits. Watching frequency of XLNJ refers to how often the 
respondent watched XLNJ in the past week181. Watching habits refers to seven types of 
television programmes that one frequently watches182. Based on the seven types, I 
established an index for watching habit of entertainment (WH_E) consisting of fashion 
programmes, reality entertainment, and television drama series183, and watching habit of 
information programmes (WH_I) on the basis of news, legal programmes, and service-type 
programmes184. These two indices are used to measure the audience’s preference for 
entertainment programmes and information programmes.  
In addition to watching frequency of XLNJ and watching habits, also included in 
this analysis as control variables are, age, education 185 , family income 186 , CCP 
membership187, experience of mediation188, and satisfaction with society189. According to 
the programme makers, most people who turn to the show for dispute resolution live at 
the ‘grass-roots’ level and have low income. So, I included respondents’ family income as 
one control variable to determine whether the audience’s financial situation has a 
relationship with their perception. Moreover, considering that the mediation show is 
                                                          
181 Respondents are asked ‘How many days in the past week that you have watched XLNJ?’  
182 Participants were asked how often they watch the following TV genres: (1) Fashion / Music / Celebrities; (2) 
Sports games; (3) Reality television talent shows; (4) News / Information programmes; (5) Programme features 
helping ordinary people to solve their issues in life; (6) Crime / Law programmes; (7) TV Drama / Soap Opera.  
These items were coded as 1=never, 2= rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=very often, 5=always. 
183 Cronbach’s Alpha for the three TV genres is 0.493.  
WH_E= fashion * reality * series. Scale ranges from 1 to 125; lower values indicate lower frequencies in 
watching entertainment programmes, and higher values indicate higher preferences for entertainment 
programmes.  
184  Cronbach’s Alpha for the three television genres is 0.545.  
WH_I= news * legal * help. Scale ranges from 1 to 125; lower values indicate lower frequencies in watching 
information programmes, while higher values indicate higher preferences for information programmes. 
185 1= Senior high school and under; 2= College; 3= Bachelor’s degree; 4= Master’s degree and higher. 
186 1= lower than 2,000 RMB; 2= 2,000-4,999 RMB; 3= 5,000-7,999 RMB; 4= 8,000 RMB and above. 
187 CCP membership is recoded as a dummy variable, 1= CCP and Youth League member, and 0= non-party 
member. 
188 Respondents are asked if they have experienced civil mediation before. This is recoded as dummy variable, 
0= no; 1= yes. 
189  Satisfaction with society is established based on three questions asking respondents to what extent they are 
satisfied with the society in terms of the economic development (satisfaction1), public security (satisfaction2), 
and environmental protection (satisfaction3). Answers are coded as: 1=not satisfied at all; 2=not so satisfied; 
3=fairly satisfied; 4=very satisfied. Satisfaction with society= satisfaction 1* satisfaction 2* satisfaction 3 
(Cronbach's Alpha = 0.740 ). The scale ranges from 1 to 64, while lower values representing lower social 
satisfaction and higher values representing higher satisfaction with society. 
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aimed at solving family disputes, those who have experienced civil mediation previously 
may have different perceptions from others who have no such experience. People who 
are dissatisfied with society might be more suspicious about television programmes, so I 
assume that those who are more satisfied with society find the show more entertaining. 
Furthermore, members of China’s Communist Party or Youth League were expected to 
have a relatively high political awareness, so I included this control variable to examine 
whether they have different perceptions from other non-Party members.  
My hypotheses related to the audience’s entertainment perception were: 
 People who watch more mediation shows in a week are more likely to H2:
perceive these shows as entertaining than those who watch them less frequently, 
keeping all other variables controlled. 
 People who often watch entertainment programmes are more likely to H3:
perceive the mediation show as entertaining than those who habitually watch 
information programmes, keeping all other variables controlled. 
On average, our respondents show a tendency to disagree (M=2.79, S.D.=0.870) 
with EP1, suggesting that they do not perceive any problem in turning civil mediation 
into entertainment on TV. Also, on average, they tend to agree with EP2 (M=2.91, 
S.D.=0.749), not taking mediation on TV as an option for themselves, but perceiving it as 
fun to watch. The means of both statements suggest that the audience considers that the 
show is somewhat entertaining; after all, it is broadcasted on an entertainment channel.  
Two ordinal logistic regressions have been carried out to investigate the relation 
between respondents’ perception of entertainment and their viewing habits as well as 
other control variables190. Table 6.2 shows the parameter estimates for the entertainment 
perception. The model 191  for EP1 confirms that there are systematic effects in the 
entertainment perception related to our independent variables, meaning that there are 
                                                          
190 Since both dependent variables entertainment perception 1 and 2 are ordinal variables with four categories, 
ordinal logit regression is adopted to further analyse the relationship between our independent variables and the 
audience’s entertainment perception. In order to make the coefficient more comparable between independent 
variables, I recode all of the independent variables such that the values run from 0 to 1.  
191 The model for EP1 is a significant improvement over the baseline or intercept-only model (p=0.08<0.1). 
The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model fit the data well (p=0.252). The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that 
the model can account for 8.6 percent of the variance in tier of entry. And the test of parallel lines does not 
reject the null hypothesis of the Proportional Odds assumption (p=0.732).   
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correlations between them. In relation to watching frequency of XLNJ, the coefficient is 
0.742, which is fairly significant192 and related to responses on the dependent variable 
EP1. Odds Ratio is calculated to indicate the odds of indicating disagreement with the 
statement for entertainment perception 1. For example, the odds for watching frequency of XLNJ 
is exp.(0.742)=2.10, indicating that the odds of showing disagreement with the 
entertainment perception 1 increase by 2.1 for each unit increase in watching frequency of XLNJ. 
Consequently, the parameter estimate indicates that respondents who watch XLNJ more 
frequently are more likely to disagree that the civil mediation is serious and should not be 
made into entertainment; in other words, they are likely to judge that making mediation 
into entertainment is acceptable. The result also indicates a close-to-significant 
relationship between watching habit for entertainment 193
 
and EP1, while no significant 
relationship is found for watching habit for information194.  
Shown in the same table is the model for EP2195, which reveals an unexpected 
significant but obvious relationship 196  between respondents’ watching habit of 
information programmes and their agreement with EP2. Those who are least interested in 
information programmes are 2.27 times (i.e. 1/0.44) more likely to watch the mediation 
show for fun than those with a highest preference for information programmes197. This 
model finds weak relations between watching frequency, preference for entertainment, 
and EP2. These findings for EP1 and EP2 are converse to the expectation in our 
hypothesis. Therefore, H2 is partially rejected, while H3 is rejected. According to our 
results, respondents’ entertainment perceptions are not influenced by the frequency with 
which they watch the mediation show, nor by their preferences for entertainment 
programmes. 
                                                          
192p=0.086 < 0.1  
193 P=0.169. The odds ratio is exp.(-1.081) = 0.34, indicating that the odds of disagreeing with the entertainment 
perception statement 1 decrease by 0.34 for each unit increase in watching habits for entertainment. 
194 The parameter for watching habits entertainment is -1.081 at a loosely significant level, and the coefficient for 
watching habits information is -0.339. 
195 The model fitting information for EP2 is p=0.393. The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model fit 
the data well (p=0.422). The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that the model can account for 5.4 percent of the variance 
in tier of entry. And the test of parallel lines does not reject the null hypothesis of the Proportional Odds 
assumption (p=0.326).   
196 P=0.190 
197 Exp. (-0.829)=0.44 
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However, the two models reveal significant effects in respondents’ perception of 
entertainment in relation to previous personal experience of mediation and age. 
Respondents with no personal experience of civil mediation are significantly more likely 
to find mediation turning into entertainment acceptable, compared with those who have 
experienced mediation before198, after other independent variables are controlled. Indeed, 
personal experience could have an effect on individuals’ opinions about the mediation 
show. It is understandable that for those who have gone through it, civil mediation is not 
a funny issue to be made into entertainment. Though not significant, respondents with no 
Party membership appear to be less likely to perceive the entertainment value of the 
mediation show199; this factor does not seem to affect one’s attitude in finding the 
mediation show entertaining. 
Respondents’ age and education have relatively strong relationships with 
entertainment perception 2 when other variables are controlled. Examining the parameter 
estimates, we can see that older respondents or those with higher education are more 
likely to agree that TV mediation might not be an ideal option for them, but that it is fun 
to watch. Age has a mildly significant effect200; when compared with younger respondents, 
older people are much more likely to find mediation on TV entertaining. This result does 
not necessarily mean that younger respondents do not watch the mediation show for fun. 
Respondents with higher education were more likely to agree that TV mediation was fun 
to watch rather than a source of information for their own issues, though the relation is 
hardly significant. Also, the result suggests that those who are more satisfied with society 
are potentially more likely to be agreeable if mediation is made into entertainment201, 
while respondents who have lower income are somewhat less likely to use it as an option 
to employ in their own lives, but more likely to watch the show for fun202.  
  
                                                          
198 B=0.915, p=0.026. The odds ratio exp.(0.915)=2.50 reveals that those with no mediation experience are 2.5 
times more likely to find that it is not an issue to make mediation into television entertainment than those who 
had previous mediation experience. 
199 Estimates for both EP1 and EP2 are negative: B for Ep1 is -0.511 and for Ep2 is -0.121. 
200 P=0.079 
201 P=0.252 
202 P=0.118  
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Table 6.2 Entertainment Perception of XLNJ (Ordinal Logistic Regression)  
 
Taken the above results for entertainment perception together, it suggests that how 
people become familiar with civil mediation may influence their perception of its 
seriousness. Those watching XLNJ on a frequent basis are devoted viewers who enjoy 
the show and obtain their knowledge about mediation through watching the show. So for 
them, regardless of whether they see mediation as serious or not, making it into television 
entertainment is not an issue. This also confirms the finding from the previous uses and 
gratifications result that heavy television / programme viewers appear to enjoy the show 







Watching frequency XLNJ 0.742* 0.433 2.10 -0.094 0.449 0.91
Watching habit entertainment -1.081 0.786 0.34 0.046 0.803 1.05
Watching habit information -0.339 0.596 0.71 -0.829 0.633 0.44
Education -0.142 0.935 0.87 1.338 0.985 3.81
Age 0.455 1.027 1.58 1.815* 1.034 6.14
Non Party member vs. CPC party 
or Youth League member
-0.511 0.312 0.60 -0.121 0.331 0.89
No mediation experience vs. Had 
mediation experience before
0.915** 0.412 2.50 0.437 0.420 1.55
Satisfaction with society 1.063 0.928 2.90 - - -
Family Income - - - -1.102 -1.102 0.33
Threshold (strongly agree 
statement)
-1.794 1.181 - - - -
Threshold (somewhat agree 
statement)
0.260 1.164 - 2.763** 1.174 -
Threshold (somewhat disagree 
with statement)
2.207* 1.093 - 0.159 1.151 -
Threshold (strongly disagree with 
statement)
- - - -2.086* 1.203 -
Link function: Logit.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01; 
Note:
EP2: N=173; Pseudo R-square: Cox and Snell= 0.048; Nagelkerke = 0.054; McFadden = 0.022
EP1: N=172; SE=Standard Error. Pseudo R-square: Cox and Snell= 0.078; Nagelkerke = 0.086; 
McFadden = 0.033 
Entertainment perception 1- 
Civil mediation is serious and 
should not be made into 
entertainment on TV
Entertainment perception 2-I 
will not choose mediation on TV 
as a solution for my own issues, 




make one consider mediation a serious affair. Having participated in real mediation, these 
people know clearly what it is like, so they are less likely to find it fun to watch others’ 
disputes on television. For them, turning civil mediation into entertainment seems 
inappropriate. 
In addition, respondents’ personal background such as age and education have an 
effect on their perception of the mediation show in terms of its entertainment appeal. 
Combined with the finding in the previous section, this suggests that while those having 
lower education tend to seek information from the show, the audience members with 
higher education are more likely to find it fun to watch the mediation show. Particularly, 
elderly people seem to enjoy the mediation show more than the young; however, this 
does not mean that the young people do not watch the show for fun. It seems possible 
that older people do not see mediation on TV as a solution to their issues.  
 Political Implications  6.4.2
Apart from the endorsement from the SJB, the popularity of XLNJ among the audience 
in the Shanghai urban and surrounding areas also won it praise from SMG and 
government officers.  The special seminars (see Chapter Five) held in 2008 and 2010 
give the programme makers confidence that the mediation show wields positive influence 
in building a harmonious society and heightening public ethical awareness. In fact, playing 
to the government’s call for a ‘harmonious society’ is an important aim of the show as 
seen by programme producer and directors. Whether the audience members perceive the 
political aim of the show in the same way as seen by its makers is a question worthy of 
pursuit. 
To measure the audience’s political perception (PP) of the mediation show, I used 
three statements with which respondents could agree or not. Two statements concern the 
public’s opinions on the social and political implication of the mediation programme: ‘I 
think this programme helps resolve some people's family disputes and helps create a 
harmonious society’ (PP1) and ‘I think such mediation shows help to reduce the number 
of lawsuits’ (PP2). The third statement, ‘I don't think those disputes in the programme are 
common in real life; so this show fails to raise attention to social issues’ (PP3), is intended 
to measure the audiences’ opinions towards disputes in the mediation show in terms of 
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their representativeness of social issues. Based on the three statements, an index for 
political perception203 is created to measure how respondents interpret the social and 
political implications of the show, of which the higher value indicates the higher political 
perception. That is, the mediation show could help to solve family conflicts, reduce the 
number of lawsuits and promote harmonious society, and raise social attention of 
common issues. A lower value refers to lower political perception of the mediation show. 
With respect to independent variables, one’s political attitude may have a 
relationship with the perception of the mediation show in terms of the social and political 
implications. Taking into account the gap between political interest and efficacy indicated 
in early research (Bromley, Curtice, and Seyd 2004), I use both political interest204 and 
political efficacy as measures for respondents’ political attitude. Political efficacy consists of 
external efficacy, referring to the belief that one is effective when participating in politics, 
and internal efficacy, indicating the belief that one can understand politics and therefore 
participate in politics. External political efficacy is measured with two statements in the 
survey205 and internal political efficacy is measured with three206. Respondents being more 
politically efficacious might have higher political awareness, and accordingly better 
perception of the political implications of mediation. In addition, I include satisfaction with 
society to measure to what extent people are satisfied with their life and the country, 
because personal satisfaction with society could influence one’s political attitude (Clarke, 
Dutt, and Kornberg 1993). Respondents are asked about their satisfaction with economic 
development, public safety, and the social welfare situation in China.  
Other control variables comprise a series of demographics, such as gender, education, 
CCP membership, and experience of mediation, because they might influence one’s political 
                                                          
203 PP1 and PP2 are coded as 1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=somewhat agree, and 4=strongly 
agree, and PP3 is coded oppositely, so that all three statements proceed in the same direction. The index for 
political perception is then created: PP=PP1*PP2*PP3; the scale ranges from 1 to 64. Lower values represent lower 
perception of political implications, while higher values represent higher political perceptions.  
204   Respondents are asked ‘How often you discuss news/political affairs with others’. 1= never; 2= 
occasionally; 3= sometimes; 4= often; 96= don’t know 
205 ‘People like me don't have any say about what the government does’ and ‘Government officials don't care 
what people like me think’. 
206 ‘Politics is so complicated that people like me can't really understand what's going on’, ‘I consider myself well 
qualified to participate in politics’, and ‘I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political 
issues facing our country’. 
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perception of the mediation show. In the survey, respondents are also asked about their 
interests in seeing other sorts of disputes on the XLNJ mediation show, including 
neighbour disputes (1); family disputes over property distribution (2); and disputes 
between citizens and the government (3)207.  Among these three sorts of disputes, 1 and 
3 are rarely seen on the mediation show, as programme makers view them as beyond the 
scope of family issues, which are likely to be intervened in by government institutions. 
Dispute 2 issues of family property distribution were very once common on 
XLNJ—although the producer and the core production team intended to cover a wider 
range of topics, disputes over houses remain the most frequently occurring topic (see 
Chapter Five).  
As mentioned above, people with high political efficacy have more faith and trust 
in government and in their own ability to understand politics. In this sense, they might be 
more likely to perceive the mediation show in terms of its political function of promoting 
social harmony. It has been argued that citizens’ satisfaction towards society reflects their 
overall trust in the government and regime (Dalton 1996). In the same vein, those who 
are more satisfied with society might be more likely to perceive the political perception of the 
show. My hypotheses for the political perception are: 
 People with higher (external and internal) political efficacy are more likely H4:
to perceive the political implications of the mediation show than those with lower 
political efficacy, keeping all other variables controlled. 
 Satisfaction with society is expected to be positively correlated with the H5:
audience’s political perception of the mediation show, keeping all other variables controlled. 
The results show that respondents generally hold a positive attitude towards the 
social and political influence of the mediation television show208. In general, they agree 
that issues addressed in the mediation show are common in society, and that the 
programme could help to solve people’s family issues and reduce the number of lawsuits.  
                                                          
207Respondents are asked if they are not interested at all, not so interested, fairly interested, or very interested to 
see the mediation for these disputes on the show. 1= Not interested at all; 2= Not so interested; 3= Fairly 
interested; 4= Very interested; 96= don’t know. 
208 The reliability test shows that these two questions were internally consistent — the Cronbach’s Alpha is 
0.801 for the first two questions (PP1 and PP2), and after recoding the value of the third question (PP3), the 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the three questions measuring audiences’ attitude is 0.621.  
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A multiple regression 209  has been run to explore the relationship between 
independent variables and respondents’ political perceptions. As Table 6.3 shows, only 
internal political efficacy (confidence that they can make a difference), rather than external 
political efficacy (perceptions of governmental and institutional responsiveness to citizens’ 
needs and demands), has a significant negative relationship with respondents’ perceptions 
of the political implications of XLNJ. Although internal and external political efficacy are 
frequently discussed as overall concepts, their measure falls into two unique dimensions 
that interact differently with other variables (Balch 1974). In this study, the results indicate 
that an increase in one’s internal political efficacy (IPE) will cause a significant decrease 
(-14.734) in the perception of the political implications contained in the mediation show. 
In other words, the more self-confidence one has in one’s ability to understand and 
participate in politics, the less likely one would perceive the show as representing 
common social issues and as being helpful in reducing the number of lawsuits. 
Respondents’ political interest seems to have a slightly significant correlation with 
their political perception (p=0.123). The relationship between respondents’ political perception 
and their political efficacy is puzzling, being associated only with lower internal political 
efficacy. Contrary to my expectation, the relationship between individuals’ political 
efficacy in fact leans towards a negative direction. The coefficient for IPE (-14.734) 
suggests that people who have less confidence in their abilities to influence politics are 
more likely to be convinced by the mediation show in terms of its representativeness of 
social issues and its effect in promoting an accessible solution to disputes other than 
going to court. The coefficient for EPE also presents a negative relation, though it is not 
significant. We therefore cannot accept H4 because of the contrary finding. Respondents’ 
faith in government responding to their concern seems neither to encourage nor 
discourage their perception of the show’s social and political implications. Compared with 
their external political efficacy, our respondents’ political perception of the show appears to 
be more associated with their confidence in understanding or participating in politics. 
Linking the discussion with focus group participants (see Chapter Seven), it seems that 
since the audience has lower confidence in themselves to make change to political affairs, 
                                                          
209  In order to compare coefficients across the independent variables and control variables, all of the 
independent variables were recoded such that values run from 0 to 1. 
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they are likely to tend to have more faith in the media’s effect in bringing attention and 
providing solutions to social issues.  
Table 6.3 Political perception of XLNJ (Multiple regression analysis) 
 
Another independent variable, Satisfaction with society, has a significantly positive 
relationship with respondents’ political perception (p<0.05). Seemingly, the more satisfied 
one is with society, the more likely one would perceive the mediation show to help solve 
family conflicts, reduce the number of lawsuits, promote a harmonious society, and raise 
social attention to common issues. Therefore, H5 is accepted. The increase of one’s 
satisfaction with society suggests that one feels that less in society needs to be improved 
and/or that one believes much has been done to improve society. 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E.
External political efficacy - 0.492 -5,189
Internal political efficacy -14.734* -7,848
Political interests 7.908 -5,088
Satisfaction with society 18.856** -9,320
Interest in Family disputes regarding property 
distribution and inheritence
19.232*** -7,163
Interest in watching disputes between neighbours 4.723 -6,564




Gender - 6.704** -3,173
Education -21.753** -8,490
CPC membership 2.238 -2,864
Mediation experience - 0.120 -3,577
Constant 33.986*** -8,751
N 130
R-Squared 0.225  
Note:





As shown in Table 6.3, there is a significant relation between respondents’ political 
perception and their interest in family disputes over housing issues 210 . Respondents’ 
interests in family disputes increased by one unit would cause a significant increase 
(19.232) in their agreement that the show is helpful in solving issues and promoting social 
harmony. But the audience’s interests in either neighbour disputes or conflicts between 
citizens and government have no influence in their political perception. Unlike what the 
producer perceived, it seems that our respondents in general remain more interested in 
family disputes211. This finding is consistent with what is revealed in Chapter Five, that 
property-related disputes remain the most frequently occurring issues that enjoy a high 
audience rating.  
A correlation test (Table 6.4) reveals significant correlation between the 
respondents’ weekly consumption of XLNJ and their interests in the three kinds of 
disputes. Seemingly, the respondents’ interests in disputes motivate their consumption of 
XLNJ. Equally, it can be argued that more consumption of XLNJ would not cause the 
audience to tire of arguments over house property. On the contrary, frequent watching of 
XLNJ seems to sustain the audience’s interest in different kinds of disputes. As discussed 
in Chapter Five, there is a political tension in the show between reaching a harmonious 
society and showing people in conflict. The respondents’ attitude towards this tension is 
somewhat reflected by the positive and significant correlation between their high interests 
and high frequency in watching disputes and their political perception. It seems that people 
might more likely be convinced by the show rather than finding it contentious if they are 
frequent and/or interested viewers. A finding is also revealed in the focus group 
discussion where non-frequent or non-interested viewers are more likely to doubt how 
efficient the mediation show could be in promoting harmony by providing solutions to 
individual cases (see Chapter Seven). 
  
                                                          
210 B=19.232, p<0.01 
211 M=3.10, S.D.= 0.3672 
146 
 
Table 6.4 Correlations between Political Perception, Weekly Consumption of 
XLNJ, and Interests in Other Disputes 
 
Gender212 and education also have significant relationships with the audience’s 
political perception (p<0.05). This result suggests that among our sample population, female 
respondents are more likely to perceive political implications of the mediation show when 
compared with male respondents. An increase in respondents’ education level leads to a 
decrease in their political perception of the mediation show. It seems that those with lower 
education are more likely to agree that the mediation show contributes to reducing the 
number of lawsuits and promoting a harmonious society. It is possible that respondents 
with lower education are more easily convinced by XLNJ.  
Three statements used to measure political perception reflect the programme makers’ 
and mediators’ opinions on the educational and social harmony aim of the show. In 
general, those who are more satisfied with society and have less self-confidence in 
understanding or participating are more likely to be convinced by the show and perceive 
it as helpful in promoting social harmony. The result of a correlation test (Appendix 10) 
suggests that satisfaction with society has a significant negative association with political 
                                                          
212 The coding: 0=female, 1= male 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix






Interests in family dispute over 
house
3.1 0.672 0.324*** 0.263***
Interests in disputes between 
citizens and government
2.94 0.786 0.102 0.270***
Interests in neighbour dispute 2.79 0.742 0.226*** 0.245***
N=183; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
PP=PP1*PP2*PP3 (range from 1 to 64)  
Satisfaction with society=satisfy1 * satisfy2 * satisfy3 (range from 1 to 64)




interest213, meaning that those who are more satisfied with society are likely to be less 
interested in politics. Moreover, the results suggest that women with lower education and 
higher interest in family disputes on house issues are more likely to perceive the aim 
established by programme makers. These characteristics to a large extent match the 
profile of the frequent viewers of the show. Indeed, it does not seem to be a difficult 
issue for the show to convey its aim to its devoted audience. Does this also mean that, 
given the issue of potentially losing face, the devoted viewers do regard televised 
mediation as a wise choice?  
 Audience’s Perception of the Cultural Aspect 6.4.3
In Chinese tradition, it is a shame to reveal one’s family disputes in public. So how do 
people perceive this issue as it relates to the programme? Two statements were used to 
examine how audiences think of this potential cultural contradiction in the show. 
Respondents were asked whether they agree or not with these statements: ‘Mediation 
shows like this promote moral virtues such as respecting and supporting the elderly; being 
loyal to marriage and family; understanding each other with tolerance’ (cultural perception 1); 
and ‘I think it is losing face to tell your family dispute on TV, which brings damage to 
your family reputation’ (cultural perception 2). The two perceptions are analysed separately 
by using ordinal logit regression214.  
The cultural aspects of XLNJ are linked to respondents’ inherent attitudes towards 
China’s traditional culture. Shi (2015) uses orientation toward authority and definition of 
self-interest as independent cultural variables to study their impacts on people’s political 
behaviour. According to Shi’s definition, these two terms refer to norms regulating the 
proper relationship between individuals and authority (the government and other kinds of 
authority) and norms telling individuals what the proper unit of analysis in their interest 
calculation is. He distinguishes the Western model and the Eastern, Confucius model for 
these two cultural norms (see Figure 6.2).  
  
                                                          
213 r= -0.239, p<0.01 
214 Cronbach’s Alpha cultural perception 1 and cultural perception 2 is only 0.216, and thus treated separately.  
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Figure 6.2 Western and Confucian models of cultural attitude 
 
In the Confucian model of society, the key social relationships are: 1) Father and 
son, 2) Brother and brother; 3) Husband and wife; 4) Neighbour and neighbour; and 5) 
Ruler and subject (Legge 1992). These pairs of relations were all hierarchical in nature in 
the Confucius model of society: parents were superior to children, older brothers to 
younger ones, husbands to wives, etc. Moreover, in the Confucian model, people tend 
incorporate their self-interests into that of collective groups so that the boundary between 
personal goals and the goals of the collective are blurred, and individuals’ self-interests 
were constrained and would not jeopardise the collective interests (Shi 2015, 48). 
According to Shi (2015), the difference between what he calls a hierarchical and a 
reciprocal orientation towards authority lies in their respective means to control the behaviour 
of those in power. People holding a hierarchical orientation tend to expect the 
government to take care of their interests, as parents do for their children. They tend to 
rely on internal and external policing systems associated with constraining power, while 
those holding a reciprocal orientation tend to rely primarily on institutions to control 
those in power (Shi 2015, 54).   
Regarding the definition of self-interest, people with an allocentric (community-minded) 
definition of self-interest voluntarily take the interests of the group they are affiliated with into 













definition have no obligation to consider the attitudes of others towards them, and they 
legitimise ‘the pursuit of personal goals separate from those of any group, even when 
personal goals are in conflict with those of groups to which the individual belongs’ (Shi 
2015, 48). 
I integrate Shi’s measurements of orientations toward authority and definition of self-interest 
in my survey as independent variables to examine whether they are correlated with the 
audience’s cultural perception of the mediation show. In the survey, three questions tap into 
individuals’ orientations towards authority, investigating people’s perception of their 
relationship with the state215. The scale of orientation towards authority (OTA) is based on the 
three statements 216 , with the lowest value meaning that the respondent holds a 
hierarchical OTA, while the highest value refers to a reciprocal OTA. Similarly, three 
questions are used to measure the respondents’ definition of self-interest, indicating entering 
into conflict with others to promote their own interests217. A scale for definition of 
self-interest (DSI) is based on the abovementioned statements218. The lowest value indicates 
an Allocentric DSI, and the highest value suggests an Idiocentric DSI.  
In addition to the two independent variables OTA and DSI, I also include the 
following control variables: age, gender, education, family income, watching frequency of 
XLNJ, satisfaction with society, CCP membership, and experience of mediation. 
Traditionally, the Chinese are regarded to be under Confucian influence, holding a 
hierarchical OTA and an allocentric DSI. They observe the hierarchical rules in social 
relations, and tend to voluntarily redefine and constrain their pursuit of self-interests so as 
to maintain harmony in society. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses: 
                                                          
215 Participants are presented three statements: (1) ‘If any conflict occurs, we should ask senior people to uphold 
justice’; (2) ‘Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children should still do what they ask’; and (3) ‘When a 
mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband 
should still persuade his wife to obey his mother’. 
216 Orientations Toward Authority (OTA) = OTA1*OTA2*OTA3. The Cronbach’s Alpha for these three DSI 
questions was 0.766. Scale range: 1~64, hierarchical OTA ~~ reciprocal OTA.  
1=strongly agree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=somewhat disagree; 4=strongly disagree. 
217 Respondents are asked to indicate to what extent they agree or disagree with the following three statements: 
1. ‘A person should not insist on his own opinion if people around him disagree’; 2. ‘When various interest 
groups operate and compete in a locale, they will damage everyone’s interests’; and 3. ‘The state is like a big 
machine and the individual a small cog, and thus should have no independent status’. 
218 Definition of self-interest = DSI1*DSI2*DSI3. The Cronbach’s Alpha for these three DSI questions was 
0.523. Scale range: 1~64, allocentric DSI ~~ idiocentric DSI.  
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H6:  People holding a more hierarchical orientation towards authority are more 
likely to perceive the cultural contradictions of the mediation show than those holding a 
reciprocal orientation towards authority, keeping all other variables controlled. 
H7:  People with an allocentric definition of self-interest are more likely to perceive 
the cultural elements of the mediation show than those with idiocentric definition of 
self-interest, keeping all other variables controlled. 
Ordinal logit regressions are used to examine the relationships between 
respondents’ OTA, DSI, and their cultural perceptions219; the results are shown in Table 
6.5. Let us take a look at the result for OTA in both the models of cultural perception 1 
(CP1)220 and cultural perception 2 (CP2)221. As the result indicates, CP1 has a negative 
relationship with respondents’ Orientations towards authority, while the relationship 
respondents’ OTA and CP2 is a positive one. It seems that respondents holding 
hierarchical OTA are more likely to agree that the mediation show could help to promote 
moral virtues, but are less likely to perceive participants as losing face when discussing 
family disputes on television. However, neither of the results is significant. We therefore 
reject H6, because the respondents’ cultural attitudes have little effect on their opinions 
towards the mediation show. This means that respondents’ perception of the mediation 
show in terms of its cultural virtues will be barely influenced by respondents’ orientation 
towards authority. 
  
                                                          
219 All of the independent variables are recoded, such that values run from 0 to 1. 
220 The model fitting information for CP1 is p=0.115. The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model fits 
the data well (p=0.995). The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that the model can account for 11.3 percent of the variance 
in tier of entry. And the test of parallel lines does not reject the null hypothesis of the Proportional Odds 
assumption (p=0.313).   
221  In order to have a more significant model for CP2, I exclude some independent variables. Therefore, 
independent variables included for CP2 are not the same as those for CP1. The model fitting information for 
CP2 is p=0.188. The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model fits the data well (p=0.548). The 
Nagelkerke R2 indicates that the model can account for 6.8 percent of the variance in tier of entry. And the test 
of parallel lines does not reject the null hypothesis of the Proportional Odds assumption (p=0.464).   
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Table 6.5 Cultural Perception of XLNJ (Ordinal Logistic Regression) 
 
Taking a look at the results of the definition of self-interest in both models (see Table 
6.5), we find no significant relation between CP1 and respondents’ DSI. As for CP2, there 
is a noticeably significant relation between respondents’ definition of self-interest and cultural 
perception 2 (p=0.05), which means that when respondents’ definition of self-interest decreases, 
i.e. moving from idiocentric towards allocentric, they are more likely to agree with the 
statement for cultural perception 2. In other words, those who take the interests of the 







Orientations toward authority -0.902 0.911 0.41 0.704 0.806 2.02
Definition of self-interest  0.136 0.902 1.15 -1.581** 0.805 0.21
Education 1,440 1,108 4.22 1.494 1.061 4.45
Non Party member vs. CPC party or 
Youth League member
0.685* 0.373 1.98 -0.245 0.332 0.78
No mediation experience vs. Had 
mediation experience before
0.406 0.486 1.50 -0.026 0.473 0.97
Watching frequency of XLNJ -0.757 0.513 0.47 - - -
Age -0.288 1,277 0.75 - - -
Female V.S. Male respondents -0.437 0.392 0.65 - - -
Satisfaction with Society 0.907 1,079 2.48 - - -
Family Income - - - -1.081 0.730 0.34
Threshold (strongly disagree with 
statement)
-4.347** 1,703 - -1.714* 0.994 -
Threshold (somewhat disagree with 
statement)
-1,386 1,402 - 0.564 0.981 -
Threshold (somewhat agree with 
statement)
1,289 1,401 - 2.559** 1.009 -
Threshold (strongly agree with 
statement)
- - - - - -
Link function: Logit.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01; 
Note:
Cultural Perception 1 - 
Mediation shows promote 
traditional virtues.
Cultural Perception 2 - It is 
losing face to discuss family 
dispute on TV, which brings 
damage to family reputation
CP1: N=139; Pseudo R-square:Cox and Snell= 0.097; Nagelkerke = 0.113; McFadden = 0.052
CP2: N=136; Pseudo R-square:Cox and Snell= 0.062; Nagelkerke = 0.068; McFadden = 0.026
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likely to agree that it is losing face to discuss one’s disputes on television. This finding 
matches our expectation that people under a Confucian model are more likely to perceive 
cultural elements contained in the mediation show. Accordingly, H7 can be partly 
accepted.  
Moreover, the results indicate that regularly watching XLNJ has a loosely 
significant relation with respondents’ cultural perception 1222, which suggests that the 
frequent watching of XLNJ would not necessarily make respondents appreciate the 
virtues promoted in the show. People who are less familiar with the show might, however, 
perceive the show as one promoting traditional virtues.  
Of the independent variables, respondents’ education seems to have a certain effect 
on one’s cultural perception of the show. The parameter estimate for education is the highest 
(1.440) in the CP1 model and the second highest (1.494) in the CP2 model, meaning that 
when the respondent’s education level increases, they are more likely to perceive the 
mediation show as promoting traditional cultural virtues though they are also likely to 
find it embarrassing to discuss family disputes in public. Both relationships are still loosely 
significant223.  
Among our sample respondents, CCP_membership has a significant effect on 
audience’s cultural perception of XLNJ. This result shows that the odds for non-party 
members to perceive the moral virtues embedded in the show are nearly two times higher 
than for members of the CCP or Youth League. In other words, Party members appear 
to be less likely to regard the show as advocating virtues in society.  
Respondents’ family income, as shown in the results for CP2, has a 
close-to-significant relationship with their opinions on face-losing issues224. It seems that 
among the respondents, those with higher income are less likely to find reputation issues 
in the mediation show problematic. When all other variables are held constant, the 
increase in family income tends to lead to a decrease in agreement with the statement that 
it is losing face to discuss family issues on television and that it brings damage to family 
reputation. In other words, respondents in our sample who have lower family income are 
more likely to judge revealing family disputes in public as discreditable. Programme 
                                                          
222 B=-0.757, p=0.140 




makers held that people from the ‘grass-roots’ level have nothing to lose, suggesting that 
they care less about their reputation in disputes. However, this seems to be untrue 
according to our result: those having lower income in fact do care about their family 
reputation.  
In general, it appears to be different from our expectation that respondents’ cultural 
perception is not significantly related to their cultural attitude. One result, however, does 
match our assumption that respondents holding allocentric DSI are likely to agree with 
the statement of CP2. Respondents having an allocentric DSI would give priority to the 
interests of the group, and it seems reasonable to expect that they would value the family 
reputation to a large degree.  
 Conclusions 6.5
In this chapter, I have discussed the profile of our frequent viewers of the mediation 
show, what motivates them to watch, and how they ‘negotiate’ with different layers and 
potential contradictions the programme has. In this study, the profile of the mediation 
show viewers quite matches the programme makers’ assumption about their target 
audience (see Chapter Five). The frequent audience of the show turns out to be, to a large 
extent, middle-aged viewers coming from the ‘grass-roots’ level, with relatively low 
education and low income, who turn to the show for dispute resolution. The audience 
seem to be attracted to the show as they share an identification with the participants, 
which also explains their appreciation of the dialect used in the show. Language, as an 
important part of culture, constructs one’s personal identity (see, for example, 
Cavalli-Sforza 2001 and Joseph 2004). Next to the need for personal identity, learning and 
seeking information appear to be important reasons for the audience to watch the show. 
It seems that the programme makers’ aim to educate the masses about civil mediation and 
legal knowledge is matched by the viewers’ gratifications.  
In addition to the audiences’ uses of and gratifications from the show, the survey 
data also provide us with some insight into the audience’s perception of possible 
contentious issues, in three aspects. First of all, there seems to be a contradiction between 
the audience’s entertainment needs and their entertainment perception of the show. On the 
one hand, they do not publicly admit that they watch the show with the purpose to amuse 
themselves. On the other, however, frequent viewers seem agreeable when serious 
mediation is made into entertainment and also find it fun to watch other people’s issues 
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on the show. This seemingly contradictory finding suggests that people might not have 
specific entertainment needs when they tune into the mediation show, but they do enjoy 
and amuse themselves when watching the show. This kind of obtained enjoyment might 
be more unconscious. This form of motivation can only become clear when you 
approach the viewers personally, which I will discuss in the next chapter that discusses 
the focus group. 
It seems that people seek not only information but also entertainment when they 
watch the mediation show. Possibly the hybrid nature of reality television makes it 
difficult for the audience to see the difference between entertainment and information, as 
commonly assumed (Hill 2005, 2). Given the positive connection between entertainment, 
social utility, and weekly consumption of television watching, it is arguable that 
respondents are attracted to the show for information seeking, while its entertainised 
content may well sustain their interest in continuing to watch. This also suggests that 
television not only provides information or entertainment, but can also enhance 
interpersonal bonding.  
Secondly, with respect to the political aspect, it seems that the show successfully 
portrays a harmonious image among the audience, especially those socially contented 
female respondents with lower education and low confidence in their ability to make a 
change in society. These perceptions of the show are largely in line with the programme 
makers’ political goal to promote social harmony. In comparison, while this group of 
respondents is more easily convinced by the show, audiences with higher education report 
the opposite perception: they are likely to find the show fun rather than promoting social 
harmony. Notably, the frequent viewers of the show are those in the first group, which 
suggests that the mediation show could easily promote its harmony-creating role among 
the audience, and subsequently win the praise of the authorities. Contrary to the 
producer’s claim that the audience gets fed up with recurring housing issues (see Chapter 
Five), this topic still seems to be interesting to our respondents—partly because, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, these issues are close to people’s ordinary lives. The result 
from the survey study suggests that respondents, especially those with lower levels of 
internal political efficacy, can be convinced that the mediation show promotes social 
harmony although it presents conflicts on the screen. Perhaps, since they lack confidence 
in themselves to participate in politics, they are likely to place faith in publicised 
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mediation to make a change in society. I will further explore this question in the next 
chapter. 
While the audience seems to perceive the show in the same way as programme 
makers do in terms of its political aspect, they do not necessarily hold the same value with 
respect to the cultural aspect. For example, although programme makers do not regard it 
as a problem, it does not necessarily mean that the reputation issue is fine with the 
audience, as well. In particular, those who are community-minded are more likely to be 
concerned about the consequence of making the private public. For them, the individual’s 
interest could never be separated from groups such as the family. It seems conflicting, 
however, that the audience sees the show as influential in promoting traditional virtue by 
televised mediation despite the concern for the potential negative consequences it would 
bring to the family.  
The findings from this chapter help to set the scene for my subsequent focus group 
research. According to the results discussed above, respondents’ perceptions of the show 
may not necessarily be consistent with their viewing preferences and traditional cultural 
values. Admittedly, the result of the online survey should not be generalised due to the 
sample size and selection bias. But we may expect that the positive or negative relations 
between variables to a large extent will remain regardless of the sample size, which can 
still provide us with insights about audience perception. The way in which audiences 
perceive the reality of mediation shows is complex. It is therefore valuable to explore in 








The previous chapter has portrayed the profile of my sample population: the majority of 
the Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, XLNJ) show viewers appear to be middle-aged (over 35 
years) in the economic classes with relatively little education. The cultural closeness of 
identity through language employed on this programme appears to be one main reason 
that attracts the audience. Respondents also watch the show particularly to learn or to 
spend time with their families, but less for relaxation purposes such as passing time or 
entertainment. Seemingly, television consumption would motivate respondents to watch a 
specific programme. The results suggest that people might enjoy the show without 
initially seeking entertainment. The results also indicate that the show might be better able 
to achieve its social and political aims among female respondents of lower education. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Confucian culture seems to have little influence on 
respondents’ judgements of reputation-based issues on the show. Having gained an idea 
about who is watching the mediation show and why they watch, the next step of the 
audience study is to further explore what audiences get out of the show and how they 
deal with the contradictions suggested in previous chapters.  
Focus groups are particularly useful for exploring people's knowledge and 
experiences because they not only allow us to examine what people think, but how they 
think and why they think that way (Merton, Fisk, and Kendall 1956). It also has the 
advantage that it can encourage participation from people reluctant to be interviewed on 
their own or who feel that they have nothing to say (Kitzinger 1995). Participants of the 
focus group consist of both frequent viewers and not-so-frequent viewers of the Shanghai 
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mediation show225. In total, four sessions have been carried out (see Chapter Four). 
Twenty-four respondents (12 males and 12 females, age 20-65 years; all from Shanghai) 
participated in four mixed-gender focus groups: one higher education and one lower 
education group for frequent and non-frequent viewers, respectively. Each group 
consisted of six participants, allowing me to control the discussion and encourage 
everyone to talk. As the show broadcasts six days a week, people who had watched twice 
or more in a week were considered frequent viewers. Similarly, non-frequent viewers were 
those who had watched the show on average once a week or less during the past six 
months. People who had not watched the mediation show before were excluded because 
they knew too little to participate in the focus group discussion.  
This composition is planned for two reasons: firstly, the survey results made clear 
that heavy viewers and non-frequent viewers differed in their views. Secondly, gender and 
educational ‘separation’ were applied to make respondents feel comfortable in the 
discussion. It is likely that people of a lower education level might be less encouraged to 
talk when they are put in the same group with those of higher educational level, and the 
same could be true for gender categorisation. In the survey, the average age of 
respondents is 34 years (min.=16, max.=73, M=34.29, S.D.=12.486), and average 
educational level is between college and bachelor’s degree. Therefore, college/university 
education is used as the dividing point between the higher and the lower education 
groups, i.e. the higher education group includes university students and those with 
college/bachelor’s or higher degree, while the lower education group includes participants 
with high school education or lower.  
In this chapter, I will firstly discuss how respondents say they make use of and 
obtain gratifications from the show. Then, I will analyse audiences’ perceptions of the 
show in three steps. Firstly, why do they watch? One contradiction raised in the survey 
analysis regarded the entertainment aspect: people enjoy watching the dispute mediation 
on TV, but they did not think that XLNJ is a show that they watch for fun. So, what, for 
them, is the entertaining appeal of the show? Secondly, the social and political aspects are 
considered. While the audiences acquire legal and mediation knowledge from the show, 
                                                          
225 Originally, I categorised the audience into two groups: fans and non-fans. Since the categorisation was 
difficult to define and not feasible when recruiting the participants, I now categorise the audience into frequent 
viewers vs. non-frequent viewers.  
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do they consider this as a goal established by the programme makers, and how do they 
deal (if they do) with the tension between the entertainment and the social harmony aims? 
Thirdly, the cultural aspect is assessed. While the audiences did not find discussing private 
disputes on TV a losing-face issue, why are they themselves unwilling to go on TV with 
their own disputes?  
 Understanding Viewers’ Uses and Gratifications 7.2
In this section, I will discuss the frequent and non-frequent viewers’ motives and uses of 
the mediation show, which allows us to understand what use audiences make of the show 
as well as their likes and dislikes226. 
In the previously conducted online survey, I used statements to measure five 
gratifications, i.e. (1) perceived closeness; (2) information seeking; (3) social utility; (4) 
passing time; and (5) entertainment227. The survey result shows that most respondents are 
attracted to the show because of the dialect used being familiar to them, while at the same 
time, they also seek information. Respondents hardly feel or admit that they watch XLNJ 
for fun or for killing time. During the focus groups, participants were asked why they 
choose to watch XLNJ over the programmes aired at the same prime time slot. The 
participants’ explanations to some extent reflect their personal uses of the show, which 
can deepen our understanding of the survey findings.  
 Dialect and Cultural Identity 7.2.1
As the survey results suggest, perceived closeness through language is the major reason 
why respondents are fond of watching XLNJ (M=4.60, S.D.=1.380). Focus group 
participants also note that the local dialect spoken on the show has enhanced its 
competitiveness for attracting viewers. Indeed, some viewers have a preference for 
                                                          
226 Appendix 14 provides a description of participants. 
227 Five statements were (1) I watch XLNJ because I find this programme interesting, it can make me laugh;(2) 
I watch XLNJ because my family member or other people I know watch it, so I can discuss it with them; (3) I 
watch XLNJ because it's a habit, and I have no other things to do; (4) I watch XLNJ because it shows how 
other people deal with the same problems I have; so I could learn about what could happen to me.; (5) I watch 
XLNJ because people speak Shanghainese in the show, which is close to real life and make me feel very close to 
those people on television.   
Participants were asked to indicate whether they find these statements were Very much like me; like me; 
somewhat like me; a little like me; not like me; and not like me at all. 
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programmes spoken in the same dialect that viewers happen to speak. In addition to 
XLNJ, other programmes that these frequent viewers often watch include Happy Three 
Brothers (Kuaile Sanxiongdi), A Qing’s Story Time (A Qing Jiang Gushi), and The Bai Wanqing 
Talk Show (Yihu Baiying), which are all in local dialects. Apparently, most of our viewers 
prefer programmes using a familiar dialect. Given the fact that few programmes are 
produced in Shanghainese, shows like XLNJ then become popular especially for viewers 
who sympathise with a sense of group identity. The same language makes the show more 
accessible for local audiences as it provides them with a sense of cultural closeness, i.e., a 
sense of ‘us’. 
Some frequent viewers seem to tune in to XLNJ for a language environment that is 
familiar to their native tongue. Many frequent viewers appreciate this feature of the show 
and regard the dialect as an important part of their identity. Indeed, dialect or, sometimes, 
slang, is a strong marker of cultural identity (Cavalli-Sforza 2001). The use of dialect 
certainly brings the disputants closer to the audience, making them just like ‘those 
ordinary people that you meet every day in your neighbourhood, in the market, or on the 
street’228. This comment is echoed by several other participants. A man in his fifties229 
reports that XLNJ ‘minimises the distance between the audience and the television 
station, by speaking the same dialect and involving the spectators in the mediation 
process’. It seems that by ‘closer’, the participants refer to the familiar feeling generated 
by the shared cultural background and the same regional identity. Born in Shanghai, the 
ability to master the local language appears to be an important part for their Shanghainese 
identity, even though they do not necessarily speak it every day. Using the same dialect to 
a certain extent makes our participants feel that they belong to the same (regional) 
community as the disputants and audience commentators on the show.  
Mastering the dialect therefore becomes an important passage to integrate into the 
society. Perhaps that explains why one participant230 uses the show as ‘educational 
material’ to familiarise her child with the language environment. Although not intended 
for language teaching, this suggests another function of programmes in dialect. This is 
somewhat evident from the programmes that participants preferred. Despite the variety 
                                                          
228 Participant #4 
229 Participant #7 
230 Participant #12 
161 
 
of shows they frequently watch, they do not mention mediation programmes broadcast 
on other provincial channels. Most TV programmes are broadcast in Mandarin Chinese 
due to the SARFT’s restraining the amount of dialect programmes in order to promote 
the official Mandarin language231. 
The dialect element seems to be an important factor for attracting audiences. Most 
programmes and teleplays broadcast in Shanghai are in Mandarin Chinese, which makes 
the few programmes that use Shanghainese particularly popular among local audiences. 
Not only elderly viewers, but also some young participants agree that mediation carried 
out in Shanghainese makes these shows more interesting to watch. Speaking the same 
language attracts the audience and draws the programme closer to them, which also 
allows the audience to feel empathy for the disputants. It seems the same dialect used in 
the programme helps to construct these participants’ identity. It seems that ‘the 
construction of identity … involves establishing opposites and others whose actualities 
are always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their 
differences from us’ (Said 1995, 332).  
Not everyone appreciates the feature of local dialect, however; one man's meat is 
another man's poison. Some non-frequent viewers assert that the use of local dialect has 
made the show even more vulgar. One of them states in a critical manner that television 
in Shanghai ‘has been decreasing in both refinement and artistic aspects. Programmes 
such as XLNJ, Bai Wanqing Talk Show, A Qing’s Story Time, are neither knowledgeable nor 
thoughtful…’232. To him, the show is vulgar regardless of its claim of promoting civil 
mediation. Another participant presumes that the limited choice is the crux of the matter, 
which explains why ‘the few programmes speaking Shanghainese become particularly 
popular’ 233 . These participants appear to be more in line with the governments’ 
Promoting Mandarin Campaign. It seems that they consider slang as inappropriate 
language for public media to employ.  
  
                                                          
231 See, for example, an article on the restraining of dialect programmes: SARFT requires producers to promote 
Mandarin, while people request protection of specific dialects (Huashang 2014). 
232 Participant #13 
233 Participant #14 
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 Learning from Others’ Stories 7.2.2
Learning experiences and seeking information through XLNJ appears to be common 
among survey respondents (M=3.98, S.D.=1.502). Likewise, the majority of 
frequent-viewer focus group participants give credit to the show for its educational 
undercurrent. Participants find that they are sometimes enlightened by certain cases in the 
show. A retired middle school teacher who is now a contented grandma234 believes the 
show is particularly helpful to people of her age, as she says:  
´They (the mediators) have done a good job when disputes [are] related to 
inheritance distribution, prenuptial and postnuptial assets… They convinced 
disputants by explaining relevant rules and regulations in a simple and clear 
way… For example, Bai often says ‘sophisticated elders should be cautious 
enough not to get their properties off their hands easily’ (shulian bu tuoshou,tuoshou 
bu shulian) ´.  
Indeed, this quote by popular mediator Bai Wanqing is well known among nearly 
all of the focus group participants, both frequent and non-frequent. Bai has repeated it 
many times, when warning the elderly to deal with their properties cautiously. This terse 
and forceful saying clearly allows the audience to quickly memorise it.  
The participants’ observations suggest that the audience’s information seeking is not 
confined to legal or policy-related knowledge. Watching issues on TV can sometimes 
trigger self-reflection on the viewer’s own life. Frequent viewers learn various lessons; for 
example, that ‘women must be financially independent… never be greedy for your 
husband’s family properties, otherwise you put yourself in a weak position at home’235. 
This opinion is echoed by other female participants in the same group. The show seems 
to make a girl in her early twenties consider issues that she might encounter in her future 
marriage.  
Some male frequent viewers take a more broad perspective. They feel that ‘the 
show is enlightening’ and ‘not only mature grown-ups, but also young people should pay 
more attention to this show and take warning from it’, so as to ‘learn how to prevent 
                                                          
234 Participant #11 
235 Participant #10 
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conflicts if similar situations happen to them in the future’236. They believe that one could 
benefit from real-life examples. Some participants acknowledge the show’s potential 
edifying function, though they themselves do not obtain information from it. As one 
non-frequent viewer237 said,  
‘I watch this show occasionally, and among the few issues I have watched were 
misunderstandings and conflicts between mothers and daughters-in-law. 
Disputes between in-laws seem to be an eternal topic in Chinese society. I think 
both the married and the unmarried shall watch this show and learn some lesson. 
After all, as an old saying goes: only the family members can appreciate the 
complexities and difficulties within the family’.  
It seems that people can learn from the programme, without necessarily seeking 
information. In this sense, the mediation show seems unintentionally educational to them. 
Indeed, knowledge and learning are intrinsic to factual television (Hill 2007). On the other 
hand, the collaboration with the Shanghai Justice Bureau created an image of the show 
being intentionally educational and informative. The audience may acquire different kinds 
of information presented in multiple ways through formal and informal learning 
experiences, such as learning about world events or social issues, and about emotions or 
practicalities (Hill 2007, 146). When watching the show, participants can extract 
information that is relevant to them personally.   
 Viewing as Social Bonding  7.2.3
The survey result indicates that watching with other family members (M=3.39, S.D. 
=1.422) is also a motive to watch XLNJ. This finding is only partially confirmed in the 
focus group discussions. All frequent viewers reported that they sometimes watch the 
show together with their family. As one male participant238 said, he watched the show as 
his wife always tunes in to the Entertainment Channel during dinner, and gradually he 
thought that ‘well, I think one can see many real-life examples from the show’. 
                                                          
236 Participants #1 and 2  
237 Participant #22 
238 Participant #9 
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Similarly, another male participant239 was initially reluctant but was made to watch 
the show by his mother’s request for companionship. Reflecting on cases he saw on TV, 
the participant felt that bonding can be close to learning: 
‘…The most recent one I watched tells disputes between a hard-working 
husband of humble birth and a spoiled wife. In the past twenty some years, they 
were brought up in two families of different lifestyles and the different habits 
and customs in their lives brought about conflicts and unhappiness in their 
marriage. My conclusion will be, as our ancestors once said, it is important that a 
couple shall come from families of equal social status’. 
Apparently, this participant’s attitude towards the show has shifted positively when 
his view of life and value was affirmed. This sense of approval caused him to discuss 
issues with his mother. Indeed, most other frequent viewers say they discuss certain cases 
with family, friends, or colleagues. Some families’ differences of opinion, in this way, 
serve as topics for personal conversations. This suggests that watching the show at times 
becomes a ritual that brings the family members together and thus promotes a better 
family relationship. For this purpose, it seems acceptable to some participants to watch 
the mediation show together with their family, even if it is not necessarily to their own 
liking. 
While frequent viewers enjoy watching and discussing an episode with family, most 
non-frequent viewers express disapproval. Some of them complain that their parents 
watch the show every night, their arguments being noisy and disturbing them. One 
participant said240 ‘Sometimes I tell my mum that such programmes are not good for her 
emotional balance because they show the negative aspects of human nature, but she 
wouldn't listen’. Another participant encountered a similar situation, being more or less 
forced to watch the show from time to time. ‘My parents love this show, always at dinner 
time. I watched several episodes with them because I have no choice… The elderly 
compose the majority audience of this show, I suppose.’
 241 The participant’s speculation 
                                                          
239 Participant #3 
240 Participant #23 
241 Participant #20 
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about the possible demographic feature of the show’s audience is used as an argument to 
distinguish himself from the supposed audience orientation. 
 Filling the Time Gap 7.2.4
As discussed in Chapter Six, the audience does not have a strong intention to watch the 
mediation show just to pass time (M=3.10, S.D.=1.434). During the focus group 
discussion, a smaller minority242 say they sometimes watch the show when they have 
nothing else to do. A young female participant243 said she would watch XLNJ if she feels 
uninterested in other programmes. Another female viewer244 usually tunes in to the show 
while doing her daily exercises. In her words, ‘when I am doing my work-out exercises, I 
am in the mood for watching something, and watching XLNJ makes exercising less 
boring’. In a similar way, another male participant245 said his mother watched the 
mediation show when she is doing the cleanup after dinner. Some audience members use 
the show as background while they do something else. They are not really watching, but 
would pause what they do when certain cases or arguments attract them. In addition to 
passing time, XLNJ also functions as background to some participants’ monotonous 
household chores.  
While watching television sometimes functions to fill the time gap, not many 
participants publicly admit this. They sometimes happen to tune into the show when 
watching other programmes, but they will not watch a complete episode of XLNJ. 
Tuning in is more to fill the time gap during advertisements246. Frequent viewers seem 
more likely to watch the show with a certain purpose, while the non-frequent viewers 
tend to watch the show almost accidentally to fill or pass time gaps.   
 Entertainment  7.2.5
The survey result suggests that respondents do not seek relaxation or amusement from 
the show to a significant degree (M=2.88, S.D.=1.456). Frequent viewers in the focus 
groups seem to have different ideas. Most frequent viewers are to a certain extent amused 
                                                          
242 Participants #6, 4, 11, and 15 
243 Participant #6 
244 Participant #4 
245 Participant #15 
246 Participants #15, 20, and 24 
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or attracted by ‘dramatic’, ‘moving’, or ‘sensational’ plots of various dispute stories. In 
fact, some participants247 make no secret of their enjoyment of the show by frankly 
admitting that they sometimes have a good laugh. For them, ‘arguments over trivial 
matters’ between couples and some issues that are ‘not common in life’ seem like ‘dark 
comedy’ or are ‘more interesting than soap operas’248
 
. One of them provided an example 
when recalling a recent case: 
 ‘…a remarried couple, when their child was born, the new dad’s ex-wife paid a 
visit to the new-born baby with her current husband whose ex also came along. 
(It is) like a complicated chain, which was so hilarious.’249  
Such extraordinary and bewildering situations the participants find amusing. It 
seems that surprise and inconceivability give rise to curiosity, which in turn provides a 
certain contentment of prying into others’ secrets. Situations that elicit laughter vary 
according to individuals’ preferences. It could be the plot of a dispute story, a specific 
personality of some disputant, or sometimes, it could be some sharp commentary 
provided by the presenter or the mediator. For instance, another frequent viewer finds 
commentaries from the mediator and the audience sometimes incisive and equally, if not 
more, witty, making him smile. As he said,  
‘…(the mediator) Huang Feijue250 is funny and will sometimes become very 
emotional. You can tell from his face whether he is about to lose temper and 
scold someone. There was one time he even snapped at the co-presenter 
Haiyan251. I think it is interesting…but I like Pei Zhen252 particularly, I think 
maybe because of his occupation (as a lawyer), he often gives clear and concise 
advice, sometimes with a sense of humour.’
 253   
                                                          
247 Participant #1, 6, and 9 
248 Participants #1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12 
249 Participant #6 
250 Huang Feijue, co-founder of the Shanghai Times (shenjiang fuwudaobao), often appears on the XLNJ show as a 
mediator.   
251 Haiyan is one of the two presenters of the XLNJ show.  
252 Pei Zhen, lawyer and also is one deputy to the National People’s Congress (NPC). 
253 Participant #9 
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Compared with the findings from the survey chapter, it seems that participants 
might not necessarily have entertainment in mind when they tune into the show, but are 
being entertained while watching. The fun they get out of watching might function as a 
reason to sustain their interest in watching. This enjoyment of entertainment, however, 
only becomes evident when you probe people. They tend not to admit when asked, but 
this admission comes out naturally during discussions of other matters.   
Not everyone would watch XLNJ with the intention to seek entertainment. The 
majority of frequent-viewer participants, however, admit that they have some fun when 
watching the mediation show, whether deliberately or inadvertently. Most frequent 
viewers also watch similar programmes, such as Bang Nvlang and the Jiafang Yifang Show254. 
They claim to have a preference for programmes showing real people’s lives, which they 
think is close to ordinary citizens’ real issues. But it is also possible that such preference 
has its root in the natural curiosity of humans. As revealed in early audience research 
(Nabi et al. 2003, 2006), the feeling one gets from peeping into others’ lives is associated 
with the enjoyment of reality TV. Also, in this study, participants seem to enjoy watching 
what happens in others’ families, as an experience of entertainment. 
On the other hand, most of the non-frequent viewers believe that the show 
downplays the seriousness of real mediation and makes use of it so as to attract (and 
entertain) the audience. With respect to them, the show is like other dialect programmes 
such as Baijiaxing and Yihubaiying on the same channel that present non-representative 
stories without any artistic refinement. Comparing with frequent viewers, non-frequent 
viewers appear to be more suspicious about the authenticity of the show. As indicated in 
many audience studies, reality TV viewers do not naively believe the authenticity claim 
made by the industry (Cui 2005, Hill 2005, Lynch 2005, Macartney 2005, Marquand 2005, 
Yardley 2005, Zhou 2005). Our respondents do not accept at face value the implicit claim 
that the shows are real. Some viewers are aware that the cases mediated are carefully 
selected, and others often suspect that the stories presented on the show are staged or 
manipulated by producers.  
                                                          
254 The Jiafang Yifang Show (literal meaning is Party A vs. Party B) is a newly emerged mediation show 
broadcasted through Shanghai satellite channel Dragon TV. Similar to XLNJ, the show claims to help in solving 
disputes between people by providing legal as well as psychological advice.  
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Moreover, some participants feel that the participants’ behaviour on the mediation 
show is affected by the presence of the cameras. They suspect that some cases might not 
come to an agreement had they been mediated off-screen. In this sense, this particular 
medium of television to some extent exerts certain pressure on the disputing parties and 
accordingly helps to bring about the agreement.  
 Tensions and Contradictions  7.3
 Perceiving Entertainment 7.3.1
In this section, I will analyse our discussants’ views on the entertaining appeal of the 
mediation show. This analysis is based on the participants’ discussion of the following 
question during the focus group: What makes you choose to watch this mediation show over other 
programmes? Subsequent questions regarding the entertainment appeal are also assessed. 
The analysis in this section also tries to understand one contradiction raised in the survey 
analysis, that people enjoy watching the dispute mediation on TV who nevertheless claim 
that the show is not fun to them. So, in the audience’s opinion, what is the entertaining 
appeal of the show? And how do they align the seriousness of conflict with the fun of 
watching it on TV? 
Generally, frequent viewers watch the show because they find it interesting. The 
word ‘interesting’ seems to contain various meanings to participants. Some of them are 
curious to know what happened between disputants, which they sometimes find quite 
dramatic, even more than soap operas. Some participants say that they are interested to 
see what the mediator would say, particularly their reaction to sometimes seemingly 
absurd issues; these mediators include Bai Wanqing, Pei Zhen, and Wan Feng, who are 
known for being tough and impartial.  
In two frequent viewers groups, some participants enjoy watching XLNJ because 
dispute stories in the show are often told in an attracting way with twists and turns, and at 
times are very dramatic. Some of them feel that some cases are like ‘a live version of 
Gushihui (collection of stories)255, it is much more interesting than watching TV plays’
 256, 
                                                          
255 Gushihui, literally collection of stories, is a widely circulated magazine in the People’s Republic of China, 




and sometimes the storyline could be ‘comparable to that of mystery films’ or even ‘more 
impressive‘ than some popular movies257.  
The show is regarded as dramatic, and almost theatrical, partly because stories are 
edited in a way to create a cliff-hanging effect and each story is given a sensational or 
thrilling title to generate the audience’s interests. A heavy viewer258 notices that episode 
titles sometimes fail to represent the actual issue, and she feels that exaggerated titles are 
used only to attract eyeballs. In that sense, entertainment does not only or does not 
necessarily refer to fun and laughter, but also to drama and dramatisation. Programme 
producers occasionally adopt editing techniques to enhance emotional conflicts between 
disputants. Nevertheless, they realise that some dispute stories per se are unbelievably 
dramatic. For example, many frequent viewers259 were shocked after learning about a 
case of a 19-year-old mother260 as they had never heard about such things before and 
such a situation is beyond their imagination, and quite dramatic. One participant thinks 
that such a story ‘could be made into a fairly good play’261. It suggests that such unusual 
issues in the show sometimes might serve as good conversation topics.   
Another example that deeply impressed the participants is the one titled Papa Has 
A New Home, Mama Has A New Home, Where Is My Home?262 This episode told a pitiful 
story about a 10-year-old abandoned boy whose parents remarried respectively and left 
him to stay with his grandfather, who suffered a myocardial infarct. Most frequent-viewer 
participants had watched this episode, and were profoundly touched by the boy’s 
sufferings. They express their pity for the boy and accused his parents of being selfish, 
irresponsible, and heartless. This story reminds many participants of a TV play, Unpaid 
                                                          
such as love stories, overseas stories, humour stories, and so on. Usually, stories were written in a way that tend 
to generate a vivid and sensational effect for their readers.  
256 Participant #2 
257 Participants #3 and #5 
258 Participant #10 
259 Participants #4, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12 
260 On Aug. 19 & 20, 2013, XLNJ broadcasted two episodes titled 19-year-old young mother was forced to 
work at night club by her birth mother (19sui xiaomama jingbeishengmu tuiruhuokeng?).  
261 Participant #12 




Debts (Nie Zhai263), depicting the story of five children who went to Shanghai from 
Xishuangbanna, Yunnan to look for their zhiqing264 parents who were sent down there. 
The once-popular theme song for the series moved a wide audience with the 
heart-touching lyrics: ‘Father has got a home, Mother has got a home, I have been left on 
my own, feeling I am a redundant one’.  
Participant #9 empathised greatly with the boy, saying that,   
‘(this episode) make me recall the song for Nie Zhai. Though I am now nearly 30 
years old, the thought of that lyric still make me feel sad. I quite understand this 
boy’s feeling as I once went through a similar situation. Marriage requires 
thorough consideration, and divorce needs even more mature deliberation. The 
divorce set you free. But even if you can hardly tolerate your imperfect marriage, 
how can you expect a child to suffer a broken family… ‘  
Other participants in the same group have sympathy with this point of view and 
they are indignant about such irresponsible parents. Indeed, the show employs an 
anything-goes format including both common and uncommon issues in society.  
Focus group participants are sometimes moved by others’ pitiful experiences. Some 
participants265, however, also frankly admit that they watch the show for relaxation and 
entertainment. Sometimes, the show could cheer them up. ‘There are all kinds of 
arguments and extremely strange people (on that show), you will suddenly realise how 
beautiful your life is, and instantly you get back into a good mood’266. The audience 
                                                          
263 Nie Zhai, first aired in 1994, is a TV series based on the novel of the same name, by author Ye Xin. The 
novel portrays five zhiqing families, among which four were marriages between Shanghai zhiqing and local people, 
and one was between zhiqing. In order to return to Shanghai, they divorced their local spouses and left their 
children. The zhiqing couple gave their son away to a local family. Those zhiqing all began a new life after they 
returned to the city. About ten years later, the children from these five broken families came from Yunnan to 
Shanghai to look for their parents. They were not looking for a better life in the city, but for an answer from 
their parents about why they disliked them. They wanted their parents to repay their emotional debts. 
264 Zhiqing (rusticated youth), literally ‘educated youth’, refers to approximately 17 million middle or high school 
graduates who were sent down to live and work in rural regions during the Cultural Revolution to ‘be reeducated 
by peasants’, as a revolutionary act by the government to reduce the difference between rural and urban 
residents. Many of those rusticated youth spent ten or more years in rural areas and then returned to their native 
cities in the early 1980s.  
265 Participants #1, 4, 6, 9, and 11. 
266 Participants #6 and 22 
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members compare their lives with others’ troubles through the process of watching a 
mediation show, which seems to make their current situations less hard to bear. Moreover, 
it also seems that watching mediation shows may help to reduce stress and make people 
less depressed267. Knowing that others are experiencing a similar or even worse situation 
might provide one with some comfort and courage to face one’s own issues. Compared 
with those disputes on television, the participants feel that they should be grateful to have 
a better life than the show participants.  
For frequent participants, it seems that they are entertained by the dramatic plotline, 
and sometimes they also obtain a pleasant and fortunate feeling when comparing their 
own life with others’ misery. As for non-frequent viewers, however, opinions differ. In 
contrast, frequent viewers might take the mediation show as a stress reliever and do not 
see the entertainment side. Participant #18 complains that it somehow irritates her that 
the show is broadcast on a daily basis: ‘It is already exhausting after a day’s work or study. 
So we want some relaxing and pleasant programmes rather than loud wrangles’. Contrary 
to frequent viewers, non-frequent-viewer participants are not interested in others’ 
domestic issues that, actually, seem provoking and unpleasing to them. 
Besides, some participants268 are still sceptical that the show is staged by amateur 
actors despite efforts by the programme makers to emphasise the genuineness of the 
show. They doubt if there are so many families’ disputes every week and suspect that all 
disputants are actually played by actors269.
 
 Other participants do not question the 
realness of the show; however, they dislike it as they consider it as vulgar, revealing the 
ugly side of human nature, and especially ‘amplifying selfishness and shallowness of those 
at the bottom of society in Shanghai’270. It seems to them that the show is not intended to 
amuse the audience by revealing people’s disputes and arguments over marriage, custody, 
or heritage. The style can be a joy to them, but the content is not. Entertainment ends 
where vulgarity begins. For them, the audience would expect to see something more 
‘positive’ on television. Here by ‘positive’, they seem to refer to inspiring or encouraging 
stories that can reflect the good of humanity; arguments are negative to them. 
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269 Participants #21 and 22 
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Interestingly, it seems to the audience that domestic disputes and those involved 
somehow become certain reference points. They can compare their own life or relatives 
with it, and consequently obtain some consolation by realising that their situation is not 
that difficult to bear. On the whole, both frequent and non-frequent viewers at times 
exhibit a sense of feeling smart or feeling better by watching the show. From the disputes 
of others, they sometimes feel that they would deal with the current case more skilfully if 
they were in the same situation. In this way, one is able to define oneself as ‘sophisticated’ 
and ‘mature’ by judging or criticising the reactions of disputants on TV. The fun of the 
programme lies then almost in the possibility to show off and feel superior to others.   
The entertainment appeal of the show is perceived in a complex way. Apparently, 
the audience enjoys the show in terms of its sometimes dramatic content, which they find 
extraordinary and somewhat ‘beyond their imagination’. It seems to them that some cases 
are comparable to television drama. They enjoy this kind of drama, but at the same time 
they can empathise with those having disputes on television. This complex process of 
entertainment in a certain sense is similar to the audience’s perception of television drama 
(Zhu 2008). To them, it is not difficult to enjoy the story and at the same time learn from 
the mediation. In fact, the structure of the mediation show facilitates this process of 
enjoyment. The show tells a story, a drama, during the first half and carries out the 
mediation during the second, which can make the televised and more serious mediation 
more acceptable. 
 Social Influences and Political Implications of XLNJ 7.3.2
So far, I have explored the audience’s perception of the XLNJ show in terms of its 
entertaining effects. In this section, I will explore participants’ opinions on issues revealed 
on the show, and how they consider the social and political implications. Analysis will be 
based on the participants’ discussions on the following topics: What kind of issues are 
frequently seen on the show?; What case gave you a deep impression?; and How do you 
think about the mediation show as a solution for family issues? Moreover, as the survey 
finding indicated that the audiences learn about legal and mediation knowledge from the 
show, would they consider it a goal established by the programme makers or some 
authority to achieve a harmonious society? 
First of all, according to the focus group participants, disputes involving properties 
are frequently seen on the show. They see house property as the most common cause of 
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family disputes on the mediation show, which is true according the content analysis in 
Chapter Five. As discussed, although programme makers wish to reduce the number of 
house-related issues, the tight resources make it difficult. Disputes over money matters 
and marital problems come second. According to most of our participants271, including 
both frequent viewers and non-frequent viewers, the majority of disputes on the show are 
either about estate properties or problems in marriages. Given that house prices have 
been rising rapidly, it is true that house property has played a crucial role in many disputes. 
For instance, relocated families often have disagreements on the distribution of allocated 
houses and compensation272. In some other cases, siblings have different ideas of caring 
for aged parents and inheritance distribution. Cases of this sort are often seen on the 
mediation show, and perhaps that is why Bai Wanqing often says that ‘sophisticated 
elders would not get their properties off their hands easily, otherwise is a lack of caution’ 
(shulian bu tuoshou, tuoshou bu shulian). One regular viewer who has been watching XLNJ 
since its first broadcast asserts that, 
‘ “house property” (fangzi) is the key word to all arguments on XLNJ. In spite of 
the fact that a variety of issues were talked about on the show including disputes 
between siblings, husband and wife, or parent and children, most of them would 
more or less involve issues over personal or real properties… we often see one 
party to the dispute request the other to add their name on property ownership 
certificate or move their hukou (household registration) from other regions to 
Shanghai, not surprisingly, the other party usually refuse such requirement as 
they worry that by adding name on the deed the requester will become the 
co-owner of the house property which may jeopardise their own interests in the 
future. And this oftentimes gives rise to the conflicts between couples, in-laws, 
or siblings’. 273 
                                                          
271 Participants #1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 17, and 23 
272 Urban constructions required demolitions of many old houses in order to construct modern business or 
commercial buildings. The original inhabitants were relocated in the outer suburbs, and some of them also 
received a certain amount of money as compensation. 
273 Participant #1 
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Some participants mention a case aired not long before the day of the focus group 
discussion274. The dispute was between a couple who had been married for just two years. 
The wife asked for a divorce for the reason ‘emotional incompatibility’. However, the 
husband suspected that his wife had some scheme because she moved back to stay with 
her parents nine days after their wedding. Since he had added his wife’s name to the 
ownership certificate of the house that was supposed to be his pre-marital property, he 
will have to pay his wife about 300,000 RMB (about 36,700 euro) if they divorce. The 
focus group participants were impressed by this incredible case, and they felt quite 
aggrieved and accused his wife of utilising marriage for personal interest. 
In addition to conflicts originating from disagreements over house properties, 
poverty seems to be another main cause of unhappy arguments. Some frequent viewers 
assume that ‘99 percent of those issues have their roots in poverty’275. And nearly half of 
the frequent-viewer participants mentioned an old saying in China that ‘When poverty 
comes in at the door, love flies out at the window’. As they see it, poverty is a powerful 
catalyst that magnifies unhappiness in life and turns family squabbles into serious 
conflicts.  
And recently, the audience noticed that domestic violence appears to be an 
increasingly common origin of disputes between couples in addition to extramarital affairs. 
Some participants are surprised that sometimes family violence ‘even happened to 
highly-educated people’276. The participants are somewhat stunned to find so many 
violent cases on XLNJ, as it seems to them that family violence is uncommon in their life.  
Focus groups participants have their own opinions about disputes mediation that 
are sometimes not accordant with the mediators’ ideas. In particular, some frequent 
viewers reported that sometimes they are not in complete agreement with the mediators’ 
suggestions, though they are loyal audience members and fond of the mediators. One of 
them experienced domestic violence during her childhood, and she found that, 
‘it is particularly incomprehensible to me that the mediator still attempt[s] to 
make peace in domestic violence cases. Maybe the elder generation has different 
                                                          
274 Titled My Wife Stays at Her Parents’ Home 5 Days in One Week, What Plot is She Brewing? (qizi yizhou 
wutian zhu niangjia, jiujingyouheyingmou), aired on September 16th 2013. 
275 Participants #4, 5, and 9 
276 Participant #11 
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understanding of life and love than us the younger generation. In my opinion, 
they can tolerate for the sake of life. While for us, we choose to stay together 
because of love, material pursues family reason, or a bit of everything. However, 
family violence is absolutely unforgivable.’277   
Indeed, the mediators seem to adhere to the belief that ‘one shall not destroy a 
marriage no matter how (ning chai shizuo miao, bu po yizhuang hun)’. In both frequent-viewer 
and non-frequent-viewer groups, participants278 remarked that the aim of the programme 
is to make peace. Specifically, some frequent viewers279 consider this acceptable because 
‘Chinese people usually suggest couple[s] to tolerate rather than to divorce (quan he bu 
quan li)’, and that is why the programme makes every effort to pull couples together. To 
some of them, the medium of television makes it possible for some cases to be solved. It 
seems to them that disputants would keep their promise made on the show because it is 
broadcast to the public: ‘under the surveillance of the public, they will have to do what 
they promise on the show’280. They give high credit to the show for its ability to solve 
disputes, suggesting that, to a certain extent, they lack confidence in their own ability to 
make a change. It seems that our panel participants believe the show can make a change 
because they cannot. This somehow confirms what is found in Chapter Six that those 
who have lower political efficacy are likely to be convinced by the show’s ability to 
promote harmony.  
But non-frequent viewers have different opinion; about one-third of them281 
believe that the show’s slogan ‘building and maintaining a harmonious society’ suggests 
that it is a political goal of the programme makers to foster peace in society and create a 
harmonious impression for the audience. While they seem to be aware of the aim 
established by the show, they are not necessarily convinced. In other words, some 
non-frequent viewers indicate that it is hardly possible to reduce the number of disputes 
by the efforts of some mediation shows. To them, the show’s slogan seems to push this 
programme towards the ‘mouthpiece’ role of the Party.    
                                                          
277 Participant #12 
278 Participants #3, 13, and 19 
279 Participants #3, 5, 7, and 11 
280 Participant #9 
281 Participants #13, 18, and 19 
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 Cultural Perception 7.3.3
With respect to the cultural aspect, I will look into participants’ attitudes towards 
discussing personal issues publicly on TV, i.e. face-saving/losing issues or whether 
participants find that the show is promoting traditional cultural values. This part of the 
analysis is based on the participants’ discussion about their opinions towards revealing 
family issues on television, the motivation behind disputants’ choice of televised 
mediation, and the assumed power of the mediation show in solving disputes.   
The survey result indicates that the audience does not find it humiliating to watch 
family disputes on television, but at the same time, they do not consider it a solution to 
their own issues. They differentiate between themselves as viewers and disputants as 
objects, suggesting a third-person effect of communication. The boundary between them 
is clearly divided by participants’ using ‘they’ to refer to disputants and ‘I’ or ‘we’ to refer 
to themselves. To them, it seems acceptable to watch others’ disputes on television, but it 
is a disgrace if they have to go on the show themselves. So, while they regard televised 
mediation as acceptable, this does not necessarily mean that they perceive it as unharmful 
to the reputation of the family. 
The focus group discussion showed that participants, particularly frequent viewers, 
hold a somewhat self-contradictory view towards mediation on TV. One the one hand, 
for most heavy-viewers, mediation TV has become a utilisable option to solve civil 
domestic disputes as it is ‘legally binding’ and ‘free of charge’. As a dispute solution, it has 
little to do for them with face-issues, especially ‘given the fact that XLNJ has broadcast 
for more than five years, and programmes of a similar type have been more common now, 
fewer people would make a fuss’282.  
On the other hand, however, the behaviour of airing dirty linen in public did give 
rise to the concern about issues related to reputation. The majority of 
participants—including both frequent and non-frequent viewers—see it as dishonourable, 
if not humiliating, to describe domestic disputes on the show. Nearly all of the 
participants believe that revealing family conflicts to the public would make oneself the 
subject of ridicule and bring embarrassment to one’s family. They believe that people put 
their family honour at stake when they pour out their discontent and fight with family on 
                                                          
282 Participant #4.  
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TV, seeking consolation and solutions. Such face-losing concern became especially 
obvious when participants found that they could identify with the disputant.  
For instance, Participant #6 once spotted a disputant couple living in a 
neighbourhood in which she used to live, and she felt that the couple had subjected 
themselves to ridicule by other neighbours by telling their private issues on the show: 
‘…apparently, our past neighbours –those who love chit-chat–must have been gossiping 
about them behind their backs for weeks’. Similarly, another participant, #8, was 
surprised when he recognised a teacher from his old school on a recent episode about 
domestic violence283. He felt sorry for her being a victim of family violence for many 
years and believed that she must have gathered her courage to seek mediation on XLNJ, 
as he speculated that ‘many other schoolmates would recognise her, now she is known to 
everyone in Shanghai...’. Both participants’ words suggested their concern for the 
disputants’ being the object of gossip. It appears that participants distinguish televised 
mediation as a solution from the act of revealing domestic disputes per se. The former 
was regarded as an acceptable option, while the latter was seen as less honourable. Many 
frequent-viewer participants showed empathy with disputants, believing that they must 
have encountered unsolvable difficulties and had no better choice than turning to the 
television programme.  
Unlike frequent viewers, the majority of non-frequent-viewer participants judged 
mediation on TV and the revelation behaviour as generally disgraceful. Many of them did 
not understand why someone would reveal private issues to an unknown audience, as for 
them quarrelling in front of relatives was already embarrassing, not to mention complete 
strangers284. Therefore, in their eyes turning to XLNJ was certainly not a wise, but rather 
a humiliating, decision. Participants’ discussion displayed various reasons for this 
disapproval, which could be summarised into two main reasons: disfavour of vulgarity and 
ethical and legal concerns. Firstly, with disfavour of the vulgarity, most non-frequent-viewer 
participants thought that TV programmes like XLNJ lack culture and taste. They thought 
the show ‘was playing to the gallery by displaying the ugliest side of the human nature’ 
and its purpose was to attract the audience and accordingly ‘profiteer from advertising’285.  
                                                          
283 Titled University teacher suffered domestic violence for ten years. 
284 Participants #15, 16, 21, and 24 
285 Participants #13, 15, 16, 21, 23, and 24 
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Secondly, a majority of the non-frequent participants expressed their doubts about 
the ethical and legal concerns. They alleged that the show stepped over the line when pursuing 
higher ratings at the expense of people’s privacy and misfortune286. In their opinions, 
carrying out civil mediation in private rather than in public is a more appropriate manner, 
as much as a mark of a civilised and progressive society. In fact, they felt that XLNJ tends 
to present a harmonious result of mediation on TV, but fails to solve the actual problem. 
After the seemingly happy ending, disputants would continue to ‘fight again when they 
get back home’287. 
When asked their opinions on the value implication of the show, contrasting 
perceptions were found between frequent and non-frequent-viewer participants. About 
three-quarters of the frequent participants felt that the show could be seen as positive in 
terms of its representation of mainstream moral and social values as well as the 
enlightenment it grants in dealing with family disputes. In contrast, almost all 
non-frequent viewers accused the show of its allegedly negative implications about social 
values that more or less impugned the reputation of Shanghai residents.  
In the heavy-viewers’ opinion, mediators on XLNJ were generally able to base their 
mediation on the law as much as on ethical and moral standards. In other words, given 
that family disputes were inevitably concerned with interpersonal relations, the mediators’ 
ability to grasp the disputants’ psychological point was as important, if not more, as their 
applicable legal knowledge because logic can convince, but only emotion can motivate. 
For such cases, emotional persuasion sometimes proved more effective in bringing 
disputants together again. All of the frequent-viewer participants mentioned that the show 
reflected real human nature, good and evil. And most of them enjoyed watching 
mediators ‘give the wrong party – such as those who have cheated on their family – a 
serious moral lesson’ 288 . It seemed to them that the show performed its claimed 
obligation to praise virtue and punish vice, adhering to the social value orientation. 
Moreover, the majority of frequent-viewer participants observed that many cases 
on the show were worth thinking about. The show, to some extent, was like ‘a social 
                                                          
286 Participants #15, 21, and 24 
287 Participants #17, 19, and 21 
288 Participants #2, 4, 6, 7, 10, and 11 
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university’289 where one can learn dispute-handling skills from others and then reflect on 
their own. Participants shared the same opinion that the lack of communication skills was 
a common problem for the disputants. Nearly half of the frequent viewers would reflect 
on their own habits of communication sometimes after watching certain episodes of 
XLNJ, because ‘the way you express yourself is particularly important when there is 
difference of opinion with others, sometimes you can make others happy or angry with 
just a single word.’290 It seemed to them that such edifying function could benefit ‘both 
the old and the young’
 
and ‘people in different occupations’291.   
By contrast, almost all of the non-frequent viewers hold the opposite view. They 
remarked that the show was ‘vulgar’, was characterised by a ‘lack of taste’, and had the 
sole purpose to ‘attract eyeballs’ by ‘playing to the audience’s curiosity of others’ 
privacy’ 292 . For them, no positive values—such as grace, courage, honesty and 
loyalty—were presented on the XLNJ show. Rather, some participants worried that the 
show would have undesirable consequences. For example, one participant293 indicated 
that such mediation programmes should be cut off and removed from the prime time 
period, because the content was ‘not enlightening or motivational, nor does it help to 
widen our horizon’. Furthermore, other participants made the accusation that too many 
disputes over the distribution of family property showed on TV would ‘wipe out 
interpersonal trust and bonding’294 as if ‘your wife or children are only concerned about 
your money’295.  
Moreover, some participants commented from a broader perspective that ‘It gives 
a misleading impression (of Shanghainese), people from outside the city think 
Shanghainese are stingy and narrow-minded when they watch the show. But in fact, the 
show only represents a small percentage of people in Shanghai’296. It seemed that 
non-frequent viewers felt that XLNJ presents a partial and unjust image of people from 
                                                          
289 Participant #5 
290 Participant #6 
291 Participants # 1, 3, 6, 8, and 9 
292 Participants # 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 24 
293 Participant #16 
294 Participant #18 
295 Participants #18, 20, and 24 
296 Participant #14 
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Shanghai. They accused that such misrepresentations would affect the image of the 
Shanghainese.  
Most participants in all four focus groups believed that they have the ability to 
communicate with their family members and resolve family issues. Only one in the 
frequent-viewer group mentioned that he might consider XLNJ as an option if one day 
he has serious family issues. Most non-frequent viewers did not consider televised 
mediation as a desirable choice for themselves, because people will talk behind your back 
when they recognise you on TV.  
 Conclusion  7.4
The discussion above has demonstrated the findings from frequent viewers and 
non-frequent viewers, who were grouped according to their obtained education level. In 
general, not many differences are found between higher and lower education groups, but 
there are evident differences between frequent and non-frequent viewers in terms of their 
perceptions. The differences might be explained by how much time they spend on 
watching the show, as the degree of familiarity with the show accordingly leads them to 
look at it from a different perspective. This confirms the finding from the Chapter Six 
that media consumption is a significant variable in explaining respondents’ perceptions of 
the show. By and large, frequent viewers’ perceptions appear to be more in line with the 
programme makers’ aim, while non-frequent viewers seem to be more suspicious and 
even tend to doubt the realness of the show. This finding perhaps is not very surprising, 
as Chinese audiences have been found to be longing for media credibility since the 1980s 
(Zhang 2009)297. 
One significant feature of the show is its use of dialect, which turns out to be what 
frequent viewers love and non-frequent viewers hate. Being one important part of culture, 
speaking and understanding dialect shorten the distance between disputants and television 
viewers by giving them a feeling of closeness. The need for a familiar native lingual 
environment appears to be the major reason why our frequent viewers watch the show. 
                                                          
297 In a 1982 audience research study conducted by Chinese academics and entertainment enterprises, only 24 




But this cultural element is what non-frequent viewers dislike. It seems that they have 
been more convinced by the Promoting Mandarin Campaign, and consider slang 
inappropriate to be used on television. These opposite attitudes towards the dialect might 
be explained by their opinions associated with Shanghai becoming a migrant metropolitan 
centre, which requires further research.   
Compared with the findings from the survey chapter, where education was 
identified as a factor explaining the respondents’ different perceptions of the show, those 
with lower education are more likely to be convinced by the show as promoting social 
harmony, but less likely to watch it for fun or consider it to be associated with a loss of 
reputation. This difference in education is not evident in the focus group research. In fact, 
the finding suggests that frequent viewers, regardless of their education, obtain 
enjoyment—but not necessarily fun—from the show. The difference between the survey 
and focus group findings may be explained by the terms used in the questions; 
entertainment may have more dimensions than ‘making you laugh’ or ‘having fun’. Both 
frequent and non-frequent viewers appear to be curious—more or less—to learn others’ 
stories. The complex enjoyment process of watching consists of various purposes such as 
‘voyeuristic needs’, ‘socialising, and ‘learning’. This suggests that sometimes viewers’ 
needs and the gratification they obtain from watching a specific show are not necessarily 
consistent. In this case, the audience might not watch XLNJ specifically for fun, but they 
obtain certain entertainment as a consequence. 
The focus group discussion allowed me to approach people and explore not only 
their uses and perceptions but also their perspectives on issues of contention in the three 
aspects. As Chapter Five has indicated, it is challenging for programme makers to 
integrate entertaining elements in the educational aim in the form of making the 
otherwise serious civil mediation fun and interesting to the audience. This seemingly 
contentious combination of entertainment and dispute resolution, however, does not 
appear to be a significant problem for programme viewers, especially the frequent ones. 
The frequent viewers in this study do not hide their curiosities about others’ disputes, 
which might make good topics in their social life. It seems that blending entertainment 
with civil mediation does not necessarily prevent the viewers from obtaining information. 
In fact, the focus group discussions suggest that (frequent) viewers might still obtain 
information gratification. The programme makers’ educational aim seems to reach the 
audience with this form of entertainised mediation.   
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As indicated in Chapter Six, the mediation show manages to establish a 
harmonious image among the respondents; on the whole, our focus group participants 
were also aware of the political aim of promoting social harmony. This aim seems 
obvious to them, as it is used as a slogan by the show. But frequent and non-frequent 
viewers hold different opinions regarding how this aim is implemented. In other words, 
frequent viewers appear to be more convinced by it and tend to believe that the show has 
‘positive’ influence in society, while non-frequent viewers are more likely to be concerned 
about its ‘negative’ influence in publicising domestic disputes. Perhaps frequent viewers 
are more likely to be interested in learning about disputes in others’ families (see Chapter 
Six), and accordingly, it is not surprising that frequent viewers are more likely to consider 
televised mediation as a helpful solution. Unlike the producer’s concern, frequent viewers 
do not seem to get bored of house-related issues. To them, the frequently occurring 
disputes over properties to a certain extent reflect the common issues in society. These 
viewers seem able to reconcile harmony with disharmony.  
With respect to the cultural aspect, i.e. the face-saving matters, though frequent 
viewers exhibit understanding of disputants’ choice of public mediation, they would not 
see it as a choice for themselves. They share the similar opinions as non-frequent viewers 
with regard to family reputation. Since the onset of media marketisation, various types of 
television programmes have been focusing on ordinary people’s lives, such as a 
conventional talk show mentioned in previous chapters. It is likely that people might be 
receptive to the new genre of programmes such as televised mediation and, again, 
accommodate the contradictions. But this does not mean that they do not care about 
‘face’ issues. On the whole, they are traditional in terms of dealing with their own issues, 
but become tolerant of others’ choices.   
In general, these viewers seem to be tolerant of the contradictions, though they are 
aware of them. In other words, the audience pays more attention to what they get from 
the show, including information and entertainment, rather than caring whether others 







In China’s traditional philosophy and culture, ‘harmony in society’ has been the pursuit of 
Chinese people for centuries. Such desire for building a harmonious society seems to have 
become more intense and urgent in the recent decade as a consequence of uneven 
economic growth. The Hu-Wen government’s renovation of the concept of building a 
‘socialist harmonious society’ (shehui zhuyi hexie shehui) subsequently became the motto for 
China. According to the official explanation, a harmonious society is one that is 
‘democratic and ruled by law, fair and just, trustworthy and fraternal, full of vitality, stable 
and orderly, and maintains harmony between man and nature’ (Angang 2005). As soon as 
the party leadership declared the utopian priority of building a harmonious China298, the 
concept has been implemented in a typical mass mobilisation fashion aimed at everyone 
and at major institutions in the cultural and educational industries (Zhu 2008). Television 
practitioners have also joined the effort of promoting social harmony, benevolence, 
stability, and family values. Among various types of television shows, mediation reality 
shows place emphasis on Confucian values that coincide with the ideology that the 
Hu-Wen administration had promoted at the time. 
In addition to the general political environment, the marketisation of the media 
industry has given rise to the emergence of mediation shows. By and large, mediation 
reality shows have now been popular for more than seven years. Dispute mediations are 
taking place on provincial and local television channels in different ways including 
in-studio and in-field mediation. Following Xin Lao NiangJiu (新老娘舅, XLNJ), many 
                                                          
298 During the 6th plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the 
leadership issued a communiqué highlighting the issue of social harmony. See Communiqué of the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee (Xinhua News 2006) 
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programmes have incorporated people’s mediation into their content and established 
collaboration with local justice bureaus299. By echoing the government’s objective and 
utilising the audience’s voyeuristic needs, these shows seem to please not only the 
government but also the audience. These mediation shows share common features in 
terms of the range of topics; that is, they deliberately restrain the scope of disputes 
between individuals to topics such as domestic and neighbourhood conflicts, avoiding 
politically sensitive issues such as labour or medical disputes. At the same time, the show 
is forecasted on an entertainment channel, giving it an air of fun and laughter. Yet 
Confucianism has also been seen as valuing ‘face’ (mianzi), and as an often repeated 
Chinese proverb goes: ‘A person needs face as a tree needs bark’. The flip side of saving 
or gaining face is avoiding shame. However, making private matters public is certainly a 
shameful behaviour as seen by Chinese people (Zuo 1997) and doing that as a source of 
entertainment might conflict with the seriousness of the topic and mediation per se. In 
this sense, the mediation shows that disclosure of personal disputes appears to be 
potentially contradictory to people’s traditional values. 
This study therefore focused on the mediation show XLNJ to examine the popular 
phenomenon of the proliferation of mediation programmes and explored what Chinese 
viewers get out of this show that potentially conflicts with their cultural and political 
values. Below, I summarise and discuss the main empirical findings of this study. The 
final section points at the main contributions and limitations of this study, and suggests 
future studies.  
 Revisiting the Main Findings  8.2
In Chapter One, I posed three sub-questions in order to investigate XLNJ’s and Chinese 
viewers’ perceptions of a mediation TV show that potentially conflicts with their cultural 
and political values: (1) What do programme makers and official mediators see as the aim of XLNJ?, 
(2) Why do viewers watch XLNJ, and what gratifications do they (not) get out of it?, and (3) What do 
                                                          
299 For example, True Feelings Mediation (Zhenqing Tiaojie) from Qingdao Television and Help You Till the End 
(Yibang Daodi) from Shandong Television. The Third Mediation Court has collaborated with the Beijing Justice 
Bureau and established a homonymic mediation committee, and similarly, The Golden Medal Mediation (Jinpai 




local viewers get out of a mediation TV show that potentially conflicts with their cultural and political 
values? In the next section, I will bring the findings together to discuss How do programme 
makers and the audience come to terms with the potentially contradictory and conflicting entertaining, 
social and political, and cultural aspects of XLNJ?  
The Production Chapter (Chapter Five) disclosed the four aims of the show as 
seen by programme makers and mediators. To prevent the similar destiny of its 
predecessors, the show tactically borrows the feature from the once-popular confessional 
talk show that focuses on individual relationships. Positioning itself as an in-between of 
preceding popular talk shows on individuals’ relationships and social issues, the show 
aims to please both the government and the audience. With respect to the marketing aim, 
audience ratings are critical for the show in a market economy where commercialisation 
and entertainisation have been taking place in the media sector and channels are less 
dependent on state subsidies and more on their own income. Thus, a primary aim of the 
show is to meet the needs of the market. In other words, the disputes on the show often 
seem to be dramatic and sensational in order to meet the audience’s voyeuristic need. 
Audience rating is a crucial criterion that indicates the programme’s performance in 
competition with others in the media market. Television practitioners constantly pay 
attention to the rating of their show and make efforts to enhance it by meeting the 
audience’s needs. Bearing this in mind, one approach the show adopts is to package itself 
as a programme that speaks for ordinary people in order to close the distance between 
itself and the audience. Entertainment elements have been applied to the making of show, 
with the same purpose to engage more viewers. 
Promoting social harmony is considered to be another important aim for the show. 
The collaboration with the Shanghai Justice Bureau (SJB) signifies the show’s intention to 
play up to the central call of ‘building a harmonious society’ by advertising itself as such 
and working together with the justice department in solving citizens’ disputes, 
propagating harmony. By incorporating the mediation in the show, it promotes social 
harmony by addressing common social issues and helps to solve people’s difficulties. 
But the show refrains from going too far in consideration of the aim of avoiding 
political sensitivity. In this sense, it has to play it safe by focussing on non-sensitive 
topics—for example, avoiding disputes between individuals and institutions or 
organisations such as medical or labour disputes—that will not trigger critical discussions 
or jeopardise the image of official institutions. Rather, the show’s strategic collaboration 
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with the local justice bureau shows its efforts to respond to the central call for a 
harmonious society by the administration of that period, the Hu-Wen government.  
Last but not least, with respect to the educational aim, the show wants to educate 
its audience with legal knowledge by referring to and applying relevant regulations and 
policies during the mediation process in the show. Apparently, programme makers are 
trying to please the party, while at the same time they manage to pursue high market 
profits. By pleasing both the party and the audience, the show is able to secure its position 
on the television channel and accordingly extend its lifetime. Programme makers, 
newspapers, and fans usually celebrate the show for its warm-heartedness in helping many 
people. Their story can be known to the public, and accordingly, they receive help from 
the society. By focusing on personal issues, the programme makers believe that the show 
is helpful in educating the viewers about relevant regulations and policies. By using moral 
persuasion as an approach in mediation, the show is also claimed to promote traditional 
moral ethics and values, which echo the call of ‘maintaining a harmonious society’. 
Programme makers in general do not seem concerned with the ‘face’ issue when ‘making 
personal issues public’. They appear to be more confident in their ‘positive’ influence in 
promoting moral standards than concerned about potential issues related to the loss of 
reputation. 
By and large, the aims of the show seem to be well implemented in terms of 
fostering a positive influence in society, which attracts the attention and appreciation 
from the local government and propaganda department, which even held seminars to 
study the programme and its implications. The government officers see the show as a 
model that reflects the real lives of ordinary citizens and as an ideal platform for 
promoting legal knowledge300. Does the audience appreciate the show in the same way as 
government officers do, and how do they perceive the aims established by the 
programme makers?   
Both an online survey and focus groups were carried out to explore answers to this 
question. The online survey revealed that, on average, the first reason why viewers are 
attracted to the show is a question of language. The use of Shanghainese dialects makes 
                                                          
300 See for example, an internal report by a district justice bureau (Jinshan Justice Bureau 2008) and another 
journal article about another justice branch in Shanghai (Yan 2012).  
187 
 
them feel close to the disputants. A component of cultural identity, the audience’s first 
motivation, appears to stress personal identity, sharing the same demographic background 
with relatively low education and low income. The audience also watches the show with 
the purpose to learn or seek information that they need, as well as for the purpose of 
maintaining or bonding with their existing network. Passing time and entertainment 
appear to be less important reasons that motivate the audience to watch the show. This 
may well be a socially desirable answer, as publicly admitting these uses might contradict 
the educational aim of the show. These uses and gratifications have been confirmed by focus 
group discussions, especially those with frequent viewers.  
Combining findings from the survey and the focus group research, it seems that 
the audience—whether they tune into the show for ‘entertainment’ needs or not—does 
enjoy the show. In other words, they might not find others’ stories on the show hilarious, 
making them laugh, but they are impressed by the complicated and sometimes 
extraordinary plots. The enjoyment of drama on the show also constitutes the perception 
of entertainment, but it seems to be a more subconscious enjoyment, as it is not obvious 
in the survey but only becomes clear from the focus groups. This finding suggests that 
‘fun’ or ‘entertainment’ might not be the reasons for watching, but are a way to sustain 
the audience’s interest.  
Regardless of how often they watch the mediation show, viewers have been aware 
of the ‘promoting social harmony’ aim of the show, but not all of them are convinced by 
it. This aim might seem obvious as it is included in the programme’s opening sequence 
and is used as a slogan for televised mediation. In general, this aim seems more 
convincing to socially contented female respondents with low education and low 
confidence in their ability to make a change in society. The focus group discussions 
suggest that the participants believe that the nature of television gives it the power to 
solve difficult disputes. It seems that they expect publicised mediation to make a change 
in society since they have less confidence in their own abilities. Contrary to the producer’s 
claims, the audience does not seem to get bored of housing as an issue, and they indicate 
that such issues frequently appear on television. From the survey results and the focus 
group discussion, the audience is content with the existing topic range, and they do not 
exhibit the desire for other issues. 
The audience’s perception of cultural aspects, however, appears to be 
self-contradictory. On the one hand, they exhibit empathy towards the disputants in 
188 
 
terms of their decision to make private issues public. On the other hand, however, they 
do not feel the same way when talking about themselves. In other words, they would not 
consider televised mediation as an option if they have disputes to solve. This suggests that 
Chinese ‘face’ still matters to them.  
 Discussion of Findings and Issues of Contention 8.3
Since its emergence, the XLNJ show has been enjoying high ratings for more than half a 
decade, which subsequently inspires the flourishing of reality mediation shows on TV 
across the nation. The case of Ms Zhang and Ms Yang described in the Chapter One is 
not uncommon on these mediation shows. Disputes regarding family responsibilities, 
marriage problems, and/or financial properties often relate to issues with a historical 
background. The consequence of market liberalisation is manifested in those issues. In 
fact, the reality mediation show, as a popular culture phenomenon shaped both by market 
and state forces, is a discursive site manifesting complex Confucian legacies and 
ideological promotion of propaganda.  
XLNJ was the first show to collaborate with a legal institution, the Shanghai Justice 
Bureau, which defines its dual role: making profits through entertainised production while 
at the same time promoting harmonious dispute solution to play up to the authority. The 
complex nature of the show—mixing entertainment with the political and the 
cultural—raises issues of contention. In the following sections, I will bring empirical 
findings together trying to compare the aim of the show and the audience perception in 
terms of the different aspects (see Table 8.1), and I will also explore whether programme 
makers and the audience recognise these tensions, and how they deal with them.   
 Political Aspects 8.3.1
As seen by the programme makers, the show XLNJ aims to entertain, promote social 
harmony, and educate ordinary citizens. These three aims are not exclusive but rather 
intertwined. It seems that the mediation show has learned two lessons from earlier talk 
shows: first, there is a balance between meeting the audience’s needs and the State 
Administration of Radio Film and TV (SARFT) requirements, meaning that programme 
makers should restrain their desire for making the show too sensational. Secondly, the 
range of topics should be confined to interpersonal issues in order to avoid politically 
sensitive issues. Failure to live up to these lessons might induce intervention from 
189 
 
administrative or governmental institutions and would very likely lead to the end of the 
show, as happened to others. Although the marketisation has given rise to the emergence 
of various television productions, the media are still subject to government control. 
Actually, belonging to the Shanghai Media Group, the Shanghai Television is under the 
guidance of the Shanghai Propaganda Department, and the media transformation has not 
changed that. As other scholars have also observed, there is a tension between media 
marketisation and the state’s attempt to control (see, for example, Li 2014a, Zhao 2008, 
and Stockmann and Gallagher 2011). This, to a certain extent, explains why programme 
makers have developed the four aims of the show, i.e. to attract large audiences to 
educate the audience with legal knowledge, to divert political sensitivity, and to promote 
social harmony. These aims explain the show’s effort in looking for a balance in tensions 
and a secured position in the market.  
On the other side, facing the fact that media ownership remains in the hands of the 
state, media practitioners such as the programme makers in this study are looking for 
their own way to cope with the status quo. The collaboration with the local justice bureau 
is apparently one decision that benefits the show even though it now only exists in name. 
To the programme makers of the XLNJ and similar shows, the nature of such 
collaboration plus media affiliation with the Propaganda Department have set the tone 
for the show to limit topics to personal or family issues and refrain from major disputes 
that involve allegations of abuse of power by government officials or state institutions. 
This restraint of disputes does not seem to bother the programme makers who adopt it 
into the selection criteria for the show. As far as XLNJ is concerned, the programme 
producer and directors do not mind carrying out self-censorship in order to ensure that 
the content stays within the permissible scope. Their efforts are appreciated by the local 
government and propaganda department who view them as a means to advance a 
harmonious society.   
While the show refrains from covering politically sensitive issues and pays attention 
mainly to family disputes, the programme makers and especially the producer appear to 
be concerned about the recurring housing issues on the show. Like the story of Ms Zhang 
in Chapter One, disputants to housing disputes often involve the generation of the 
sent-down youth (zhiqing), and the disagreements about house properties often involve 
hukou problems. These family disputes reflect, to a certain extent, issues facing a changing 
society with inequality of wealth, defects in policies, and unexpected consequences of 
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economic reforms. The frequent appearance of such issues on the show seems to worry 
the producer, who argues that the audience have had enough of such topics and that the 
number of such cases should be reduced. But it seems contentious, as it turns out, that 
housing issues remain the most common topic of the show (see Chapter Five). In spite of 
the selection criteria, this topic seems to be inevitable. Given the rising housing prices and 
the difficulty of household registration in urban cities (for example, see the case in 
Chapter One), it is understandable that property distribution has become common in 
many family disputes. In fact, our respondents do not seem to be fed up with such topics, 
partially for the reason that housing issues are close to life and common in society (see 
Table 8.1, and also Chapters Six and Seven). While the frequent housing issue does not 
seem to be a problem for the audience, it worries the producer. As for the producer, the 
precedent talk show taught him that social issues can sometimes be sensitive; in this sense, 
his argument on the audience’s being uninterested in housing issues might be explained 
by his concern that the frequently-appearing topic would upset the authority and affect its 
attitude towards the show.  
Table 8.1 Comparison of programme makers' aim and audience perception  
 
Table 8.1 summarises the aims of the show as seen by the programme makers and according to the audience’s 
perception.  
Not all of the viewers are convinced by the show’s influence in promoting social 
harmony, though they all seem to be aware of such a goal. The regular viewers of the 
show are more likely to see the show as having a positive role in society to promote social 
harmony. This can largely be explained by the time they spent on watching the show. For 
frequent viewers, their ritualised viewing involves the use of television for diverse reasons 
Programme Makers’ Aim Audience’s Perception
Promoting social harmony Recognised by frequent viewers 
Avoiding political sensitivity/ 
divert political sensitivity
Reflection of real life
Educational aim Learning / information seeking
Marketing / entertaining Dramatic/ sensational
Dialect as entertaining element Closeness / personal identity
Cultural Aspect





and a greater attachment to the medium itself (Rubin 1985). Such attachment with the 
show may somehow enable them to be more empathetic with disputants, while 
non-frequent viewers appear to be more aware of the limited ability of the show to reduce 
the number of disputes. 
 Entertainment Aspects 8.3.2
By collaborating with the Justice Bureau, XLNJ has institutionally mixed entertainment 
and the political. Turning the otherwise serious civil mediation into a popular show on an 
entertainment channel can be a challenging task, but it does not seem difficult to the 
programme makers who mostly have experience in making entertainment programmes. 
As shown in Table 8.1 (and also Chapter Five), in the pursuit of profit, programme 
makers adopt editing techniques to make the show entertaining and attractive, such as 
using sensational titles for episodes and re-organising the storyline to emphasise the ‘love 
and hate’301 between disputants. Learning the lessons from the confessional talk shows 
that are mostly staged, XLNJ also placed emphasis on its ‘realness’ to please the audience 
as well as the authority.  
The show makers achieve their marketing aim as indicated by the continuous high 
ratings of the show. But the method of story-telling might not be appreciated by everyone, 
which is suggested by the findings from the empirical research on the audience. In spite 
of the show’s emphasis on ‘realness’, some focus group participants in this study actually 
have their doubts because they find some cases exaggerated and unbelievable. The editing 
techniques may make the story sensational, but while some see television as a mirror of 
society, others hold reservations about its credibility. This is hardly surprising, as Chinese 
media used to lack credibility (see, for example Zhang 2009)302. It is possible that those 
staged confessional talk shows strengthened the audience’s impression of low credibility. 
Findings from focus group discussions suggest that, in a similar format of entertainment, 
it might take the mediation show some time to enhance its credibility and make people 
believe that it tells real stories. Meanwhile, the dialect used in the show minimises the 
distance between the audience and disputants on TV. The same language helps and urges 
                                                          
301 Focus group participants #5 and #13 
302 According to the first Chinese audience research co-organised by Chinese academics and entertainment 
enterprises in 1982, only 24 percent of the 1,966 people surveyed found the media credible.  
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the viewers to identify and empathise with others. Dialect as an entertaining element 
might not be appreciated by all and might explain why frequent viewers, who also watch 
other programmes in Shanghainese, doubt the realness of the show less than 
non-frequent viewers.  
While the audience sometimes finds disputes on the show dramatic, they do not 
seem to consider the show as entertainment that is fun and that makes people laugh. 
Although sometimes a sensational title may trigger their curiosity, they do not necessarily 
recognise it as entertaining. They might enjoy the dramatic story subconsciously while 
claiming that they learn something from the show rather than obtain enjoyment. It is 
likely that they do not distinguish information from entertainment when mediation is 
presented in an entertainment format.  
The relation between entertainment and politics is subtle in China. The show has to 
be careful not to upset the authorities or the propaganda department by being too 
politically sensitive or too sensational. To survive the market and political environment, 
media practitioners use a set of methods to ensure that their production pleases the local 
audience and the authorities alike. An effective way seems to be to market an image that 
plays up to the authority, which is used not only by the media but also popular culture 
(see, for example, Fung 2003). Shows like XLNJ strategically place themselves in the 
same line as the government and manage to ‘repackage’ their tabloid-style content in ways 
that appear to promote a harmonious society as the government wishes (Kong and 
Hawes 2014). In this case, the programme makers might well reach their educational aim 
by converting information into entertainment, without upsetting their audience. 
 Cultural Aspects  8.3.3
XLNJ benefits from the collaboration with the Shanghai Justice Bureau in terms of 
building up its reputation and credibility. But the hierarchical administrative structure has 
prevented the show from having a sufficient source of cases and consequently leads to 
the current situation where this collaboration only exists in name. While the programme 
makers decided to regain control of case selection by relying on its hotlines as a source of 
dispute cases, they realise that whether the story can be produced or not largely depends 
on the callers’ willingness to go public voluntarily. In fact, disputants hesitate to go on the 
show and may change their mind at the last minute. As it turns out, the production team 
of XLNJ have comprised with disputants’ retreat from attendance and carry out 
193 
 
mediation with only one party’s presence. This suggests that ‘losing-face’ is still a concern 
for ordinary people when deciding turn to the mediation for solution, even though the 
programme makers claim that ‘people have nothing to lose’303.  
The show seems to have conflicting intentions, as it promotes the Confucian 
‘harmony’ value at the cost of the ‘face’ issues. The audience, particularly frequent viewers, 
seem to be fine with such contradiction. As seen by them, televised mediation offers 
disputants a platform to solve their issues, which is more important than the ’face’ 
concern. But this reputation issue appears to be quite confusing here because the 
audience exhibits different attitudes if they were to choose dispute solution for 
themselves. The concept of reputation may be abstruse and difficult to understand even 
to Chinese people. For example, Lu Xun, a well-known Chinese intellectual who 
endeavoured his whole life to study the national character of Chinese people and the 
reconstruction of Chinese culture, said, ‘What is going on about “face”? It is wise not to 
think about it. When you think of it, you will get confused (Quoted in Mou and Yi 1991, 
126)’. It requires a further understanding of the concept of ‘face’ to understand people’s 
conflicting attitude towards the reputation issue. As Hwang (2006, 2012) indicates, the 
Chinese usage of face can be divided into two broad categories, moral face (lian) and 
social face (mianzi). Moral face is more basic and is the baseline for being an upright 
person, a reputation that should not be lost in any situation. Social face is acquired 
through personal talent or achievement (Hwang 2012). In this sense, it explains why 
people are inclined not to choose televised mediation for themselves, as they value their 
moral face. This suggests that when watching others’ disputes on television, their 
‘voyeuristic’ needs surpass their concern for others’ face issues. Indeed, since the 
marketisation of the television industry, there is an increasing number of programmes 
displaying ordinary people’s lives to the public. The audience might have become 
accustomed to this phenomenon. The conflicting attitude towards one’s own and others’ 
face highlights the tension between tradition and modernity. Traditional values are subject 
to change, and the media undoubtedly play a role in this.  
Media marketisation in China has indeed encouraged diversity in production. 
However, marketisation with Chinese characteristics does not necessarily lead to private 
                                                          
303 Interviewee #1 
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ownership of television. The implicit official attitude towards television can be read from 
a rule ‘shiye danwei, qiye hua guanli’, which means that the ownership of television remains in 
the hands of the state. The transition of Chinese television from a politically-oriented 
pattern to a market-oriented one occurred under the preconditions that ‘the ideological 
function of television remains foremost and the operation of television responds to 
market disciplines’ (Xu 2013). The media are more independent economically, but not 
politically. 
The marketisation of the television industry and the changing political environment 
forced television practitioners to produce contents that can satisfy both the market and 
the authority. In this study, mediation seems to have been used as a combination of 
education, control, propaganda, and entertainment. In this way, XLNJ and similar shows 
are able to stay mostly within the thematic and pictorial confines of what the Party 
permits, and still turn a profit (Zhu 2008, 136). While mediation shows are seen by 
officials and programme makers as alternative solutions to family conflicts, they neglect 
the traditional ‘saving-face’ issue.  
Our respondents perceive the show differently relative to each other. They seem 
more likely to obtain enjoyment from the dramatic storyline and at the same time are 
aware of the ‘harmonious’ image the show endeavours to build. It does not seem difficult 
for the audience to deal with the cultural contention regarding face issues as they 
distinguish moral face from social face, with the former being more essential than the 
latter. The audience not only identifies with but also distinguishes themselves from the 
disputants on TV. What appears consistent with earlier studies304 (Zhang 2002, 2009) is 
that the audience still exhibits the need for information, particularly information that 
relates to their life. To do that in an entertaining way is not seen as contradictory. 
Programmes paying attention to citizens’ lives (minsheng) such as mediation shows may 
well meet both needs. 
 
 
                                                          
304 Early study on the Chinese audience indicate that their reasons for watching changed very little from 1987 to 
2002. ‘Entertainment’, ‘knowledge of policies of the party and the government’, ‘learning current news and 
politics’, and ‘general education’ have consistently ranked as the top four. 
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 Limitations, Contributions, and Future Prospects   8.4
Looking back and reflecting on the process of my qualitative research, this study has 
admittedly, some points for future improvement. If more and specific statements had 
been adopted, the result of the uses and gratifications approach would have revealed more 
critical audience perceptions. In consideration of the questionnaire length, I have cut 
down the number of statements, which might have affected the outcome. This 
inadequacy may partly explain different perceptions of, for example, entertainment 
between survey and focus group participants. When doing qualitative research, especially 
group discussions such as utilised in focus groups, the researcher should create an 
environment that is as comfortable as possible, so as to help the group to continue talking. 
It is preferable that the researcher does not try to derive meaning from conversations 
while they talk, as this will divert the researcher’s attention and can unintentionally cause 
them to speak in an academic way, which is not helpful in the qualitative research. My 
experience taught me that it is better to only focus on how to get every participant to talk 
more rather than think too much about one particular participant’s exact words.  
This study focused only on the production and the audience side of mediation 
shows. For various reasons, I did not include disputants as research objects, which 
requires more time, more patience, and extensive commitment to contact those 
disputants and probe their real feelings. In future studies, one may consider interviewing 
people seeking solutions from televised mediation to provide a thorough understanding 
of the reasons why they choose mediation on screen at the cost of losing face. At this 
stage, it is important to acknowledge that the data come from a relatively small N, so the 
findings of this research can not be generalized. In a sense, it is worth noticing that such 
data, as a first start to tap into the audience, can say something about a set of nuanced 
relationships between social actors and audience perceptions. More abundant and 
higher-quality data from a larger population should produce stronger results.  
This study of the mediation reality show and its audience has made a modest 
contribution to the body of literature as well as the empirical audience research in 
mainland China. First of all, it provides a prism through which to understand the subtle 
relation between the media and the authoritarian state in the course of economic reforms. 
Indeed, marketisation and commercialisation impact on individual’s everyday life and on 
the media industry. After more than three decades, the government recognised social 
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discontent stemming from the consequences of economic reforms. The then Hu-Wen 
administration turned to the Confucian ideas of equality and balance for possible 
solutions. Their decision on ‘building a harmonious society’ implied that there are 
‘unharmonious’ problems associated with marketisation and rapid economic growth. 
Building and maintaining social stability is partly an effort for the then Hu-Wen 
government to preserve Communist rule in China (Zhu, 2008), but it is also pivotal to the 
realization of Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’. 
Meanwhile, the marketisation with Chinese characteristics does not change the 
ownership of television, but creates a dilemma for producers, as Yin (2008) suggests (see 
Chapter Three), with responsibility on the one hand and freedom on the other. The 
proliferation of entertainment reality programmes is a consequence of the severe 
competition in the television market. Entertainment-oriented content as politically safe 
and economically lucrative might be the logic behind the vibrant growth of these shows. 
At the same time, the propaganda authorities are concerned about the tendency of 
‘excessive entertainisation’ and valgarisation (Bai 2015). More importantly, their 
expectation for the media is to render social inequalities invisible rather than amplify them 
and to educate rather than deteriorate moral values. The relation between the media and 
the state seems to be reciprocal at this point, because the latter seems to be satisfied with 
such a role of the media and considers it a helpful tool in portraying a picture of 
harmonious society and responsive government. 
Secondly, this study adds a modest contribution to the existing literature on 
entertainment and politics in China, and life-counselling programmes in particular. 
Life-counselling shows like XLNJ manage to serve the twin masters of the party-state and 
the market: they pay attention to social issues and people’s grievances but at the same 
time confine topics to a non-sensitive range, responding to the government’s social 
governance campaign. These programmes defuse social conflicts by providing viewers 
with an impression that most problems and issues can be solved. Packaging their political 
intent in the format of entertainment, life-counselling shows like XLNJ provide advice on 
a wide range of ‘life issues’ from professionals or experts such as mediators, lawyers, 
psychologists, which can be arguably convincing for certain groups of viewers. As seen by 
the audience, these programmes are not likely to have a hidden agenda other than 
transmitting technical, scientific, objective and practical knowledge (Sun and Zhao 2009, 
Sun 2014, 2015).  
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Compared with studies on media entertainment and politics in Western 
democracies where entertainment such as soft news is blamed for the image of malaise 
that creates a constant ambience of public mistrust (see also Chapter Three), this study 
suggests that this media malaise theory developed in the liberal democracies might not be 
automatically applicable to an authoritarian state like China. The situation seems to be the 
opposite: politics or information packaged in an entertainment format is more likely to be 
acceptable and effectual. This is partly because news in the government-run media is 
prone to censorship and thus have a notorious credibility problem (Shirk 2011). In a 
transition period towards marketisation with Chinese characteristics, the Party still 
attempts to maintain strict control, which gradually push the media towards the direction 
of entertainisation, because entertainment programmes generally enjoy a greater freedom 
(Li 2014a). Infotainment like life-counselling programmes in a sense may be more 
informative than a news programme in terms of providing people with advice and 
knowledge relevant to individual’s life, which echoes earlier studies in Northern Europe 
(see Brants 1998, Brants and Neijens 1998). 
Furthermore, the study taps into the Chinese audience by combining an online 
survey and a focus group, which provides a humble foundation for further research on 
audiences in China. As mentioned in Chapter Three, there has been increasing attention 
devoted to mediation shows and similar formats. But most studies lack solid empirical 
evidence, especially evidence about the audience’s perception. This study attempts to 
illustrate how the contradiction in and of a mediation show is perceived by the audience 
by combining online surveys and focus groups. The findings may be helpful for future 
studies that look into public opinion regarding social issues and government responses.  
From the perspective of the television viewer, this study may supplement empirical 
findings that are in line with other studies that analyse media and political practice in 
China regarding the government’s expectation of the media from a top-down perspective 
(for example, see Hawes and Kong 2013, Kong 2014, Sun 2014, 2015). Admittedly, 
findings in this study are not from a large sample population, they provide a prism 
through which one might see how Chinese media can be simultaneously ‘spectacular and 
mundane, ideologically overbearing and extremely entertaining, and subservient and 
defiant of the Party-state’ (Sun 2014).  
As a first tap into the audience perception of an entertainment reality show, the uses 
and gratifications approach provides the possibility to explore a rough idea of what motives 
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people might have to watch mediation shows, which may provide a foundation for future 
audience studies of life-counselling shows in general. Future studies can also extend the 
present research by covering mediation shows broadcasted on channels across various 
regions. It would be interesting to conduct a comparison of a wide range of audiences, 
which will provide a deeper and more general understanding of audience perception 
towards reality shows. It is also necessary to combine various methods in future research 
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Appendix 1 List of Mediation Programmes (up to 2012) 
No. Programme Title Channel Location 
1 Listener in the world (zhiyin renjian) Channel Five Zhengzhou 
2 
The true, the good and the beautiful 
(Zhenshanmei) Public Channel Hunan 
3 
The helpful lady assistant (Zhenqing nv 
bangban) Law Channel Jilin 
4 
True Feelings Mediation (Zhenqing 
Tiaojie)  Life Channel Qingdao 
5 Seeking ture emotion (Xunqingji) City Channel Hunan 
6 Seeking ture emotion (Xunqingji) News Channel Hainan 
7 New Elder Uncle (Xin Laoniangjiu) 
Entertainment 
Channel Shanghai 
8 Mood (xinqing) Life Channel Liaoning 
9 Secret Code of the Mind (Xinling Mima) Life Channel Beijing 
10 




Channel Shanxi  
11 
Xiao Guo, your errand boy (Xiao Guo 
paotui) 
Satellite 
Television Shanxi  
12 
45 minutes live on the scene (xianchang 
45 fenzhong) 




13 Highlights in the night (wanjian kandian) News Channel Wuxi 
14 Who is talking (shui zai shuo) Youth Channel Beijing 
15 Emotion Search  (qinggan da sousuo) Financial Channel Hubei 
16 Touching 8pm (qingdong 8 dian) 





Qiantang Elder Uncle(Qiantang Lao Niang 
Jiu) 
Life and leisure 
Channel Zhejiang 
18 Uncle the big stone (Niangjiu da shitou) 
Finance and Life 
Channel Ningbo 








21 Mediator (Heshi Lao) Pearl Channel Hangzhou 
22 
Hangzhou old brother (hangzhou lao 
dage) Life Channel Hangzhou 
23 
Wide-angle of life  (Guangjiao 
Minsheng) Country Channel Jilin 
24 Unusual Help (feichang bangzhu) Farmer Channel Hebei 
25 
Ordinary People Got Trouble (Fanren You 
Shi) City Channel Chongqing 
26 
Mediating secret emotional code (Tiaohe 
qinggan mima) 
Movie and TV 
Channel Shijiazhuang 
27 Mediation (Tiao He) 
Movie and TV 
Channel Shijiazhuang 
28 
The Third Mediation Court (Disan Tiaojie 
shi) 
Education and 
sciences Channel Beijing 
29 Di long dao dao guai 
Economics Info 
Channel Chengdu 
30 Loving Mediation (Aixin Tiaojie) Public Channel Henan 
31 80's theatre (80hou juchang) Channel Young Shanghai 
32 80's theatre (80hou juchang) 
Education 
Channel Shandong 
33 80's theatre (80hou juchang) 
Satellite 
Television Ningxia 





35 80's theatre (80hou juchang) 
Entertainment 
Channel Wuxi 
36 80's theatre (80hou juchang) Life Channel Liaoning 
37 Man's world (renjian) 
Satellite 
Television Jiangsu 
38 Don't lie to me (bie dui wo shuohuang) 
General 
Entertainment 
Channel  Jiangsu 
39 Help you till the end (Yi bang daodi) 
 
Shandong 
40 Super Mediation (Chaoji Tiaojie) 
Satellite Channel, 
Jiangsu Jiangsu  




Here comes the litigant (youqing 
dangshiren) Life Channel Nanjing 
43 Magic cube of Happiness (xingfu mofang) 
Dragon Satellite 
TV Shanghai 




Meddler lady the Mediator (xianshi po 
heshilao) News Channel Wenzhou 
46 
Face-to-face mediation (Tiaojie 
mianduimian) 
Satellite 
Television Hubei  





Appendix 2 Observation Checklist 
 
Observed Items     Yes No N/A Notes 
Pre-production   
1) Is the issues selected through discussion among producer, editor and mediator?
  
2) Are there any topics not selected? For what reasons?   
3) When they contact parties to a dispute to come to the studio, what do they say?
  
4) How do producers and editors decide the running order of the programme? 
  
5) How do they decide which mediator will be in the programme?   
6) Is there a running order of the programme?   
7) How do the producer and the editors decide the order the programme?   
8) Does the mediator or the editor review relevant regulations in advance?   
Production   
1) Does the programme production team separate parties to a dispute before 
filming  
2) Does the mediator talk to both parties to a dispute before the filming and 
mediate their conflicts?   
3) Does the editor tell the parties to a dispute what to say and what not before 
filmin  
4) Does the editor/producer give instructions or hints to the presenter to 
investigate the conflict more deeply? If so, when?   
5) Does the editor/producer give instructions or hints to the presenter to change 
topic during the programme recording? If so, when?   
6) Does the editor/producer give instructions or hints to the presenter / mediator 
to change the topic in order to guide the participant’s emotion?   
7) Is there a break during the filming?   
8) If there is a break, does the editor/mediator talk to parties to a dispute?   
9) Does any participant lose control of his/her emotions during the filming?   
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10) What does the producer / editor do if the participant lose control of their 
emotion  
11) Do both parties to a dispute accept the mediator’s suggestions?   
12) If any party refuses to accept the mediator’s suggestions, will the 
producer/editor try to persuade him/her to accept?   
13) If the mediation fails to reach an agreement, will the producer/editor ask 
participants pretend that they come to an agreement?   
14) How long does it take to finish the programme filming?   
15) Does the mediator continue to mediate after the filming?   
16) After the programme filming, do the parties to a dispute leave together 
peacefully  
17) What does the producer/editor say to the parties to a dispute after the filming?
  
Post-Production   
1) Have any parts of the programme been cut out?   
2) What kind of parts is cut out from the original recording tape?   
3) Does the editor change the order of the topics / issues in the programme?  





Appendix 3 Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide I 
Programme makers 
1) Can you tell me something about your role in the mediation programme? 
2) Can you describe the job function and responsibility of your job? 
3) How long have you been working for this programme? 
Mediators 
1) Why did you decide to join?  
2) Did you have experience in mediation before? (and how was that?) 
3) Does the Shanghai Justice Bureau give you suggestions regarding your mediation 
style? (what kind of relationship do you have with the SJB?) 
About: Production and Traditional Cultural Value 
4) We know that China has a long history of mediation, in your opinion, what do 
you think are the differences between television mediation and traditional 
mediation? 
5) In your opinion, why do people choose to come to the television programme for 
mediation rather than other options?  
6) In this television programme, people talk about their family issues in public, 
which may be regarded as ‘losing face’ in our traditional culture. In this sense, 
this programme may look contrary to traditional culture value. What is your 
opinion about this? What do you think about the ‘face’ problem of these 
mediation seekers?  
7) What kind of Chinese cultural values do you think is reflected in this 
programme?  
8) What do you think of the role television plays in the mediation show? (In what 
ways does it affect or improve or entertainise the mediation effect?) 
About: Social and Political issues 
9) What issues do you think are mostly put forward for mediation? 
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10) Are there any special or unforgettable case / experiences in your past work？
What is it about?  
11) Are there issues not being discussed? What are they about (probe: re the 
authorities, etc.?) 
12) Who decides what issues are up for mediation (probe: influence by official 
mediation bureau, by TV authorities, others)? 
13) In the programme there is a mediation agreement presented for both parties to 
sign. When did you prepare that agreement? Are the details in the agreement 
discussed in advance? And if so, with whom? 
About: Entertainisation 
14) What do you think about the rating of this programme? 
15) What do you think attracts people to watch this programme? 





Interview Guide II 
Audience Mediators 
1) Can you tell me how you joined today’s programme? (did you call the hotline to 
join or some episode editor selected you?) 
2) Is this the first time you join this programme as an audience mediator? 
3) Did you have experience in mediation before? 
About: Traditional Cultural Value 
4) We know that China has a long history of mediation, in your opinion, what do 
you think are the differences between television mediation and traditional 
mediation? 
5) In your opinion, why do people come to the television programme for 
mediation? 
6) In this television programme, people talk about their family issues in public, 
which is regarded as ‘losing face’ in our traditional culture. In this sense, this 
programme may look contrary to traditional culture values. What is your opinion 
about this? What do you think about the ‘face’ problem of these mediation 
seekers? 
7) What kind of Chinese cultural values do you think is reflected in this 
programme? 
8) What do you think the role that television plays in the mediation show? (Does it 
affect or improve or entertainise the mediation effect?) 
About: Social and Political issues 
9) What issues do you think are mostly put forward for mediation? 
10) Do you think that there are some issues not being discussed? What are they 
about (probe: re the authorities, etc.?) 
11) What issues do you think should be added or discussed more in this 
programme? 
12) If your family of friends have disputes, will you recommend them to come to this 





13) What do you think of this experience as an audience mediator? 
14) What attracts you to watch this programme? 




Appendix 4 Interviewee List  
 
  
Date Intrviewee No. Description
2010-12-10 & 2011-10-09 1 Producer
2011-10-23 2 Director (chief)
2011-10-13 3 Director
2011-10-13 4 Director
2011-10-23 5 Director (senior)
2011-10-13 6 Hotline Receptionist
2011-10-14 7 Show Presenter
2011-10-23 8 Cameraman
2011-10-17 9 Ordinary Mediator
2011-10-17 10 Ordinary Mediator
2011-10-17 11 Ordinary Mediator
2011-10-18 12 Ordinary Mediator
2011-10-20 13 Audience Commentator
2011-10-20 14 Hotline Receptionist
2011-10-18 15 TV Mediator
2011-10-21 16 Audience Commentator
2011-10-21 17 Audience Commentator
2011-10-14 18 TV Mediator
2011-10-22 19 TV Mediator
2011-10-21 20 Audience Commentator
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Appendix 5 A Full List of XLNJ Episodes in 2013 
Note: Special issues on national holidays are highlighted below. 
Issue 
number 
Date Title Ratings 
1790 1.1 《新老娘舅》元旦特别节目 4.40 
1791 1.2 我就是麻辣娘舅 万峰 4.30 
1792 1.3 知心大姐暖人心 蔚兰 4.30 
1793 1.4 聚少离多 情转薄 6.00 
1794 1.5 结婚几十年为钱吵不停？ 5.20 
1795 1.6 女友要上“达人秀”（上） 5.40 
1796 1.7 女友要上“达人秀”（下） 5.50 
1804 1.15 结婚几十年 究竟谁出轨？ 5.80 
1805 1.16 老公遇到旧情人 我就去流浪！ 6.10 
1806 1.17 赌徒的最后忏悔能否留住亲情？ 4.50 
1807 1.18 花心老公的最后保证能否相信？ 4.20 
1808 1.19 父母偏心我就放煤气？ 5.00 
1809 1.20 孝顺孙子为何痛哭流涕？ 6.40 
1810 1.21 我爱妻子胜过我的生命 5.80 
1818 1.29 90 后女孩儿的叛逆“复仇”之路（下） 6.30 
1819 1.30 30 岁再婚夫妻为何又走离婚路？ 5.20 
1820 1.31 超生家庭遭遇煤气爆炸后 5.40 
1821 2.1 “偷瞄”丈夫就挨打？ 4.90 
1822 2.2 我向婆婆吐口水！ 5.40 
1823 2.3 为何丈夫只顾父母却冷落我？ 4.20 
1824 2.4 妻子竟为打麻将不要这个家？ 4.60 
1832 2.12 老娘舅回娘家 3 梁山伯与祝英台 3.00 
1833 2.13 好赌前夫别烦我 4.90 
1834 2.14 妻子为何不愿上班？ 6.90 
1835 2.15 产后抑郁症毁了我们的感情？ 6.10 
1836 2.16 大人小孩都任性 85 后婚姻遭瓶颈 5.00 
1837 2.17 我养了两个“白眼狼”？（上） 6.80 
1838 2.18 我养了两个“白眼狼”？（下） 6.50 
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1846 2.26 丈夫十年不回家 我要跟他离婚！（下） 5.90 
1847 2.27 “错误”的婚姻割裂母女情 4.00 
1848 2.28 “歇斯底里”的丈夫毁了我们的家？（上） 4.70 
1849 3.1 “歇斯底里”的丈夫毁了我们的家？（下） 7.20 
1850 3.2 80 岁老公为何离家不归？ 5.90 
1851 3.3 男友为我离婚 为何又抛弃我？（上） 5.50 
1852 3.4 男友为我离婚 为何又抛弃我？（下） 5.30 
1860 3.12 “金龟婿”不懂“灰姑娘”的心（上） 5.20 
1861 3.13 “金龟婿”不懂“灰姑娘”的心（下） 6.40 
1862 3.14 花甲老公去了 KTV 之后（上） 5.80 
1863 3.15 花甲老公去了 KTV 之后（下） 5.80 
1864 3.16 坐拥千万家产为何守不住婚姻？（上） 6.60 
1865 3.17 坐拥千万家产为何守不住婚姻？（下） 6.50 
1866 3.18 为了孙子我与全家为敌（上） 4.60 
1874 3.26 丈夫小气还是妻子太挥霍？（下） 6.00 
1875 3.27 跟我谈恋爱为何前女友还要叫你去开房？ 4.80 
1876 3.28 叫你爸妈死 跟我去贵州？ 4.40 
1877 3.29 神秘骚扰短信幕后黑手究竟是谁？ 4.90 
1878 3.30 妻子曾为我自杀 如今为何变了心？ 4.60 
1879 3.31 调解前夜 仓促离婚为哪般？ 4.60 
1880 4.1 他老婆一走 就会娶我？（上） 4.70 
1888 4.9 大年三十 小夫妻为何被妈赶出门？ 5.14 
1889 4.10 因为我的病 继父就要与母亲离婚（上） 5.54 
1890 4.11 因为我的病 继父就要与母亲离婚（下） 4.57 
1891 4.12 最爱的人爱上了别人？ 4.83 
1892 4.13 老婆的女儿我搞不定？ 4.02 
1893 4.14 妻子被强暴之后 5.04 
1894 4.15 爸爸为何险将我的眼打瞎？（上） 5.18 
1902 4.23 惨烈家暴妻子被打住院 丈夫身陷囹圄（上） 5.93 
1903 4.24 惨烈家暴妻子被打住院 丈夫身陷囹圄（下） 5.66 
1904 4.25 泼辣老婆为何逼得父母无家可归？ 5.02 
1905 4.26 丈夫难忘前女友 5.41 
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1906 4.27 每月 500 元 刚够吃饭不许乱花！ 4.40 
1907 4.28 丈夫为何教唆 6 岁幼女去讨债？ 4.85 
1908 4.29 “五一劳动节特别节目”买房卖房添烦恼（上） 3.67 
1916 5.7 儿子我要为你还几十万？ 4.50 
1917 5.8 我深爱的男人原来有老婆（上） 6.69 
1918 5.9 我深爱的男人原来有老婆（下） 5.53 
1919 5.10 还不了钱只能跳楼 4.37 
1920 5.11 85 后小夫妻怀孕不久为何老公却要卖婚房？ 4.07 
1921 5.12 双胞胎姐妹花相煎何太急？ 5.45 
1922 5.13 妻子打丈夫 竟然打了 36 年？ 4.32 
1930 5.21 85 后小娇妻难忍硕士丈夫规矩多？（上） 4.18 
1931 5.22 85 后小娇妻难忍硕士丈夫规矩多？（下） 5.54 
1932 5.23 温柔洗脚妹婚后竟成“暴力狂”？（上） 3.83 
1933 5.24 温柔洗脚妹婚后竟成“暴力狂”？（下） 5.16 
1934 5.25 相好十年为何还不承认是我男友？ 4.08 
1935 5.26 与继母不合却逼继母与父亲复婚？ 5.70 
1936 5.27 好心做红娘为何还要被逼写检讨？（上） 4.46 
1944 6.4 新婚之夜婆婆为何冲入洞房？（下） 4.36 
1945 6.5 “强势”公公遭遇“敏感”丈人夫妻两家闹翻天（上） 6.01 
1946 6.6 “强势”公公遭遇“敏感”丈人夫妻两家闹翻天（下） 5.35 
1947 6.7 乖儿子结婚竟“逼疯”老母亲？ 6.66 
1948 6.8 泼辣儿媳为何不能容忍公公？ 5.42 
1949 6.9 小娇妻为何吃不饱饭还被丈夫赶走？ 5.32 
1950 6.10 妻子结婚时竟然就已怀孕孩子不是我的？ 3.50 
1958 6.18 “千万富婆”为何有一把辛酸泪？ 5.77 
1959 6.19 85 后新娘离奇淹死谁才是“凶手”？（上） 4.95 
1960 6.20 85 后新娘离奇淹死谁才是“凶手”？（下） 6.17 
1961 6.21 老婆不在身边你就偷偷找女网友？ 4.05 
1962 6.22 洗脚妹抢走了我老公？ 4.15 
1963 6.23 丈夫笑里藏刀竟要把我逼疯？（上） 5.79 
1964 6.24 丈夫笑里藏刀竟要把我逼疯？（下） 5.17 
1972 7.2 儿子在棋牌室认识了离过婚的女人之后 4.47 
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1973 7.3 妻子为啥扮“小三”丈夫竟然中了计（上） 4.50 
1974 7.4 妻子为啥扮“小三”丈夫竟然中了计（下） 5.47 
1975 7.5 妻子究竟为了什么神秘失踪？ 4.98 
1976 7.6 80 后小娇妻难忍 51 岁丈夫太严厉？ 4.61 
1977 7.7 大丈夫在家“买汰烧”为啥难讨女友欢心？ 4.75 
1978 7.8 老公签了一份神秘协议引发全家闹翻天（上） 5.20 
1986 7.16 老婆你心里到底藏着什么秘密？ 4.46 
1987 7.17 有妈为何成“孤儿”母亲连弃三子为哪般？（上） 4.38 
1988 7.18 有妈为何成“孤儿”母亲连弃三子为哪般？（下） 4.39 
1989 7.19 为何我要带着现妻找前妻？ 5.39 
1990 7.20 30 年夫妻离婚容易复婚难？ 3.87 
1991 7.21 85 后美丽小妈妈为何要放弃幸福生活？（上） 4.69 
1992 7.22 85 后美丽小妈妈为何要放弃幸福生活？（下） 4.93 
2000 7.30 “美人”嫁给“英雄”后能收获幸福吗？（下） 5.22 
2001 7.31 大我 35 岁的丈夫有了私生子？ 5.10 
2002 8.1 丈夫的前妻为何指控我“第三者”插足？ 5.42 
2003 8.2 老公你再这么惯孩子我就“跳楼”（上） 5.02 
2004 8.3 老公你再这么惯孩子我就“跳楼”（下） 3.48 
2005 8.4 老公和弟媳到底有没有关系？（上） 5.99 
2006 8.5 老公和弟媳到底有没有关系？（下） 5.17 
2014 8.13 男友竟然曾经非礼我？ 5.41 
2015 8.14 迎娶 90 后女友为何这么难？ 5.60 
2016 8.15 重症监护室里的“植物人”父亲到底谁来管？（上） 6.14 
2017 8.16 重症监护室里的“植物人”父亲到底谁来管？（下） 5.16 
2018 8.17 我要搬回家 弟媳妇就打我？ 4.95 
2019 8.18 到底是研究生丈夫不顾家还是妻子想太多？ 4.90 
2020 8.19 19 岁小妈妈竟被生母推入“火坑”？（上） 5.37 
2028 8.27 80 后儿媳怒骂公婆只因对方管太多？（下） 5.59 
2029 8.28 卖房给爱人换肾爱人去世却要被继子赶走？（上） 5.78 
2030 8.29 卖房给爱人换肾爱人去世却要被继子赶走？（下） 6.46 
2031 8.30 “抠门”老公让我实在无法忍受？ 5.17 
2032 8.31 这个女人是表妹还是情人？ 3.49 
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2033 9.1 90 后美女淘宝店主为何恋爱父母都反对？（上） 4.74 
2034 9.2 90 后美女淘宝店主为何恋爱父母都反对？（下） 4.96 
2042 9.10 88 年女孩嫁给“富二代”真的幸福吗？（上） 4.51 
2043 9.11 88 年女孩嫁给“富二代”真的幸福吗？（下） 6.34 
2044 9.12 老公为何要和比自己小 22 岁的“富婆”离婚？ 5.15 
2045 9.13 深爱老婆的男人为何也会移情别恋？ 3.80 
2046 9.14 前夫究竟为何阻止女儿结婚？（上） 4.27 
2047 9.14 前夫究竟为何阻止女儿结婚？（下） 5.14 
2048 9.15 老夫妻为何复婚一年又闹离婚？ 4.26 
2049 9.16 妻子一周五天住娘家究竟有何“阴谋”？ 4.95 
2057 9.24 女婿为何将岳父打得满头是血倒在地？ 3.88 
2058 9.25 父母为何不喜欢这个外来媳？ 5.82 
2059 9.26 丈夫的“神秘录音”把我逼出忧郁症 3.67 
2060 9.27 儿子要玩游戏就把我赶出门？（上） 4.59 
2061 9.28 儿子要玩游戏就把我赶出门？（下） 4.23 
2062 9.29 公婆管太多日子怎么过？（上） 5.39 
2063 9.30 公婆管太多日子怎么过？（下） 4.77 
2071 10.8 爷爷为何“不待见”刚出生的小孙女？（下） 6.53 
2072 10.9 我已一无所有爱女竟“落井下石”？（上） 5.94 
2073 10.10 我已一无所有爱女竟“落井下石”？（下） 4.21 
2074 10.11 父亲为何只要女人不要儿子？（上） 3.89 
2075 10.12 父亲为何只要女人不要儿子？（下） 5.60 
2076 10.13 为何买瓶水还要被老公骂？ 5.72 
2077 10.14 老婆竟和别人“结婚”还发我喜帖？ 4.90 
2085 10.22 准丈母娘为何看不惯留洋硕士“毛脚女婿”？（上） 5.25 
2086 10.23 准丈母娘为何看不惯留洋硕士“毛脚女婿”？（下） 4.23 
2087 10.24 老父母被迫卖房逃命竟是女儿一手造成？（上） 5.57 
2088 10.25 老父母被迫卖房逃命竟是女儿一手造成？（下） 5.57 
2089 10.26 有爸有妈的孩子为何还要姑姑照顾？ 5.13 
2090 10.27 儿媳领了“离婚证”为何还没离婚？（上） 6.07 
2091 10.28 儿媳领了“离婚证”为何还没离婚？（下） 5.19 
2099 11.5 都是独生子女凭啥家务我多做？ 5.30 
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2100 11.6 得了经适房还问我要 50 万？ 6.38 
2101 11.7 80 后小夫妻离婚两年男方为何还死缠？ 5.27 
2102 11.8 老公为何一喝酒就拿我撒气？ 5.22 
2103 11.9 离婚夫妻为何纠缠不休？ 4.19 
2104 11.10 妻子竟然把丈夫逼到浴室里过夜？ 4.96 
2105 11.11 不称职的爸爸娶了新媳妇之后 4.71 
2113 11.19 离婚夫妻为何不好聚好散非要同一屋檐下？（上） 4.32 
2114 11.20 离婚夫妻为何不好聚好散非要同一屋檐下？（下） 5.24 
2115 11.21 时髦外婆爱上视频聊天引发老伴满腹怨言？（上） 4.87 
2116 11.22 时髦外婆爱上视频聊天引发老伴满腹怨言？（下） 4.27 
2117 11.23 母亲真的是被儿子逼死的吗？ 5.86 
2118 11.24 你要男网友我就要前女友 6.58 
2119 11.25 18 岁妙龄女友难道只爱我的钱？（上） 4.59 
2127 12.3 85 后小夫妻为何“冷战”已成家常便饭？（下） 4.89 
2128 12.4 这位 86 岁的离休老干部为何不能安享晚年？ 5.72 
2129 12.5 十多年的痛苦婚姻令顾家丈夫挥起拳头 4.65 
2130 12.6 亲爸爸为何要毁我爱情赶我走？ 5.39 
2131 12.7 我还是不是你最深爱的“小白龙”？ 5.23 
2132 12.8 弟弟竟然“黑心”虐待八旬老父？（上） 6.06 
2133 12.9 弟弟竟然“黑心”虐待八旬老父？（下） 5.01 
2141 12.17 母亲身患重病女儿为何“见死不救”？（下） 6.02 
2142 12.18 小夫妻结婚半年竟从未同住亲家还大打出手？（上） 4.75 
2143 12.19 小夫妻结婚半年竟从未同住亲家还大打出手？（下） 6.00 
2144 12.20 忍无可忍离婚一个月为何还要给前夫一个机会？（上） 5.33 
2145 12.21 忍无可忍离婚一个月为何还要给前夫一个机会？（下） 5.14 
2146 12.22 大哥惹祸上身逼得我妻子要跳楼？（上） 4.62 





Appendix 6 Questionnaire for online survey  
1. Please indicate your gender: 
1) Male 
2) Female 
2. When were you born?  
Year 19___ 
3. What is the highest education that you have attained? If you are a student, please 
indicate the highest level you expect to complete 
1) No formal education  
2) primary school  
3) secondary school 
4) senior high school 
5) university or colleges  
6) master’s degree and above  
7)  other (please indicate)___ 
4. a. In which Province / Municipality / Autonomous Regions are you living 
now?________ 
b. And how long have you been living there? ____ year  
5. What kind of hukou do you have? 
1) Urban Hukou 
2) Rural Hukou 
6. In the last week, you have watched _____days TV. 
7. Yesterday, how many hours did you spend watching TV? _____ hours 
8. How often do you watch the following types of television programmes? 
 Always  Sometimes Rarely  Never 
a. Fashion / Music / Arts / 
Celebrities  
1 2 3 4 
b. Sport (e.g. sports news; sports 
competition) 
1 2 3 4 
c. Reality television and talent 
shows 
1 2 3 4 
d. News / Information programme 1 2 3 4 
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e. Programme about people's life in 
society (e.g. XLNJ; Bang NvLang) 
1 2 3 4 
f. Crime / Law (e.g. Jinri Shuo Fa/ 
Law today; Anjian Jujiao/Focus) 
1 2 3 4 
g. TV Drama / Soap Opera 1 2 3 4 
9. Have you heard of XLNJ television programme? 
1) Yes (continues to Q10) 
2) No (ends here) 
10. Have you watched XLNJ before? 
1) Yes (continues to Q10a) 
2) No (continues to Q10b) 
10a. if yes, how many times did you watch this programme in the last week? ______ 
times. (Continues to Q11.) 
10b. if no, why do you not watch this programme? The following statements are 
some reasons; please indicate how much these reasons are like your own reasons for 























a. Because I think it is 
staged and 
exaggerated. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Because it is wasting 
time and I have better 
things to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Because nobody I know 
watch this programme. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Because it is not useful 
to me at all. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
11. Why do you watch XLNJ? The following statements are some reasons, please 

























a. Because it’s interesting 
and it entertains me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Because my family 
member or other people I 
know watch it, so I can 
discuss it with them.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Because it’s a habit, and 
I have nothing better to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Because it shows how 
other people deal with the 
same problems I have, so I 
could learn about what 
could happen to me.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 



















a. Causes or reasons of the 
disputes  
1 2 3 4  8 
b. The procedure of 
mediation 
1 2 3 4  8 
c. Audience mediators’ 
comments 
1 2 3 4  8 




1 2 3 4  8 
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13. The following statements listed some different opinions towards this programme, 


















e. Civil mediation is 
serious and should 
not be made into 
entertainment on 
TV. 
1 2 3 4 
 
8 





1 2 3 4 
 
8 
g. I will not choose 
mediation on TV 
myself, but it is fun 
to watching others’ 
disputes. 
1 2 3 4 
 
8 
h. I think such 
mediation 
programme to some 
extent helps reduce 
the number of 
lawsuits. 
1 2 3 4 
 
8 
i. This programme 
evokes moral 
considerations in 
society, such as 
issues regarding the 





respect for the 
elderly; loyalty in 
marriage, etc. 
j. The audience 
mediators say what 
I want to say. 
1 2 3 4 
 
8 
k. This mediation 
show tells people to 
be understanding 
and forgiving, which 
is a part of Chinese 
traditional virtue. 
1 2 3 4 
 
8 
l. I think telling your 
family disputes on 
TV is losing face and 
damages the family 
reputation.  
1 2 3 4 
 
8 
14. The following are some different types of disputes; will you be interested if these 


















a. Neighbour disputes 
(e.g. Regarding the 
use of public 
places) 
1 2 3 4  8 
b. Disputes regarding 
the dividing and 
inheriting of house 
properties. 
1 2 3 4  8 
c. Disputes between 1 2 3 4  8 
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residents living in 
aging buildings in 




15. Please indicate for each statements do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 















a. If any conflict occurs, we should 
ask senior people to uphold 
justice. 
1 2 3 4 
b. Even if parents’ demands are 
unreasonable, children should still 
do what they ask. 
1 2 3 4 
c. When a mother-in-law and a 
daughter-in-law come into 
conflict, even if the mother-in-law 
is in the wrong, the husband 
should still persuade his wife to 
obey his mother. 
1 2 3 4 
d. A person should not insist on his 
own opinion if people around him 
disagree.  
1 2 3 4 
e. When interest groups operate 
and compete in a locale, they will 
damage everyone’s interests.  
1 2 3 4 
f. The state is like a big machine and 
the individual a small cog, and 
1 2 3 4 
245 
 
thus should have no independent 
status. 
g. People like me have no say in 
politics and government affairs. 
1 2 3 4 
h. Government officials don’t care 
too much about what people like 
me think. 
1 2 3 4 
i. I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country. 
1 2 3 4 
j. I consider myself to be well 
qualified to participate in politics. 
1 2 3 4 
k. Politics and government are so 
complicated that I cannot really 
understand what is going on. 
1 2 3 4 
16. Last month, did you hear anything through the ‘grapevine’ concerning economics, 
political affairs, or society? 
1) Yes 2) No 8) Don’t know 
17. Do you talk about political issues and national affairs with other people? 
Often Sometimes Occasionally Never 
 Don’t 
know 
1 2 3 4  8 














a. The economy 
(stable and 
high level of 
growth) 
1 2 3 4  8 
b. Public safety  1 2 3 4  8 





19. Have you experienced mediation before? 
1) Yes 
2) No  
19a.  If yes, were you satisfied with the outcome of the most recent 
mediation? 
Very satisfied Fairly satisfied 
Not so 
satisfied 




1 2 3 4  8 
20. Ms. Wang, about 50 years old, is the second eldest in her family. Recently she has 
been caught up in a family dispute with her two siblings regarding the distribution 
of family properties and who should take care and support their 80-year-old 
mother. Their mum has a small flat in the old urban area where has been recently 
included in a relocation program. Thus their mum is expected to receive an 
amount of compensation, which is about 2 million RMB. Ms. Wang says that the 
one who is willing to take care of their old mum should get a little bit more of the 
heritage. But her younger sister insists that the heritage should be divided equally, 
while the elder brother says he should get more because he is the only son in the 
family. They have several arguments about this issue and the dispute is getting 
more and more serious. 
20a. which action you would suggest Ms. Wang to take in the face of such 
dispute? 
1) Mediation through People’s mediation committee in your local community 
2) Go to court, initiating a lawsuit 
3) Petition 
4) Protest 
5) Other (please indicate_____) 
20b. what is your reason for the above choice? (maximum 3 choices) 
1) I trust in the court 
2) They have higher authority  
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3) fairness of the court process 
4) low costs of money 
5) I trust in the mediator  
6) effectiveness  
7) good reputation 
8) geographically closer 
9) it takes less time, quicker 
10) Other (please indicate____) 
21. Mr. Zhang established labour relation with a branch stock exchange office 
Shanghai in 2000. On a working day in February last year, Mr. Zhang and two 
colleagues went to the manager’s office reporting work progress. At that time, a 
client was in the office and refused to leave, claiming that has business to discuss 
with the manager. Zhang and his colleagues were in a hurry to see the manager 
and argued with the client. The dispute culminated in both parties throwing chairs 
to each other. Later that night, the client went to the hospital, claiming that he 
had a heart attack. The stock exchange office paid the client 50,000 RMB 
compensation for medical expenses, nutritional costs and other expenses.  
Three months after this incident, the office dismissed Zhang for serious violations 
of principles and terminated labour contracts with the other two colleagues on an 
agreement. Mr. Zhang refused to accept this decision and appealed it to the 
higher authorities  in the company, asking for an investigation. He said that the 
client appeared in the manager’s office very frequently, which affect their normal 
work. The dispute started because he wanted the client to leave so he can do his 
work. He argued that the manager should take the main responsibility for this and 
asked for restore the labour relations. The branch office refused his appeal.  
Zhang then sent letters to every staff in the company and also report the case to 
the relevant district department. He believed that the stock exchange office 
illegally terminated the labour relationship and asked for an amount of 220,000 
RMB compensation. 
21a. which action you would suggest Mr. Zhang to take in the face of such dispute? 
1) Mediation through People’s mediation committee in your local community 





5) Other (please indicate_____) 
21b. what is your reason for the above choice? (maximum 3 choices) 
1) I trust in the court 
2) They have higher authority  
3) fairness of the court process 
4) low costs of money 
5) I trust in the mediator  
6) effectiveness  
7) good reputation 
8) geographically closer 
9) it takes less time, quicker 
10) Other (please indicate____) 
22. Are you?  
1) a member of CPC  
2) a Youth League member  
3) a member of the United Front (minor parties) 
4) common people 
23. What is your current employment situation?  
1) Employed 
2) Self employed  
3) Retired/pensioned  
4) Housewife/househusband not otherwise employed  
5) Student 
6) Unemployed  
7) Other (write in):______________________  
24. What is your current/before retired profession? __________________ 
25. Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or 
industry, or for a private non-profit organization? If you do not work currently, 
characterize your major work in the past.  
1) Party/State Unit 
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2) State-owned enterprise  
3) Private business or industry  
4) joint venture/foreign  
5) Private non-profit organization  
6) None of above  
7) Don’t know 
26. What is the average monthly income of your family?  
1) under 2000 RMB 
2) 2000-4999 RMB 
3) 5000-7999 RMB 
4) 8000-10999 RMB 
5) 11000-13999 RMB 
6) 14000 RMB and above  




Appendix 7 Focus Group Question Guide 
Entertaining appeal and the show 
The goals 
1. What is the entertaining appeal of the show (Participants’ views on the 
entertainment provided by the show) 
2. Participant’s uses and gratifications of the show 
Qs asked in Focus Group 
1) As we know, the XLNJ aired at 6:30p.m. and there are other programmes 
broadcasted at this prime time period, such as news programme, why you 
choose to watch this mediation show over other programmes? 
2) Is there any other programme you think is similar/comparable to the XLNJ 
show? 
3) What label would you give to XLNJ show, for example news, entertainment, 
information, talk show, reality show, etc.?  
4) There is one programme called XLNJ broadcasted on the Entertainment channel, 
have you watched this programme? and how often do you watch this show in a 
week? 
5) In your leisure time, will you discuss with others about those cases that 
impressed you?   
For less-frequent viewers group:  
6) Can you talk about your impression of the XLNJ show? for example, what kind of 
show it is, and what is the target audience of the show, in your opinion? 
 
Social and political aspects 
The goals 
3. Participants’ opinions on dispute issues on the show 
4. How do they perceive the aim of the show (while the audiences learn about legal 
and mediation knowledge from the show, whether do they consider it as a goal 
set by the programme makers) 
251 
 
5. Participants’ views regarding the social and political influence of the mediation 
show 
Qs asked in Focus Group 
7) Since you might have watched a lot cases on XLNJ, in your memory, what kind of 
issues were often discussed on TV? 
8) Do you think these kind of issues common in the real life in society?  
9) Among the episodes you have watched, which one impressed you a lot?  
10) What influence do you think that the televised mediation of conflicts will have in 
society? 
11) Do you think whether the televised mediation can be a useful solution for family 
disputes? 
12) What influence do you think that the televised mediation of conflicts will have in 
society?  
13) In your neighborhood, what do you normally do when there is dispute? 




6. Attitude towards discussing personal issues on TV, i.e. face-saving/losing issues. 
7. Whether participants find the show promoting traditional cultural values? 
Qs asked in Focus Group 
 
15) When you discuss with your friends or relatives, would you talk about the 
disputant go on TV? 
16)  What do you think about discussing family disputes on television? (losing face? 
Or acceptable?) 
17)  In your opinion, why do people go on television for solutions? 






Appendix 8 ANOVA Analysis for Watching Frequency of XLNJ between 



















Note: N=185, *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
College 4.00
Bachelor's Degree 3.68
How many times watch XLNJ in a week
Education Groups
Mean
Senior higher school 
and under
4.98























Note: N=175; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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4.30











Appendix 10 Correlations between Political Efficacy, Political Interest, and 













1 0.156* 0.097 0.132*
Internal Political 
Efficacy
- 1 -0.011 0.324***
Satisfication with 
society
- - 1 -0.239***
Political Interest - - - 1























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 14 Description of Focus Group Participants 
Number Surname* Gender Age Education level 
1 Zhang Male 33 Master 
2 Huang Male 31 Bachelor 
3 Yang Male 37 Bachelor 
4 Li Female 27 Bachelor 
5 Kong Female 58 Bachelor 
6 Cheng Female 23 Bachelor 
7 Zhao Male 53 Senior High School 
8 Xiong Male 38 College 
9 Tang Male 31 Vocational School 
10 Luo Female 20 College 
11 Liu Female 69 Junior high School 
12 Sun Female 30 Vocational School 
13 Yang Male 53 Bachelor 
14 Mi Male 46 Bachelor 
15 Shi Male 28 Master 
16 Liu Female 33 Bachelor 
17 Du Female 42 Bachelor 
18 Yang Female 61 Master 
19 Zhang Male 49 Senior High School 
20 Luo Male 26 College 
21 Cai Male 50 Senior High School 
22 Huang Female 28 Vocational School 
23 Zhao Female 23 Vocational School 
24 Ji Female 25 College 
Note: 
    
* Pseudonyms are provided here to protect the confidentialiy and anonymity of participants. 
#1-#6 participants, conducted on Saturday, 28 sept. 2013, frequent-viewers (higher education) 
#7-#12 participants, conducted on Saturday, 28 sept. 2013, frequent-viewers (lower education) 
#13-#18 participants, conducted on Sunday , 29 sept. 2013, non-frequent-viewers (higher education) 




Since 2008, with the market opened up for privatisation and commercialisation, mediation 
TV-shows have been highly popular on Chinese television. These shows respond to the 
then Hu-Wen government’s demands for establishing and maintaining a “harmonious 
society”, but also integrating the audience’s interests and needs in learning about others’ 
life and obtaining information about it. The combination of traditional Confucian 
mediation and television entertainment gives rise to latent tensions in three respects: 
Firstly, these programmes blur the boundary between politics and popular culture by 
incorporating entertainment elements with a supposedly serious mediation process. 
Secondly, it seems paradoxical for these shows to promote harmony while their content 
focuses on family disputes and conflicts which reflect the consequences of social and 
political changes following economic reforms. And thirdly, publicizing private issues on 
television is contrary to the nation’s traditional Confucianism culture of “saving face”. 
The mediation show seems not consistent with traditional values people were taught.  
This study focuses on the production and consumption of New Elder Uncle (Xin Lao 
Niang Jiu, XLNJ) – the first mediation show that collaborates with Shanghai Justice 
Bureau and broadcasts on Entertainment Channel - exploring answers to questions raised 
from the mentioned entertainization, social and political, and cultural issues. Findings 
suggest that the media are more independent economically, but not politically. The 
marketization of the television industry and the broad political environment forces them 
to produce contents that must satisfy both the needs of the market and of the authorities. 
Mediation, in this study, turns out to be the key to pleasing both parties, used as a delicate 
combination of education, control, propaganda and entertainment. The show’s viewers 
(respondents from surveys and focus groups we conducted) obtain enjoyment from the 
dramatic storyline and at the same time they are aware of the “harmonious” image the 
show aims to build. It does not seem difficult for the audience to deal with the cultural 
contention as they distinguish moral face from social face, and they enjoy the show as 
long as the ‘face’ issue does not concern themselves. The results also suggest that the 
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political goal in an entertainment format is both acceptable and can be convincing to the 
audience as a source of useful information. 
By comparing programme production with audience perceptions, this research 
contributes to the scholarly discussion on political communication in China and other 
Communist authoritarian regimes as well as the effects of entertainization of media for 
politics. 
The mediation show in this study provides a prism through which to understand 
the subtle relation between the media and the authoritarian state in the course of 
economic reforms. After more than three decades, the government perceived social 
discontent stemming from the consequences of economic reforms. The then Hu-Wen 
administration turned to the Confucian ideas of equality and balance for possible 
solutions. Their decision to ‘build a harmonious society’ implied that there are 
‘unharmonious’ problems associated with marketisation and rapid economic growth. 
Building and maintaining social stability is partly an effort for the then Hu-Wen 
government to preserve Communist rule in China (Zhu, 2008), but also pivotal to the 
realization of Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’. 
Meanwhile, the marketisation with Chinese characteristics does not change the 
ownership of television, which runs the risk of creating a dilemma between responsibility 
on the one hand and freedom on the other (Yin 2008). The proliferation of entertainment 
reality programmes is a consequence of the severe competition in the television market. 
Entertainment-oriented content is both politically safe and economically lucrative, which 
might be the logic behind the vibrant growth of these shows. However, at the same time 
the propaganda authorities were apparently concerned about the tendency of vulgar and 
‘excessive entertainisation’ (Bai 2015). More importantly, they expect the media to render 
social inequalities invisible rather than amplify them and to educate rather than deteriorate 
moral values. The relation between the media and the state seems to be reciprocal at this 
point, because the latter seems to be satisfied with the media’s role and considers it a 
helpful tool in strengthening a picture of harmonious society and responsive government. 
This study also adds a modest contribution to the existing literature on 
entertainment and politics in China, and life-counselling programmes in particular. 
Life-counselling shows like XLNJ manage to serve the twin masters of the party-state and 
the market: they pay attention to social issues and people’s grievances, but at the same 
time confine topics to a non-sensitive range and as such responding to the government’s 
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social governance campaign. These programmes defuse social conflicts by providing 
viewers with an impression that most problems and issues can be solved. Packaging their 
political intent in the format of entertainment, life-counselling shows like XLNJ provide 
advice on a wide range of ‘life issues’; from professionals or experts such as mediators, 
lawyers or psychologists, which can be arguably convincing for certain groups of viewers. 
As seen by the audience these programmes are not likely to have a hidden agenda beyond 
transmitting technical, scientific, objective and practical knowledge (Sun and Zhao 2009, 
Sun 2014, 2015).  
Compared with studies on media entertainment and politics in Western 
democracies where entertainment such as soft news is blamed for the portrayal of malaise 
that creates a constant ambience of public mistrust, this study suggests that this media 
malaise theory, developed in the liberal democracies, might not be automatically 
applicable to authoritarian states like China, where the situation seems to be the opposite: 
politics or information packaged in an entertainment format is more likely to be 
acceptable and seen as positive. This is partly because news in the government-run media 
is prone to censorship and thus have a notorious credibility problem (Shirk 2011). In a 
transition period towards marketisation with Chinese characteristics, the Party still 
attempts to maintain strict control, which gradually pushes the media towards the 
direction of entertainisation, as entertainment programmes will be less censored (Li 
2014a). The infotainment format like life-counselling programmes in a sense may be more 
informative than a news programme. They provide people with advice and create 
knowledge relevant to an individual’s life, and as such echo earlier studies in Western 





Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
Sinds 2008, met de markt opengesteld voor privatisering en commercialisering, is de 
Chinese televisiemarkt aan hevige concurrentie onderhevig waarbij vooral entertainment 
reality-programma’s zeer populair zijn geworden. Mediation shows, waarin live bemiddeld 
wordt tussen personen met conflicten, zijn daar een sprekend voorbeeld van. Deze shows 
spelen zowel een politieke als een sociale rol: ze voldoen aan de eisen van de toenmalige 
Hu-Wen-regering om een "harmonieuze samenleving" te bevorderen en te onderhouden, 
maar ook aan het doel het publiek te informeren en te leren over het leven van anderen 
en daarmee de belangen en behoeften van het publiek te integreren. De 
vermarkting-met-Chinese-trekken laat het staatseigendom van tv-kanalen echter onverlet 
en loopt daarmee het risico een dilemma te creëren tussen verantwoordelijkheid en 
vrijheid (Yin 2008).  
Tegelijkertijd geeft de combinatie van traditionele confucianistische bemiddeling en 
televisie-entertainment aanleiding tot latente spanningen op drie punten. Ten eerste 
vervagen deze programma's de grens tussen politiek en populaire cultuur door een serieus 
bemiddelingsproces te mengen met entertainment-elementen. Ten tweede tenderen de 
shows naar een paradox tussen harmonie en conflict: ze pretenderen het eerste te 
bevorderen door op het tweede te focusen, met  familiegeschillen en conflicten die vaak 
het gevolg zijn van sociale en politieke veranderingen na de economische hervormingen. 
Ten derde lijkt het openbaar communiceren van privé-problemen op de televisie in strijd 
met de traditionele confucianistische cultuur van ‘saving face’, geen gezichtsverlies lijden. 
De mediation show lijkt niet in overeenstemming met de traditionele waarden die worden 
onderwezen, te meer als het op een populariserende manier gebeurt. 
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de productie en consumptie van New Elder Uncle 
(Xin Lao Niang Jiu, XLNJ), een mediation show geproduceerd door een 
entertainmentkanaal in samenwerking met het Shanghai Justitice Bureau. Het richt zich in 
het bijzonder op de potentiële spanningen rond de genoemde entertainisering, sociale, 
politieke en culturele kwesties. Ingebed in theorieën over politiek, media en entertainment, 
en de uses and gratifications die mensen uit media halen, maakt het onderzoek gebruik van 
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interviews en documentenanalyse (voor de productiekant) en een gebruikerssurvey en 
focus groepen (voor de consumptiekant). De analyse leidt tot het volgende beeld.  
In de eerste plaats suggereren de resultaten dat de media economisch meer 
onafhankelijk zijn, maar politiek minder. Enerzijds bieden de autoriteiten ruimte, maar 
anderzijds, als ze bezorgd zijn over vulgaire en ‘excessive entertainisation’ (Bai 2015), dan 
is een enkel signaal genoeg om een en ander aan te passen. De logica achter de levendige 
groei van deze shows lijkt te verklaren uit het feit dat entertainment-gerichte inhoud 
zowel economisch lucratief als politiek relatief veilig is. De vermarkting van de 
televisie-industrie en het veranderende politieke klimaat dwingt hen om inhoudelijk te 
laveren tussen de behoeften van publiek en markt en de eisen van de overheid. Mediation 
blijkt de sleutel tot het behagen van beide partijen, in een fijngevoelige combinatie van 
educatie, controle, propaganda en entertainment.  
In de tweede plaats suggereren de resultaten ook dat het entertainment format het 
politieke doel niet in de weg staat: de show’s producenten hebben geen probleem met de 
focus op harmonie, ook in de keuze van issues, en het publiek herkent en waardeert de 
aantrekkelijkheid van het format en de educatieve functie. Een tegenstelling tussen 
harmonie en conflict wordt niet herkend, genegeerd of ontkend. De verwachting van de 
autoriteiten is dat de media sociale ongelijkheden eerder onzichtbaar maken dan ze te 
vergroten. Op dit punt lijken media en de autoriteiten een wederzijds belang te hebben; 
de laatsten zijn tevreden met de manier waarop de eersten bijdragen aan het beeld van een 
harmonieuze samenleving en een responsieve overheid. Voor het publiek is het 
entertainment format niet alleen acceptabel, maar zij zien het ook als een nuttige 
informatiebron. 
In de derde plaats genieten kijkers naar de show van de dramatische verhaallijn, 
terwijl zij zich tegelijkertijd bewust zijn van en instemmen met het "harmonieuze" beeld 
dat de show propageert. Het publiek lijkt geen moeite te hebben met de culturele 
tegenstelling die gezichtsverlies potentieel oproept, omdat het een onderscheid maakt 
tussen een moreel en een sociaal gezicht. Ze beleven plezier aan de show zolang het 
gezichtsverlies niet henzelf betreft 
Door de productie van programma’s te vergelijken met publiekspercepties, draagt 
dit onderzoek bij aan de onderbouwing van de wetenschappelijke discussie over politieke 
communicatie in China en andere communistische autoritaire regimes, als mede aan de 
studie naar de politieke effecten van vermarkting en entertainisering van de media. Het 
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rijkt een prisma aan, waardoor de subtiele relatie tussen media en autoritaire staat in een 
periode van sociale onvrede zijn te begrijpen. Voor mogelijke oplossing van de 
spanningen wendde de toenmalige Hu-Wen-regering zich tot de confucianistische ideeën 
van gelijkheid en evenwicht. Hun beslissing om te bouwen aan een ‘harmonieuze 
samenleving’ veronderstelt ‘onharmonieuze’ problemen die het gevolg zijn van 
vermarkting en snelle economische groei. Dit opbouwen en onderhouden van sociale 
stabiliteit was deels een poging van de Hu-Wen-regering om het communistische bewind 
in China te verstevigen (Zhu 2008), zoals het ook van cruciaal belang is  voor de 
verwezenlijking van Xi Jinping’s  'Chinese Droom'. 
Deze studie levert ook een bescheiden bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur over 
entertainment en politiek in China, en over service-programma’s zoals mediation shows in 
het bijzonder. Shows als XLNJ slagen er in om de twee meesters van partij/staat en markt 
te dienen: zij besteden aandacht aan sociale kwesties en grieven van de mensen, maar 
tegelijkertijd beperken zij onderwerpen tot niet-gevoelige zaken. Als zodanig 
beantwoorden zij aan de governance campagne van de regering. Deze programma’s maken 
sociale conflicten onschadelijk door kijkers de indruk te geven dat de meeste problemen 
op te lossen zijn. Door hun politieke bedoelingen in het format van entertainment te 
verpakken en door gebruik te maken van professionals als mediators, advocaten en 
psychologen die met overtuiging bepaalde publieksgroepen kunnen aanspreken, slagen 
service-shows als XLNJ er in advies te geven over een breed scala aan ‘levensvragen’. 
Voor het publiek kennen deze programma’s geen verborgen agenda naast het overdragen 
van objectieve, wetenschappelijke en praktische kennis (Zon en Zhao 2009; Zon 2014, 
2015). 
In studies over media-entertainment en politiek in westerse liberale democratieën 
worden entertainment en ‘soft’ nieuws vaak verantwoordelijk gehouden voor de 
‘over-verbeelding’ van narigheid en een daaruit voortvloeiende sfeer van publiek 
wantrouwen. Deze studie suggereert dat deze media malaise theorie niet automatisch 
toepasbaar is op autoritaire staten zoals China. De situatie lijkt hier eerder het 
tegenovergestelde: politiek of informatie verpakt in een entertainment-format is 
waarschijnlijk meer aanvaardbaar en wordt als positief gezien door zowel publiek als 
autoriteiten. Dit komt deels doordat nieuws in de door de regering gecontroleerde media 
gevoelig is voor censuur en dus een geloofwaardigheidsprobleem heeft (Shirk 2011). In 
een overgangsperiode naar vermarkting-met-Chinese-trekken probeert de partij nog 
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steeds strikte controle uit te oefenen, wat de media in de richting van entertainisation dwingt; 
dat soort programma’s kent minder censuur (Li 2014a). Daarmee kan het infotainment 
format in zekere zin informatiever zijn dan het nieuws-format: ze geven relevant advies 
en creëren nuttige kennis, die wordt gebruikt en gewaardeerd. Deze resultaten sluiten 
daarbij aan bij wat in eerdere studies in West-Europa is gevonden (zie Brants 1998; Brants 
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